AN EXPLORATION OF GILLIGAN'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AS APPLIED TO TRADITIONALLY AGED, FULL-TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS

By

MARY LYNN WILLIAMSON

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1994

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Completion of this dissertation and doctoral program would not have been possible without many wonderful individuals whom it has been my privilege to know. I am indebted to Dr. Jim Wattenbarger for his unwavering belief and encouragement, to Dr. David Honeyman for his ever ready assistance (and forgiveness for not doing a financial study), to Dr. Art Sandeen who taught me how to be a vice president, and to Dr. Jim Pitts for his support.

Without the young men and women who shared the moral dilemmas of their lives, there would be no study. Beyond gratitude for their openness and honesty, I am humbled by their moral courage which flourishes in an environment more brutal than what most of us could imagine.

Professional colleagues, fellow graduate students, and friends too numerous to list have provided assistance, insight, and reminded me that this too shall pass. I thank them for each act of kindness.

To paraphrase a favored quotation, whatever we are, we begin and end with family, and it is to mine that this work is dedicated; to Ted for facing his own moral dilemma and changing his life in such a positive way, to my father who is the best man I ever knew, and first, last, and always to my mother. She said, "you can be anything you want to be if you

work hard enough." I believed her, and that has made all the difference. Because she could have been so many things, had she had the opportunity, this degree is for both of us.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

LIST OF TABLES vii

ABSTRACT ix

CHAPTERS

1 INTRODUCTION 1

Statement of the Problem 3
Purpose of the Study 3
Need for the Study 7
Significance of the Study 11
Research Questions 13
Definitions of Terms 13
Organization of the Study 16

2 ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE 19

Theoretical Assumptions 19
Lawrence Kohlberg 19
Kohlberg's Philosophical Assumptions 25
Carol Gilligan 28
Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development 31
The Philosophical 37
Importance of Moral Philosophy 39
The Role of Woman in the History of Philosophical Thought 42
The Primacy of the Kantian Image 45
Introduction to Kant, Reason, and Duty 45
The Categorical Imperative 51
Kant's Nature of Morality 54
Traditional Challenges to Kantian Ethics 56
Additional Problems with the Kantian Image 59
Summary 63
Applied Research 64
Analysis, Synthesis, and Results 67
Implicit Philosophical Assumptions of Gilligan's Moral Theory 68
The Philosophy of Responsible Altruism: Response, Responsiveness, and Responsibility 75
Response. 76
Responsiveness 84
Responsibility 87

Challenges to the Philosophy of Responsible Altruism 91
Summary of Philosophical Results 93

3 DESIGN OF THE STUDY 96

General Research Design 96
Population 98
Sample 98
Data Collection 99
Coding the Data 102
Interrater Reliability 104
Interrater Reliability and Generalizability Theory 106
Specific Design of the Study 108
Mode of Self-Definition 109
Data Analysis Using the Chi-Square Statistic 110

4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 112

Quantitative Analysis and Results 112
Description of the Sample 113
Description of the College 113
Data Collection 115
Generalizability Theory 115
Moral Orientation--An Ethic of Care or An Ethic of Justice 119
Relationship of Variables, the Chi-Square Analysis 120
Response (Care) and Rights (Justice) Considerations 123
Summary of Results About Moral Orientation 126
Statistical Analysis Using the Chi-Square Test .. 128
Summary of Results About Mode of Self-Definition 129
Summary of All Quantitative Analysis and Results 131
Qualitative Analysis and Results 134
Summary of Qualitative Analysis 149

5 SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 151

Summary 151
The Problem 152
The Purpose 152
The Methodology 155
Data Collection 157
Statistical Analysis (Generalizability Theory and Chi-Square) 159
Findings of the Study 160
Implications of the Findings 162
Recommendations for Future Research 166

APPENDICES

A PERMISSION TO QUOTE/REPRODUCE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL 169

B PARTICIPANT DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY 173

C INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 175

D A SCHEME FOR CODING RESPONSES TO THE "DESCRIBE YOURSELF" QUESTION USED TO DETERMINE MODE OF SELF-DEFINITION 177

E A SCHEME FOR CODING CONSIDERATIONS OF RESPONSE AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RIGHTS USED TO DETERMINE MORAL ORIENTATION (RESPONSE = CARE, RIGHTS = JUSTICE) 179

F FORMULAE AND CALCULATIONS USED FOR GENERALIZABILITY COEFFICIENT 182

G INFORMATION ON THE LYONS SCORING PROCEDURE AND MANUAL 185

REFERENCES 186

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 195

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1	Relationships* of Reciprocity and Relationships of Response (Lyons Conceptualization)	36
2	The Relationship of Conceptions of Self and Morality to Considerations Made in Real-Life Moral Choice: An Overview (Lyons' Conceptualization)	38
3	Coding Scheme for Considerations	103
4	Analysis of Variance for the Generalizability Study	117
5	Estimates of Variance Components	117
6	Five Categories of Moral Orientation by Gender	121
7	Collapsed Categories of Moral Orientation by Gender	122
8	Collapsed Categories of Moral Orientation by Race	122
9	Collapsed Categories of Moral Orientation by Race and Gender	123
10	Frequency of Considerations* of Response or Rights in the Construction and Resolution of Moral Conflict: Females and Males	124
11	Frequency of Considerations of Response of Rights in the Construction and Resolution of Moral Conflict: Blacks and Whites	125
12	Absence of Response or Rights Considerations: Females and Males	125
13	Absence of Response or Rights Considerations: Blacks and Whites	126
14	Subject #4--An Ethic of Care	136
15	Subject #19--An Ethic of Justice	137
16	Profile of Black Male Subjects	142

17 Profile of White Male Subjects..... 143

18 Profile of Black Female Subjects..... 144

19 Profile of White Female Subjects..... 145

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate School of the University of Florida
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

AN EXPLORATION OF GILLIGAN'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AS APPLIED TO TRADITIONALLY AGED, FULL-TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS

By

Mary Lynn Williamson

April 1994

Chairperson: Dr. James L. Wattenbarger
Major Department: Educational Leadership

This study replicates Carol Gilligan's research by investigating whether the real-life moral dilemmas of college students evidence two moral orientations, an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice. In addition, the possibility of two modes of self-definition, the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self, was explored. The relationship between moral orientation and definition of self was explored, as it was in Gilligan's work. Moral orientation, self-definition, and the relationship between these two factors was then analyzed in terms of the study's two variables--gender and race. In addition, this study was an attempt to answer three of the most serious challenges to Gilligan's theory; one of those challenges was theoretical, one was philosophical, and one was methodological.

Twenty undergraduate students were tape recorded as they recounted real-life moral dilemmas in response to the Interview Protocol developed by Gilligan and her colleagues. Transcripts of those interviews were then coded by the principal investigator and two independent scorers using the Coding Schemes and Coding Manual developed by Nona Lyons.

A fully crossed, three-random-facet, Decision study model was used to address the issue of interrater reliability. This analysis estimated the dependability of the scoring procedure used by the three raters in categorizing the subjects' moral orientation. The D study produced a generalizability coefficient of .63.

Both quantitative and qualitative results emerged from the data. Quantitative results included empirical verification of Gilligan's hypothesis that two moral orientations did exist within the sample. Gilligan's assertion that moral orientation is gender-related was reconfirmed in the study, but only for white students.

Three major themes emerged from the qualitative analysis. The first theme reaffirmed Gilligan's thesis that moral problems are construed, resolved, and evaluated in completely different ways by those operating from the two ethics. Secondly, the assumption of gender-relatedness to moral orientation was reconfirmed, but only for white students. Black males, in particular, evidenced a pattern of moral orientation which was completely opposite that of their white counterparts. Finally, the influence of television as

a critical feature of moral decision-making emerged after analyzing the subjects' real-life moral dilemmas.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

> "Can you tell me Socrates, is virtue, something that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice, but natural aptitude or instinct?" Socrates, "You must think I am singularly fortunate to know whether virtue can be taught or how it is acquired. The fact is that far from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue itself is."
>
> Plato's Meno

Carol Gilligan has argued that men and women proceed from different moral perspectives, develop along different developmental paths, and ultimately claim different moral imperatives (1977, 1982). With the publication of In A Different Voice (1982), Gilligan elaborated a conception of morality based upon an Ethic of Care that centered moral development around the principle of connectedness. The research of Gilligan and her associates (1982) indicated that this Care perspective was gender-related, but not gender-specific (most individuals using an Ethic of Care are women). In order to understand more fully the significance of Gilligan's departure from traditional moral development thinking, the existing predominant model of moral theory must first be examined.

The most significant work in the field of moral development has been that of Lawrence Kohlberg. The central principle of Kohlberg's theory was Justice, which built upon

the philosophic tradition of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. For Kohlberg, moral development referred to the thought process that an individual employed in making judgments and arriving at conclusions related to moral dilemmas (Cohen, 1982).

In his 1958 dissertation study at the University of Chicago, Kohlberg attempted to validate Dewey's and Piaget's ideas about developmental stages, specifically in the realm of moral development. His study involved an empirical investigation of the judgments boys made in responding to hypothetical moral dilemmas. For the next 40 years, Kohlberg refined and extended his stage theory of moral development, further elaborating the concepts of justice and moral reasoning.

Gilligan, a colleague of Kohlberg at Harvard's Center for Moral Development, has charged that there is a systematic sex bias inherent in not only moral development theory, but the broader field of developmental psychology as well.

> It was in an effort to ask a different question that I wrote the book under discussion (In a Different Voice), seeking to discover whether something had been missed by the practice of leaving out girls and women at the theory-building stage of research in developmental psychology - that is, whether Piaget's and Kohlberg's descriptions of moral development, Erikson's description of identity development, Offer's description of adolescent development, Levinson's and Vaillant's descriptions of adult development, as well as more general accounts of human personality and motivation, contained a consistent conceptual and observational bias, reflected in and extended by their choice of all-male research samples. (Gilligan, 1986, p. 325)

By including females as well as males in her research, Gilligan sought an expanded theory of moral development which more fully incorporated the 'voices' of both women and men. A series of research projects (1977, 1979, 1982) identified two different conceptions of self and morality. These two different moral perspectives were reported as "significantly related, but not absolutely confined to gender" (Gilligan, Langdale, & Lyons, 1982, p. 2).

Statement of the Problem

This study was a replication of Gilligan's research by investigating whether the real-life moral dilemmas of college students evidenced two moral orientations (an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice) and two modes of self-definition (the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self). The relationship between orientation and definition of self is explored, as it was in Gilligan's work. Moral orientation, self-definition, and the relationship between these two factors was then analyzed in terms of the study's two variables--gender and race. In addition, this study was an attempt to answer three of the most serious challenges to Gilligan's theory; one theoretical, one philosophical, and one methodological.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to test the validity of Gilligan's theory of moral development based upon a sample of traditionally aged, full-time, college students. The study replicated Gilligan's research and employed her hypotheses

that (a) there are two distinct moral orientations (an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice); (b) there are two distinct modes of self-definition (the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self); and (c) that modes of self-definition and moral orientation are related.

By focusing on race, as well as gender, this study was an extension of Gilligan's work in a significant and timely direction. Race and gender are undoubtedly sensitive areas of investigation. Researchers who focus on racial or gender variation are likely to be suspected of "reactionary politics or malevolence toward socially disadvantaged groups" wrote Scarr (1988, p. 56). In a forceful argument, she articulated the necessity of such studies by pointing out that ignorance of racial and gender variation has served no one well.

> There should be no qualms about the forthright study of racial and gender differences; science is in desperate need of good studies that highlight race and gender variables, unabashedly, to inform us of what we need to do to help underrepresented people to succeed in this society. (Scarr, 1988, p. 56)

Gender and race are the two variables which were analyzed in relation to each of Gilligan's three hypotheses. Data collected from structured interviews with 20 college students were coded and analyzed in terms of the study's variables using the Lyons' Coding Manual (1982) developed by Gilligan and her associates.

There is a compelling need for field research designed to provide empirical data in support or denial of Gilligan's work. Brabeck (1983) summarized this need for additional

research by noting that Gilligan's theory has been given wide scholarly attention, but that empirical evidence supporting her work was virtually nonexistent.

Validation of Gilligan's theory of moral development cannot be achieved based entirely upon independent corroboration or replication of her research, however. Although that purpose provided the essential structure of this study, other major challenges must also be adequately answered. Serious theoretical, philosophical, and methodological concerns have been identified by a number of researchers and must be addressed if Gilligan's work is to be accepted as a fully functioning model of moral development. This study was designed to answer the three most serious challenges to Gilligan's theory.

The first challenge was theoretical in nature. It questions Gilligan's assertion that the predominant theory of moral development is flawed by an inherent sex bias. According to Gilligan, Kohlberg's six-stage model of moral development is inadequate to reflect accurately the moral development of most women and some men. The second prong of the theoretical challenge to Gilligan's work questions whether her Ethic of Care can be shown to exist empirically in the general population. These challenges are addressed in the applied section of the Analysis of Literature in Chapter 2 and in the results reported in Chapter 4.

Many critics believe that Gilligan's work is also suspect on philosophical grounds. Sichel (1985) expressed

the concern in this way. "No matter whether it possesses heuristic value and is intuitively correct, Gilligan's thesis fails in a way that Kohlberg succeeds. Whereas, Kohlberg interrelates psychology and philosophy, Gilligan does not ground her raw data or thesis with philosophical assumptions" (p. 153).

The philosophical section of Chapter 2 addresses this challenge by virtue of its analysis of the Kantian philosophic tradition of reason, duty, and will. Contrasted to this Kantian philosophy, upon which Kohlberg's theory rests, is an alternative aretaic approach which provides a philosophical basis for Gilligan's research. As a result of this analysis, three metaethical assumptions implicitly suggested throughout Gilligan's work were identified.

In addition, a working philosophical framework which supports Gilligan's Ethic of Care was conceptualized. The metaethical assumptions and philosophical framework are reported in Chapter 2 of this study.

The final challenge to Gilligan's work addressed by this study was methodological in nature. Limited sampling has made Gilligan's research open to attack. Participants in the three studies reported by Gilligan and her associates were all drawn from small, economically advantaged, highly educated samples which were not randomly selected. Luria (1986) addressed the need for additional studies in this way, "eight males and eight females at different ages do not make up a number sufficient to characterize all males and females.

Then, too, samples drawn from classes on moral development at Harvard university are dubious examples of students generally" (p. 317). This study has been designed to correct some of these methodological concerns. A full discussion of methodological issues is found in Chapter 3 of this study.

Need for the Study

Alternately attacked and applauded, Gilligan's work is currently the topic of fierce debate. Historians and psychologists such as Kerber (1986), Greeno and Maccoby (1986), and numerous other authors, both male and female, from widely divergent disciplines have joined the fray. Even a cursory literature review reveals an interest in Gilligan's work by speech pathologists, management consultants, sociologists, and educators from virtually all disciplines. The widespread interest in Gilligan's controversial challenge to Kohlberg's dominant model of moral development, becomes the first of several compelling reasons why this topic deserves scholarly examination.

The scope and depth of interest in Gilligan's work indicates how quickly the practical implications of her theory have suggested themselves to practitioners from all fields. Should Gilligan's hypotheses withstand the rigor of repeated, independent empirical research, the practical implications for educators suggest fundamental changes in the ways schools are designed, structured, and managed at all levels. Sichel (1986) suggested the magnitude of these implications when she wrote,

> it can be asked what methods, curriculum, and evaluation procedures would be implied by an integration of competition and caring, rights and relationship. . . . This latter direction would not dilute cognitive or academic standards, but would recognize that humane interrelationships can contribute to society, school life, personal welfare, and happiness. (p. 159)

Finally, for the student services practitioner, Gilligan's work offers a different and rich perspective which could dramatically change the way in which services and programs are provided to college students. This provides an additional compelling reason for a student services practitioner to thoroughly investigate her work.

In "The ethics of care: Implications of Gilligan for the student services profession," Delworth and Seeman (1984) affirmed the importance of this new and different moral orientation. Student services professionals, the organization of their departments, and the interventions they employ were called into question. Delworth and Seeman stressed the importance of Gilligan's work in this way, "what she has said, and what her research, and that of her colleagues indicates, is crucial for student services professionals, both male and female" (1984, p. 489).

The link between student services and moral development as an area of inquiry is both historically and philosophically sound. As early as 1937, the literature of the emerging student services profession reflected what would later be called a developmental viewpoint. The landmark document for the profession, the 1937 (revised 1949) "Student Personnel Point of View" emphasized the holistic nature of

students. By 1975, a formal statement prepared by the COSPA (Council of Student Personnel Administrators) declared that the student services philosophy was developmental in nature. Currently, student services literature calls for programs which address all of the developmental needs of students, including moral and ethical dimensions. Knefelkamp and others (1978) stated that it was too easy to decry a lack of ethical standards by students. Practitioners must identify this as a problem, search for a theoretical base, and devise practical, understandable ways in which students can grow in this crucial area.

Smith (1978) emphasized the importance of the college years in moral development, "the collegiate experience has the potential to make a significant difference in whether a student stabilizes his moral thinking or moves successfully from conventional to post conventional thought" (p. 59). As early as 1909, Dewey identified experience in confronting moral issues as essential to moral development. Kohlberg (1972) reaffirmed the importance of this experience and identified it as the critical component for moral development. Smith (1978) wrote that, "the cognitive-developmental view holds that growth in moral reasoning occurs naturally as that result of continuous interaction between an individual and the environment" (p. 63).

Thus, if the time in college is to affect the moral development of students as fully as possible, opportunities must be provided for students to actively experience

different levels of moral reasoning and to make moral judgments (Smith, 1978). Opportunities created in the collegiate environment to role play, confront different moral perspectives, assume responsibility for decision-making, and discuss ethical issues are almost always the responsibility of student services administrators.

Increasingly, student services professionals have become actively involved in ethics and values education. In the spring of 1991, the first Institute on College Student Values was held for student services professionals interested in the moral development of their students. A cursory review of programs at the major student services national conferences (NASPA, ACPA, ACUHO-I, NACA, and NAWDAC) reflected the profession's growing concern with moral development. Recent national conference presentations have dealt with ethics education for fraternities and sororities, residence assistants, student government officers, and other student leaders. Judicial Boards and Honor Courts are increasingly receiving training from student services practitioners in the arena of moral development.

Thus, student services professionals have no choice but to be vitally interested in moral development research. As Chickering (1969) wrote, "the development of values is inextricably bound to the development of the student, and commitment to one presupposes commitment to the other" (p. 27). The final compelling reason for this study, rests then, upon the nature of student services work, and by extension,

the academic endeavors of those student services professionals in Departments of Educational Leadership.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant because it advances knowledge about arguably the most important theory to emerge in the field of moral development over the past 30 years. The study advances knowledge in three distinct ways. First, as demonstrated in the section of this document entitled Need for the Study, there exists a critical demand for independent research which empirically tests Gilligan's theory of moral development.

Vasudev (1988) suggested that the most important contribution of Gilligan and her associates were the questions which must be addressed by additional empirical research. In her words, "my commentary is a criticism, a hope, and a justified demand for theory-driven research to substantiate Gilligan's theory. The opening summary of the debate on sex differences underscores the political and psychological significance of Gilligan's ideas" (p. 243). Because Gilligan's work challenges accepted fundamental concepts about self, relationships, development, and philosophy, research which validates her theory has wide-ranging implications. The controversy surrounding this theory is indicative of the implications, should it be corroborated by independent researchers.

Gilligan's work did more than simply challenge the predominance of the Kohlbergian model of moral development.

She called into question the very nature of how morality has been defined, implemented, and measured. Moral philosophers have added their voice to the chorus demanding empirical proof of Gilligan's research because her theory demands a new dissection of the accepted image of the Kantian moral self. Thus, the results of this study are widely generalizable, particularly those philosophic results which are reported in Chapter 2.

This study advances knowledge in the field of moral development in yet another way. By introducing race as a variable, this study extends the applicability of Gilligan's work in an important new direction. In addition, the participants in this study were drawn from the opposite end of the socioeconomic status continuum than were Gilligan's subjects. If Gilligan's findings are reconfirmed through this study, the generalizability of her theory will be demonstrated for at least one populations' sample.

This study advances knowledge because it contributes independent replication of Gilligan's work in response to the critical demand for such theory validation. By addressing the philosophical implications of Gilligan's theory, the results of the study are generalizable beyond the parameters of the population sample and extend into disciplines such as moral philosophy. Finally, the results of this study extend Gilligan's work by introducing the variable of race, which has not yet been explored.

Research Questions

The following questions are modifications of those reported by Gilligan and Attanucci (1988). In addition, questions reflecting the use of race as a focal variable have also been included.

1. Is there evidence of both an Ethic of Justice and an Ethic of Care in college students' discussions of real-life moral conflicts?

2. Do college students evidence both sets of concerns (Justice and Care) equally, or does one ethic predominate?

3. Is there a relationship between moral orientation and gender?

4. Is there a relationship between moral orientation and race?

5. Is there evidence of two different conceptions of self among college students?

6. Is there a relationship between conception of self and moral orientation?

7. Do black and white college students evidence both sets of moral concerns (Justice and Care) in similar patterns?

8. Do black and white college students evidence both conceptions of self (Connected Self and Separate/Objective Self) in similar patterns?

Definitions of Terms

For consistency's sake this study utilized the same definitions employed by Gilligan and her associates.

Relationships are the ways of being with or towards others that all individuals experience but that may be understood in either of two ways (Lyons, 1983).

Relationships of Reciprocity are the perspective of the Separate/Objective self. These relationships are based on impartiality, objectivity, and distancing of self from others (Lyons, 1983).

Relationships of Response are the perspective of the Connected Self. These relationships are based on interdependence and concern for another's well-being. Lyons (1983) indicated that the choice of RESPONSE as a label for the Connected Self is based upon the ancient meaning of the word in the English language. In that sense, response means an answer, a reply, an action or feeling which answers to some stimulus or influence. Responsibility as it is currently used is most often associated with moral accountability and obligation. It is frequently used with contractual agreements related to a morality of Justice. However, the earliest meaning of responsibility carried a sense of answering to something. In the 19th century, this sense was overshadowed as the word responsibility became attached to moral accountability and rational conduct. (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. response, responsibility).

An Ethic of Justice constructs moral problems in terms of the conflicting rights or claims of the actor. Universal principles are central to moral decision

making. "The resolution of the dilemma is one that does the least damage to the principles at stake and that least compromises the individual's rights and autonomy and/or the rights and autonomy of others" (Dickey, Kroll, & Jenkins,1987, p. 11).

An Ethic of Care constructs moral problems in terms of conflicting responsibilities of actors in the dilemma. Maintaining and caring for relationships is central to moral decision-making. "The resolution of the dilemma is one that does the least damage to those relationships and that least compromises the individual's responsibility to self and/or others" (Dickey, Kroll, & Jenkins, 1987, p. 11).

A Consideration is the unit of analysis in the Lyon's Coding Scheme. A consideration is an idea presented by the individual in the framing, resolution, or evaluation of moral problems as described in real-life moral dilemmas (Lyons, 1982).

The Connected Self is one of two characteristic ways of describing the self in relationships. Relationships are experienced as response to others in their own terms, mediated through the activity of care, and grounded in interdependence (Lyons, 1983).

The Separate/Objective Self is positioned as the bipolar opposite to the Connected Self. Relationships are experienced in terms of reciprocity, mediated through rules,

and grounded in roles defined by the twin duties of obligation and commitment (Lyons, 1983).

Organization of the Study

Chapter 1 contains a general introduction to Carol Gilligan's theory of moral development, referencing Lawrence Kohlberg's seminal work in the field. The need for independent, empirical corroboration of Gilligan's controversial theory was established. The significance of the study was demonstrated and the study's purpose articulated. The general research questions which guided this project were enumerated, as were operational definitions.

Chapter 2 begins with an expanded explanation of the moral development theories of Gilligan and Kohlberg. The major focus of Chapter 2, however, is its philosophical analysis which elaborates the current prominence of the Kantian moral legacy. That image of morality is then countered by the philosophy of morality indicated in Gilligan's theory. The applied portion of Chapter 2 is an answer to the most frequently posed theoretical challenge to Gilligan's assertion that Kohlberg's work is flawed by an inherent sex bias.

The analysis, synthesis, and results section of Chapter 2 reports the identification of the philosophical assumptions implicit in Gilligan's theory. Both metaethical and normative ethical assumptions are discussed. An additional result of the philosophical analysis undertaken in this study

was the conceptualization of a working philosophical framework termed Responsible Altruism. This conceptual model was suggested by Gilligan's theory of moral development and provides a philosophical foundation upon which other researchers are invited to build.

The Responsible Altruism concept is not offered as a fully functioning, completely delineated model. It is proffered in the hope that it will serve as a catalyst for the thinking of other ethicists. Their subsequent analysis, arguments, additions, and refinements should eventually lead to a complete, normative ethical philosophical model which supports and explains Gilligan's theory of moral development.

Chapter 3 contains details on how the study was conducted. Specific hypotheses were formulated, data collection procedures reported, and interrater reliability addressed with a discussion on generalizability theory. A fully crossed, three-random-facet, Decision study model was used to address reliability concerns for this research. Sections on the use of the chi-square statistic and an introduction to the qualitative analysis of the subjects' interviews complete the chapter. By virtue of the design described in Chapter 3, the methodological challenge to Gilligan's research is addressed.

Results from the study are reported in two sections of Chapter 4. The first section of Chapter 4 is a quantitative analysis of the data and includes a discussion of data collection, interrater reliability, and statistical analysis.

Data on subjects' moral orientation, and mode of self-definition are reported. The frequency and absence of Considerations of Rights (Justice) versus Responsibilities (Care) are also indicated. These data are reported in terms of the study's two variables--race and gender and are then analyzed using the chi-square statistic.

The second section of Chapter 4 provides a qualitative analysis of the data. Three major themes which emerged from this analysis of the real-life moral dilemmas of the subjects in the study were articulated and explored.

Chapter 5 is a summary of the study, suggesting implications for those interested in both the theory and practice of moral development. Recommendations based upon the study are the concluding feature of this work.

CHAPTER 2
ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE

Theoretical Assumptions

> Building up an author's meaning out of separate texts means nothing, unless you have first grasped the centre of his vision by an act of imagination.
>
> William James

Lawrence Kohlberg

In his dissertation study (1958) Lawrence Kohlberg attempted to validate the assumptions of Dewey and Piaget about stages of development in the moral reasoning of 50 boys aged 10 to 16. Based on this and further research, Kohlberg articulated a theory of moral reasoning which became widely known as a theory of moral development. Kohlberg's (1979) research centered on identifying the qualitatively different modes of moral reasoning or moral judgment. Moral judgment was described as evolving through various stages of development, with each moral stage representing a different mode or structure of thought.

Kohlberg's (1984) theory of moral reasoning postulates six moral stages which are grouped into three major levels: Preconventional (Stages 1 and 2); Conventional (Stages 3 and 4); and Postconventional (Stages 5 and 6). The term 'conventional' is key in understanding Kohlberg's three level theory. As used by Kohlberg (1984), conventional reasoning

refers to conforming to and upholding the rules and expectations of society or authority, simply because they are, in fact, society's rules, expectations or conventions. This conventional reasoning is manifested in Stages 3 and 4.

An individual at the Preconventional Level (Stages 1 and 2) has yet to really understand and/or uphold conventional or societal rules and expectations (Kohlberg, 1984). An individual at the Postconventional Level (Stages 5 and 6) understands and accepts the rules of society. However, that acceptance of society's rules is based on formulating, understanding, and accepting the general moral principles which underlie these rules (Kohlberg, 1984). In some cases, these important, fundamental principles conflict with society's rules. On those occasions, the Postconventional person judges on the basis of the principle and not the rule of society (Kohlberg, 1984).

Kohlberg's three levels of moral reasoning can also be understood as three different types of relationships between one's self and the rules and expectations of society. At the first level, is the Preconventional (Stages 1 and 2) individual, who views societal rules and expectations as external to the self (Kohlberg, 1984). At the second level, is the Conventional (Stages 3 and 4) person who has identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations of others, particularly those of authority figures (Kohlberg, 1984). For Kohlberg (1984), someone at the Postconventional level (Stages 5 and 6) is able to

differentiate between self and the rules and expectations of others. The Postconventional individual defines values in terms of self-chosen principles.

As indicated, each of Kohlberg's (1984) three levels contains two stages of moral reasoning with a marked transition between the fourth and fifth stages, identifying the transition to principled reasoning. Each stage of moral reasoning reflects a different basis for deciding what is the just, fair, or right way to resolve moral problems (Smith, 1978). Kohlberg's research focused on HOW moral judgments are made; the WHYS and not the WHATS are the context of the judgment (1984). For this reason, his work is identified with deontological philosophy (Kohlberg, 1971).

In the same manner that a person's physical structure can be described by identifying height, weight, hair, eyes, skin, etc., the structure of an individual's moral reasoning can be described in terms of eight dimensions (Kohlberg, 1967):

1. Social Perspective - the point of view from which a judgment is made
2. Role-Taking - the ability to recognize and understand differing points of view
3. Exchange - the predominant way in which physical or emotional exchanges between people are shaped
4. Interpersonal Relationships - the basic form that relationships take

5. Governance - who is responsible for determining the structure between people
6. Rules - how the governance structure is interpreted
7. Sanctions - how the structure is maintained
8. Property - how property is viewed and valued
9. Life - how life is viewed and valued

Kohlberg (1984) later offered a revised and less complicated version of moral structure as represented through his six-stage theory. The six moral stages are defined in terms of (a) what is right, (b) the reason for upholding the right, and (c) the social perspective behind each stage.

According to Kohlberg (1979), "each higher stage reflects a more adequate representation of the principle of justice, which is the defining characteristic of the highest stage" (p. 111). Kohlberg's (1971) definitions of morality and moral development are formal terms based upon Hare's (1963) neo-Kantian definition of morality. Hare believed that moral judgments must be both prescriptive and universalizeable, which is directly derived from Kant's Categorical Imperative.

Kohlberg (1971) believed that "the core of morality and moral development was deontological; i.e., it is a matter of rights and duties as prescriptions" (p. 18). The core of deontological philosophy is the equation of morality with the principle of Justice. (Kohlberg, 1971). Kohlberg's adoption of the primacy of Justice was based upon Piaget's (1932) study of moral development. Piaget (1932) equated morality

with Justice in The Moral Judgment of the Child. Piaget (1932) further defined morality as a respect for rules and the fair application of those rules to all. By defining morality as respect for both people and rules, Piaget adopted the Kantian version of morality (Kohlberg, 1971). A more thorough discussion of the Kantian view of morality is offered in a subsequent section of this chapter.

Because his research focused on the identification of the distinctly differing modes of moral reasoning or moral judgment which occurred at each stage of moral thought, Kohlberg's work can be classified as a cognitive-developmental theory (Kohlberg, 1969). As a cognitive-developmental theorist, Kohlberg (1984) posits his six stages of moral development as sequential, irreversible, and universal. Each of Kohlberg's six stages are differentiated by a basic thought structure which can be identified across cultures (Smith, 1978). The content of each stage of moral development, however, will vary from culture to culture because stage content is based upon personal values, which are relative and culturally and/or socially derived (Smith, 1978).

While numerous studies have confirmed Kohlberg's stage-theory concept of moral development, perhaps one of the most telling is the Colby et al. (1983) monograph for the Society for Research in Child Development. This work reports a 20-year longitudinal study on a sample of 53 American males. The Colby et al. (1983) research demonstrated the sequential

nature of Kohlberg's model in that no stage skipping was observed in the longitudinal data.

The irreversible nature of Kohlberg's model was demonstrated in the Colby (1983b) study as well by the extremely low rate of downward stage movement reported (only 4% of the cases). In addition, the downward movement that did occur was mainly half a stage.

Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) provided cross-cultural validation of his stage-sequence model of moral development with a Turkish longitudinal sample. Snarey et al. (1982) corroborated the universal nature of Kohlberg's stage theory with an Israeli kibbutz sample of males and females.

Habermas (1983) referred to Kohlberg's work as a "rational reconstruction of developmental progress" (p. 14). Kohlberg (1983) agreed that the terminology was apt and offered the following reasons why his theory was a rational reconstruction of Justice ontogenesis: "(a) it describes the developmental logic inherent in the development of justice reasoning with the aid of and (b) the normative criteria of Stage 6 which is held to be the most adequate stage of justice reasoning" (p. 14). Kohlberg (1983) stated that it is for these reasons that his theory required moral philosophic, as well as social scientific analysis. In fact, Kohlberg (1983) asserted that moral development and learning cannot be understood or discussed without first addressing the philosophic questions, "What is virtue? What is justice?" (p. xiv). Kohlberg (1983) believed the only route

which made sense was "that taken by Plato and Dewey, which ends with the writing of a treatise describing moral development in a school and society that to the philosopher seems just" (p. xiv).

Kohlberg's Philosophical Assumptions

Kohlberg (1983) emphasized the necessity of differentiating between the philosophic assumptions made prior to research and the philosophic implications drawn from such research. In "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with it in the Study of Moral Development," Kohlberg (1971) made two types of philosophical claims which are tied to his work. A set of metaethical assumptions is the first claim, a set of normative ethical assumptions is the second. Kohlberg retained the metaethical assumptions in subsequent publications and reaffirmed their importance in 1983.

> [these] Metaethical assumptions are made prior to research and they have helped us to orient ourselves to the empirical study of moral development as justice reasoning. It should be noted that at a philosophical level these assumptions remain controversial, but their use has led to the discovery of empirical findings which seem to justify their continued use. (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 9)

The nine metaethical philosophical assumptions which Kohlberg (1983) identified as critical to understanding his theory of moral development are shown below.

1. The assumption of value relevance means that moral concepts are not value-neutral, but are normative.

2. The assumption of phenomenalism indicates that moral decision-making is a conscious process.

3. The assumption of universalism illustrates the belief that moral development has identifiable elements which can be found in any culture or subculture. Universalism also means that moral development cannot be completely described in value-relative terms.

4. The assumption of prescriptivism implies that one ought to do something, not merely that one might or would do it. Prescriptivism elevates moral decision-making beyond the realm of factual judgments and is a corollary to the concept of moral universalizability.

5. The assumption of rationalism implies that moral judgments reflect reasoning, as distinct from motives.

6. The assumption of formalism indicates that agreement can be reached about the formal characteristics of moral judgments, regardless of whether agreement on substantive matters is possible.

7. The assumption of principledness requires that moral judgments be more than evaluations of particular actions. Instead, moral judgments must rest upon general principles.

8. The assumption of constructivism indicates that moral judgments and principles are not independent propositions known 'a priori.' Neither are they facts which have been empirically tested and generalized in the world. Moral principles are, instead, human constructions originating from human interaction.

9. Acceptance of the previous assumptions leads to the concluding assumption of the primacy of Justice. The purpose of moral judgments and principles is to resolve conflict, both interpersonal and social. Conflicting claims and rights, along with relative duties, is the context out of which moral judgments and principles emerge. Resolution of these conflicting claims, duties, and rights rests upon the concept of "equilibrium, balancing, or reversibility of claims" (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 9). Moral judgments and principles defined in this manner, ultimately require some interpretation of Justice.

Researchers utilizing Kohlberg's theory accept a set of normative ethical claims, in addition to the metaethical assumptions previously outlined. Kohlberg (1983) illustrated one such normative ethical assumption in the claim that Stage 6 reasoning defines "morally adequate principles" (p. 9). As represented by Kohlberg (1983), movement through his sequential stages represents closer proximity to this desirable Stage 6, where just and principled resolution of conflict occurs.

Kohlberg's scoring procedure also reflects this normative ethical assumption in that the procedure is not value-neutral about subjects' moral development (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Kohlberg et al. (1983) believed that his theory and scoring process presupposed, "a stance toward the greater or lesser moral rationality of the moral judgments being interpreted. Thus, our stage interpretations

are not value-neutral, they do imply some normative reference" (p. 14).

Recognizing that other theorists took issue with his normative ethical claims, Kohlberg (1983) suggested that other researchers working in the cognitive-structural domain need not accept his normative ethical assumptions. However, understanding his theory as a "rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of Justice reasoning" is essential, as is awareness of the normative ethical assumptions it contains (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 10).

Carol Gilligan

Carol Gilligan's theory of moral development has most often been interpreted as an alternative to Kohlberg's research, which Gilligan asserted had an inherent sex bias (see the Applied section of this chapter for a more complete discussion of the sex bias issue). While most authors contrast Gilligan's work with Kohlberg's in order to highlight differences, the work of the two theorists can also be examined in terms of similarities.

Gilligan's work is indebted to Kohlberg on many levels (Gilligan, 1982). Analysis of Gilligan's theory of moral development reveals two major assumptions borrowed from the research of Kohlberg and his associates. First, Gilligan's three-stage theory obviously endorsed the notion of stages of development and accepted the appropriateness of a cognitive-developmental paradigm to identify and examine them

(Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Secondly, Gilligan's methodology suggested an acceptance of using a hermeneutic style in interpreting interviews (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Her research reflected the influence of Habermas (1983), as did Kohlberg's before her.

Gilligan's choice of the title, In A Different Voice (1982), indicated an attempt to hear and see the world through the senses of the interviewee. Habermas (1983) indicated that when engaged in interpretive social science, the researcher begins with an attitude of communication between the scientist and the client. Interpretation, the hermeneutic art, can only be achieved by understanding the world in the client's terms. Habermas (1983) wrote that a good moral interviewer begins by attempting to see the world through the interviewee's eyes.

> Only to the extent that the interpreter grasps the reasons that allow the author's utterance to appear as rational does he understand what the author could have meant. Thus, the interpreter understands the meaning of his text only to the extent that he sees why the author felt himself entitled to put forward as true certain assertions, to recognize as right certain values and norms, to express as sincere certain experiences. (Habermas, 1983, p. 11)

While an acceptance of the stage concept in moral development, approval of the cognitive-developmental framework for analysis, and the shared belief in the hermeneutic approach to data collection are some of the points of agreement between Gilligan and Kohlberg, there are numerous areas of discord. There are four major criticisms

of Kohlberg's work which are reflected in the writings of Gilligan and her colleagues.

First, Gilligan and Murphy (1979) believed that mature morality was contextually relative, and thus, aligned themselves with the ethical relativists. Secondly, Gilligan and Murphy (1979) and Murphy and Gilligan (1980) objected to Kohlberg's definition of morality as moral judgment or reasoning. It was Gilligan's (1982) premise that moral reasoning or cognition alone presented an inadequate picture of morality. Kohlberg's use of hypothetical dilemmas to evaluate individual moral reasoning was the third major area of criticism. Gilligan (1977, 1979, 1988) and others (Habermas, 1979; Sullivan, 1977; Simpson, 1974) believed that real-life moral dilemmas in the full context of particular, social situations offered greater insight into individual moral development.

As detailed previously, one of the normative ethical assumptions of Kohlberg's theory, revolved around the endpoint of moral development. Kohlberg's morality equaled Justice, which resolves competing claims and competing rights (Kohlberg et al., 1983). This assumption of the primacy of Justice, inherited from Kant, ignored other virtues to which Gilligan assigned equal moral value. For Gilligan (1982, 1988), the virtues of caring and responsibility to others were equally as important as Justice in moral development.

Kohlberg (1983) acknowledged that some critics believed his scoring procedure applied a normative system to all

individuals, some of whom held differing normative values. Thus, their normative values would be inadequately represented in his theory (Kohlberg, 1983). Added to this charge of bias, Kohlberg's work is under attack as inadequate because of its solitary emphasis upon Justice. The Philosophical Section of Chapter 2 explores these ideas in greater detail. With a basic understanding of how the two theorists agree and disagree on major assumptions, Gilligan's theory of moral development can now be explored in more detail.

Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development

Carol Gilligan (1988) suggested that "since moral judgments reflect a logic of social understanding and form a standard of self-evaluation, a conception of morality is key to a conception of self in relationships" (p. 4). The Western philosophic tradition outlined in the Philosophical section of this chapter portrayed the moral self as an isolated, separate being. This image of individual autonomy interprets social responsibility as duty or obligation (Gilligan, 1988). The underlying moral principle is that of Justice, expressed through an individual's attempts at equality and fairness. This Justice orientation of morality is at the heart of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

Emerging from the work of Gilligan and her associates (1982, 1988) is a moral perspective based upon the principle of Care. In the Care orientation of morality, responsibility means responsiveness in relationships (Gilligan, 1988). In

this alternate conception, the moral self is defined by the exchange of human interaction. Gilligan (1988) described her vision in this way:

> The close tie I have observed between self-description and moral judgment illuminates the significance of this distinction by indicating how different images of self give rise to different visions of moral agency, which in turn are reflected in different ways of defining responsibility. (p. 7)

Nona Lyons, Gilligan's research associate, in Two perspectives: On self, relationships, & morality (1983), gave form to her mentor's structure by describing in detail these different moral orientations; Justice and Care. Lyons (1983) identified and described a Morality of Justice and a Morality of Care in this way.

A Morality of Justice is Kohlberg's conception of morality as a principle, a set of ideals, a specific reason which informs and guides behavior. Morality is perceived as knowing what is right, what one ought to do. One pictures an individual alone, deciding what must be done and making that decision based upon a principle, a reason, or an ideal. Morality is perceived as a discrete moment of moral choice (Lyons, 1983).

A Morality of Care is Gilligan's conception of morality as a type of encompassing consciousness. Morality is perceived as a sensitivity, incorporating an injunction not to endanger or hurt other people. One pictures an individual aware, concerned about, and attending to others. Morality is

a type of consciousness and is not bound to a single moment of choice (Lyons, 1983).

Gilligan (1982) hypothesized that (a) there are two distinct modes of moral judgment--Justice and Care--in the thinking of men and women, (b) that these modes of moral judgments are gender related, and (c) that modes of moral judgment might be related to self-definition. Lyons (1983) elaborated these ideas further as she described two distinguishable ways of considering moral issues. The heretofore unchallenged morality of Justice and rights, articulated best by Kohlberg and derived from all-male samples, was the first. A second morality of response and Care, as delineated by Gilligan (1982, 1988) and based upon research sampling both males and females, has emerged as the second.

In addition, data gathered for a National Institute of Education project (Gilligan, Langdale, & Lyons, 1982) revealed two characteristic modes of describing the self in relation to others. One description of self reflects objectivity, distance, and separateness in relation to others. A second image of self was seen as connected or interdependent in relations with others (Gilligan et al., 1982). Piaget first noted the importance of relationships in considerations of morality as demonstrated through his insight, "apart from our relations to each other, there can be no moral necessity" (1932/1965, p. 196).

Individuals operating from what Lyons (1983) called the Separate/Objective Self, connect to others through their abilities. Their way of relating to others is in their own terms, through the self's "I." An illustration from Lyons' research (1983) made the point well. "I think I am a pretty good friend. I treat my friends like I want them to treat me" (p. 25). Other people, then, are seen through the eyes of one's self. The perspective of the Separate/Objective Self is labeled Reciprocity (Lyons, 1983).

Reciprocal relationships are based on impartiality, objectivity, and the distancing of one's self from others (Lyons, 1983). By defining the moral self in terms of individual autonomy and social responsibility, the agent acts upon reason and will, guided by duty and obligation (Gilligan, 1988). This notion of duty to others has been expressed through Kant's "categorical imperative" and the biblical "golden rule." An ideal relationship would be based upon equality. When equality is not possible, "the best recourse is to fairness as an approximation of equality" (Lyons, 1983, p. 33). Fairness requires some distancing of self from others in order to mediate impartially. Relationships of reciprocity imply considering others' situations as if one were there themselves. Thus, the underlying, psychological assumption is that others are the same as oneself (Lyons, 1983).

In counterpoint to the Separate/Objective Self is the Connected Self (Lyons, 1983). These individuals connect

through the people in their world. People are viewed in their own terms. Relationships are viewed as interdependent. The Connected Self is labeled by Lyons (1983) as having Relationships of Response (see Definition of Terms for an explanation of Response). Relationships of Response are based upon interdependence and concern for another's well-being (Lyons, 1983).

The ideal Relationship of Reciprocity is based upon equality. The ideal Relationship of Response assumes care and responsiveness to others. In order to maintain relationships, others must be understood in their own terms, their own contexts (Lyons, 1983). Relationships of Response require an attempt to understand others' situations as they are to them. The underlying psychological assumption here is not that others are the same as self (Reciprocity), but that others are different. Thus, their experiences, needs, and concerns would be different than one's own (Lyons, 1983).

Lyons schematically presented ideas about the relationship between these definitions of self and orientations to morality as they emerged from the empirical data of her 1983 research. See Table 1.

For one operating from a Separate/Objective Self perspective, the moral imperative is to determine the principle involved and to act upon it. Thus, solving a moral problem entails thinking about what would be the right thing to do, and following through on that decision (Lyons, 1983).

Table 1
Relationships* of Reciprocity and Relationships of Response
(Lyons Conceptualization)

The Separate/Objective Self		
Relationships are experienced in terms of	mediated through	and grounded in
RECIPROCITY	RULES	ROLES
between separate individuals that is, as a concern for others considering them as one would like to be considered, with objectivity and in fairness;	that maintain fairness and reciprocity in relationships;	which come from duties of obligation and commitment.
The Connected Self		
Relationships are experienced as	mediated through	and grounded in
RESPONSE TO OTHERS IN THEIR OWN TERMS	THE ACTIVITY OF CARE	INTERDEPENDENCE
that is, as a concern for the good of others or for the alleviation of their burdens, hurt, or suffering (physical or psychological);	which maintains and sustains caring and connection in relationships;	which comes from recognition of the interconnectedness of people.

*Relationships are the ways of being with or towards others that all individuals experience but that may be understood in either of two ways.

**Table cited from Lyons, N. P. (1983). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality, Harvard Educational Review, 53(2), May.

For one operating from a Connected Self perspective, the moral imperative is to be sensitive to the possible fractures between people and in trying to prevent them (Lyons, 1983). How things worked out for those involved is the criterion against which one decides if a choice was the right one. Choices are validated if relationships are sustained (Lyons, 1983).

The importance of relationships to women is not a new concept. Freud (1925/1961), Piaget (1932/1965), and Broverman et al. (1972), have all commented on the relational

bias of women's concept of self and morality. However, Gilligan (1982) insisted that this emphasis by women upon the care and nurturance of relationships was not a deviation from a male-defined standard of what self and morality were. This different definition of self and different moral orientation were instead, she argued, an equally valid and potentially rich source for human understanding. "My critics say that this story seems 'intuitively' right to many women, but is at odds with the findings of psychological research. This is precisely the point I was exploring; the dissonance between psychological theory and women's experience" (Gilligan, 1986, p. 325).

Based upon data derived from interviews in which participants shared real-life moral dilemmas, Gilligan (1977, 1982) suggested two moral perspectives, each of which constructs social reality differently. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) wrote that, "the distinction made here between a Justice and a Care orientation pertains to the ways in which moral problems are conceived and reflects different dimensions of human relationships that give rise to moral concern" (p. 73).

Lyons' (1983) schematic representation of these two moral positions offers a concise introduction for each perspective. See Table 2.

The Philosophical

> To do philosophy is to explore one's own temperament, and yet at the same time to attempt to discover the truth.
>
> Iris Murdoch

Table 2
The Relationship of Conceptions of Self and Morality to Considerations Made in Real-Life Moral Choice: An Overview
(Lyons Conceptualization)

A Morality of Justice

Individuals defined as SEPARATE/ OBJECTIVE in RELATION to OTHERS: see others as one would like to be seen by them in objectivity and	tend to use a morality of JUSTICE as FAIRNESS that rests on an under-standing of RELATION-SHIPS as RECIPROCITY between separate individuals grounded in the duty and and obligation of their roles;	moral problems are generally construed as issues, especially decisions, of con-flicting claims between self and others (including society); resolved by invoking impartial rules, principles, or standards;	considering: (1)one's role-related obligations, duty, or commitments; (2)standards, rules, or principles for self, others, or society; including reciprocity, that is, fairness-how one should treat another considering how one would like to be treated if in their place;	and evaluated considering: (1)how decisions are thought about and justified; or (2)whether values, principles, or standards are (were) maintained, especially fairness.

A Morality of Response and Care

Individuals defined as CONNECTED in RELATION to OTHERS: see others in their own situations and contexts;	tend to use a morality of care that rests on an under-standing of RELATION-SHIPS as RESPONSE to ANOTHER in their own terms;	Moral problems are generally construed as issues of relationships or of response, that is how to respond to others in their particular terms; resolved through the activity of care;	considering: (1)maintaining relationships and response that is, the connections of interdependent individuals to one another; or promoting the welfare of others or preventing their harm; or relieving the burdens, hurt, or suffering (physical or psychological) of others;	and evaluated considering: (1)what happened/ will happen, or how things worked out; or (2)whether relationships were/are maintained or restored.

*Lyons, N.P. (1983). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality, Harvard Educational Review, 53(2), May.

Importance of Moral Philosophy

What difference does it make which philosophy a person accepts? Does moral philosophy have anything to do with the everyday lives of human beings? Beset by moral dilemmas, does philosophy assist humanity in answering the age old query, "What shall I do?" These questions are answered affirmatively in the philosophic work analyzed in this review. Moral philosophy, as used in the context of this research, is perceived as an essential task in which all of humanity is involved. Murdoch (1970) asserted that moral questions are the issues with which all persons must wrestle, "We would like to know what, as moral agents, we have got to do because of logic, what we have got to do because of human nature, and what we can choose to do" (p. 2).

Dewey (1936) confirmed that the study of ethics was not only an essential task, but a practical matter as well when he wrote that ethics was really about actual people confronting actual problems. The goal of ethics for Dewey was an elaboration of what constitutes moral problems and the formulation of their solutions. Niebuhr (1963) stressed the centrality of ethics for individuals and society, as both struggle for integrity with divided loyalties and competing claims. Niebuhr (1963) made a compelling argument for each individual's need to engage in moral philosophy and clarified what that process entails:

> Ethics, as an intellectual enterprise, enables us to bring more clarity into our interpretation of the social world of which we are a part-not by pure

> sociological analysis, but by ethical analysis, an analysis of values, goals, purposes, moral claims, and aspirations that compete, conflict, or co-exist uncomfortably. It does not give us the unequivocal rank-order of values to be sought in some universal order of preference to each other. It does not plot out the design for the ideal society in which all the tensions and ambiguities of social and moral incoherence are brought into a harmonious, beautiful whole. Rather, it clarifies our understanding of moral existence through its analysis and in turn enables us to be more responsible selves in the social world. (p. 18)

Morality and ethics have been inseparably linked with philosophic thought since Socrates. It is a widely held truism that research in the arena of moral development cannot be fully understood, implemented, or evaluated without considerable attention to the metaethical assumptions upon which theories are constructed (Kohlberg, 1983). Accepting that premise, this philosophical analysis will attempt several goals. First, the current predominant philosophical framework of moral development, as typified by Kant, elaborated by Rawls, and specified by Kohlberg will be outlined and analyzed. This philosophical school of thought provides the foundation upon which most of today's educational and psychological theories are based. Kohlberg (1983) attested to the importance of this philosophic tradition in this way, "following Socrates, Kant, and Piaget, the answer I and my colleagues offer says that the first virtue of a person, school, or society is justice" (p. xv). Understanding the philosophy of Kant and his first virtue of Justice, becomes then, a necessary first step for those interested in moral development research.

The second step in this philosophical analysis is an investigation of the various challenges to Kantian ethics. This analysis has two parts. Several traditional challenges to Kant's philosophy which revolve around specific aspects of his work, are examined. In addition, Gilligan's (1982, 1988) work on moral theory suggested additional problems with the Kantian philosophy, which are explored in some detail.

Because Gilligan's (1982) theory of morality is based upon the voice of women, understanding their role in philosophic thought becomes an important task. Documenting woman's role in the history of philosophical thought is the third goal of this analysis.

Chapter 4 of this study contains two results of this philosophical analysis. First, the analysis resulted in an attempt to make explicit some of the implicit ethical assumptions revealed in Gilligan's theory of moral development. Both metaethical and normative ethical assumptions are articulated.

Sichel (1985) and others have written of the necessity of this task. "No matter whether it possesses heuristic value and is intuitively correct, Gilligan's thesis fails in a way that Kohlberg succeeds. Whereas, Kohlberg interrelates psychology and philosophy, Gilligan does not ground her raw data or thesis with philosophical assumptions" (p. 153). In an attempt to answer this philosophical challenge to Gilligan's theory, several of the philosophical assumptions evidenced in her work are articulated in Chapter 4. This

review will not attempt to prove those assumptions, however, as that work is best left to professional philosophers and is beyond the scope of this endeavor.

An analysis of the philosophic work of Hume (1975, 1978, 1985), Blum (1980), Niebuhr (1963), and Murdoch (1970) yielded support for the assumptions which ground Gilligan's theory. Gilligan's work suggested a new moral philosophy which combines elements distilled from each of these philosophers in what might be termed Responsible Altruism. Thus, the second major result reported in Chapter 4 is an elaboration of Responsible Altruism as a conceptual, philosophical framework for Gilligan's theory of moral development.

The Role of Woman in the History of Philosophical Thought

Even the most cursory review of philosophical thought, reveals a pattern, a way of thinking about woman's place in the world which is clearly separate and unequal to that occupied by man. The crucial importance of Reason in philosophy will become apparent in a subsequent discussion of Kant and Kohlberg appearing later in this analysis. Taking the importance of Reason as a given for the moment, however, it is worth noting that the idea of woman as less rational than man is evident beginning with the Greeks. Femaleness has long been symbolically associated with what Reason left behind (Lloyd, 1983).

In a perceptive and illuminating essay, Lloyd (1983), charged that early versions of woman's relationship with

Reason portray femaleness as being excluded, derivative, or insufficient when compared to an essentially male humanity. Using examples drawn from Philo, Augustine, and Aquinas, Lloyd (1983) suggested a genderization of the character ideals based on Reason that goes beyond misogynist attitudes. "An exclusion or transcending of the feminine is built into past ideals of rationality; and correlatively, the content of femininity has itself been partly formed by such process of exclusion" (p. 500).

Descartes continued this tradition, argued Lloyd (1983), by reinforcing the notion that intellectual labor was apportioned by sex. The Cartesian man must transcend the sensuous, which woman was responsible for, in order to acquire true knowledge (Lloyd, 1983). In the 18th century both Rousseau and Kant (1938) further elaborated the concept that woman was best suited for a different type of intellectual activity, which was always portrayed as complementary, yet secondary to man's.

Lloyd (1983) believed that acknowledging the imperfection of male Reason, thus necessitating woman's contribution, is part of the philosophic tradition. "Making good the lacks in male thought, providing it with a necessary complementation, is a large part of what the suppression and the correlative creation of womankind have been all about" (p. 513).

Lloyd's (1983) premise seemed to be that the different voice of women as reported by Gilligan (1982) is merely the

last in a long succession of roles which position woman in an unequal, if complementary and helpful relationship to man. Lloyd (1983) offered an insightful review of woman's role in the history of philosophical thought. However, her concern that the portrayal of women in Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral development is somehow a new variation upon an old theme seems misplaced.

Of the many arguments which might be employed in assuaging Lloyd's (1983) concern, two are primary. First, Gilligan's (1982) thesis is that two moral orientations exist that are grounded in different perspectives of self and relationships. The Justice perspective, is currently equated with moral reasoning (due in no small part to the developments summarized in Lloyd's [1983] history of philosophic thought).

In proposing an alternate Care perspective, Gilligan (1982) did not position either way of thinking as superior to the other. Further, her research and that of her colleagues indicated that moral orientation, while gender-related, is not gender specific (Gilligan, Langdale, & Lyons, 1982). In short, Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral development cannot be relegated entirely to women. Further, the Ethic of Care is not conceived of as complementary to the Ethic of Justice. The Care perspective exists independently from the Justice orientation and is sufficient unto itself (Gilligan, 1986).

As demonstrated in some detail later in this analysis, the philosopher David Hume (1975, 1978, 1985) served as a

philosophic source for many of the ideas expressed in Gilligan's theory. Baier (1987) wrote that Hume questioned whether women need to cast aside their expertise in care as they shed their timorous and servile roles (the traditional role assigned to them through the history of philosophy). In Hume's (1975) story of a single mother, Of Moral Prejudices, he suggested that the answer is no. "Avoidance of servile dependence on men can be combined with the virtues of the caring and bearing responsibility, that pride and at least some forms of love can be combined" (1975, p. 54). Although caring is a trait characteristically assigned to the female in philosophic thought, an Ethic of Care as delineated by Gilligan, exists as a fully developed alternative to Justice reasoning. Care in this context serves as a principle around which self and relationships are defined, not merely an activity that women undertake because they are unable to participate in higher forms of intellectual reasoning (Gilligan, 1982).

The Primacy of the Kantian Image

Introduction to Kant, Reason, and Duty

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was born and lived his life in Konigsberg, Prussia. His most important writings were published in 1785 and 1788. In terms of both his influence and the power of his insight, he is considered by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived. While Kant may not have derived the ultimate truth, the importance of his work

and its effect upon the philosophers who followed was profound.

Prior to Kant, the work of previous philosophers was viewed as being in opposition to each other. Kant synthesized philosophic thought developed since Descartes, developed the system known as criticism, and is recognized as beginning contemporary philosophical thought (Perelman, 1965). Kant's thinking was tied to intricate epistemological and metaphysical speculations that cannot be fully explicated here. However, the dominance of Kantian thought and its subsequent pervasive influence on moral development theory is such that at least a superficial examination of his major tenets must be attempted.

Development of the ideas of good and morality are largely credited to the Greeks. Good, for the Greeks, was identified with ends, such as happiness, health, or riches and was equated with morality (Perelman, 1965). The Romans, however, with their sophisticated legal system, made the authority of law central to their concept of morality. Roman jurists summarized the moral code in three maxims: "(1) Render to every other man that which is his due; (2) So use what is your own as not to injure others; and (3) Vivere honestrum--live so as to deserve good repute from others" (Dewey, 1936, p. 238).

Kant was no doubt heavily influenced by the Roman school of thought. He accepted and embellished the idea that authority and law came first, and that the concept of good,

in moral terms was secondary. The supremacy of Right over Good was inviolate for Kant who believed that the judgment of what made someone good or bad was to be based, not on their behavior, but on their reasoning. Kant (1925) identified morally good people as those of good will who do their duty because of good intentions; doing one's duty for any other reason was neither worthy of praise nor morally acceptable. In fact, good will was the only truly good thing in Kant's universe. In his words, "nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will" (1925, p. 10).

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (1949b) undertook to understand and explain the moral good. His position is now known as the deontological view, which simply stated means behavior can be judged right or wrong independent of the consequences (Kimbrough, 1985). Kohlberg (1971) wholeheartedly adopted this view as evidenced by his assumption that the core of morality and moral development was deontological, i.e., it was a matter of rights and duties as prescriptions.

For deontologists, the morality of an act must be judged independently of the end attained. An act can be judged as moral if it is caused by or through good will (Perelman, 1965). Kant (1949b) identified the will as practical reason. The categorical obligations or imperatives; duty, conscience, and a sense of ought, are not derived from the senses, as the naturalists held. Instead, these moral duties are processed

in the part of the mind where Reason presides (Kant, 1949). Kant described this as pure, innate reason which can be both practical and absolute (Kimbrough, 1985).

As demonstrated previously through Lloyd's (1983) essay on the role of women in the history of philosophical thought, the primacy of reason and judgment was a powerful tradition in western philosophy. Soloman (1976) articulated this tradition, "reason is that part of the soul that is most our own, the only part of the soul that is completely under our control" (p. 11). In acting according to reason, then, man is fully autonomous and in control (Blum, 1980).

In demonstrating that morality was determined by good will, Kant (1957) defined will as good when will acts in accordance with duty. For Kant (1949) mere conformity to duty was not enough. An act could only be said to be performed from duty when it is in response to the moral law (Perelman, 1965).

Durant (1961) defined Kant's moral law as action that was good, not because it was wise or produced good results, but because it obeyed an inner sense of duty. Kant's (1967) moral law did not develop from personal experiences, but simply existed and legislated *a priori* for all behavior, past, present, and future. In Kant's (1967) view, the only unqualifiedly good thing in the world was the agent which followed the moral law, regardless of the sacrifice involved. Durant (1961) cited Kant's famous admonition, "never mind your happiness, do your duty" (p. 276-277).

Norman (1983) and others have written that the concept of the Protestant ethic, elaborated by sociologist Max Weber, profoundly affected Kant's choice of duty as the central focus of his ethic. Murdoch (1970) agreed with Norman, identifying several shared qualities between Kant and the Protestant version of morality: "the emphasis on obedience to duty; controlling feelings and inclinations; strength of will in resisting impulses from one's selfish, baser nature; and conscientious action based on principle, rather than emotional spontaneity" (p. 3). Murdoch (1970) concluded that this Kantian tradition has deeply affected the moral thinking and experience of Anglo-Americans.

As the first philosopher to centralize the notion of duty, Kant (1938) defined the concept as referring to the requirements imposed by the particular social, economic, or political positions one might hold. Examples might include duties imposed as a parent or child, employer or employee, a citizen or elected official (Kimbrough, 1985).

Fulfilling one's obligations was a form of obedience to the fundamental principle of morality, and as such, was the essence of morality (Ackley, 1976). According to Kant (1957), acts are morally good, morally right, as distinct from merely satisfactory, only when the motive for the act was to fulfill one's duty. Thus, even the wish to be of service to others, must be subordinated to reverence for morality's fundamental principle (Kant, 1965).

Kant (1967) called this fundamental principle of ethics, this moral law, the Categorical Imperative. Thus, in order for an act to be moral, it must obey the categorical imperative. In Kant's (1949b) words, "so act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle of a universal legislation" (p. 7). For Kant (1967) the moral law was imperative--absolute, unconditional, and unwavering. Kant (1967) identified this moral law as categorical in order to distinguish it from the requirements of hypothetical laws or imperatives. In hypothetical laws, commands may vary dependent upon the desired result. A hypothetical command could be stated as: If one wishes health, or material success, one must do thus (Kant, 1967). The categorical law, however, commands--one must act from the motive of duty anyway (1967). Thus, moral action was divorced from the ends attained, or even the act itself (Dewey, 1936). Instead, morality remained consistently focused on duty. For this reason, Kantian ethics were often referred to as an ethic of duty, as opposed to an ethic of utility, wherein morality depended upon the act (Perelman, 1965).

Kant's (1967) Categorical Imperative is a formal rule, it does not specify behavior (the act), merely the form. Dewey (1936) wrote that in order to know one's duty, however, one need only ask if the motive of the contemplated act could be made universal without self-contradiction. The universal nature of moral law indicated that its origin was rational

and was not derived from experience (Dewey, 1936). Put more simply, when confronted by moral decisions, one must examine the consequences of anticipated action in the widest possible sense, imagining that hereafter one's self and all others would stand by such decisions. Dewey (1936) suggested that Kant intended such reflection to lead one to the determination of what duty demands and therein, to the moral course.

The Categorical Imperative

Kant (1967) postulated his fundamental principle of ethics in a number of specific formulations, each of which emphasized a particular aspect of the imperative. In The Categorical Imperative, Paton (1967) translated the five major formulations in the following way:

> 1. Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
>
> 2. Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.
>
> 3. So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means..
>
> 4. So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.
>
> 5. So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-making member in a universal kingdom of ends. (p. 129)

Each of the specific formulations assert essentially the same moral law, the only difference being one of emphasis. The first formulation identified universalizability as the

essence of morality. In order for an action to be moral, one must be able to assert that all other persons confronted with the same circumstances could and would behave in the same manner (Ackley, 1976).

The second formulation logically extends the first directive of universalizability, by considering the implications if all persons acted as the agent does (Kant, 1967). Prior to action, one need pose the question, what would happen if one's action were made a universal law of human nature which compelled all to act upon it? (Kant, 1967). This was Kant's only attempt, albeit a limited one, in which he attempted to deal with the consequences of moral action. Even so, it was not the results or consequences, per se, which would disqualify an action as immoral, but rather the inconsistency of the idea when actually implemented by all others in similar circumstances (Ackley, 1976).

The third formulation was an important one and dealt specifically with equality (Kant, 1967). Acting on maxims which must hold for all persons, significantly limited possible alternatives when faced with moral decisions. In Ackley's (1976) words, "One is limited to those acts which one would not object to having done by everyone and which could, without logical contradiction, be done by everyone. To act otherwise is to particularize arbitrarily one's actions rather than universalizing them" (p. 48). The third formulation limits one's choices by a logical respect for the equality of others.

The apparent contradiction between freedom and reason was addressed in the fourth formulation. Since people are free, they might do whatever they wish. For Kant (1967), however, following a path bounded by reason, meant that one's actions were circumscribed in specific ways as defined by the moral law (i.e., actions must be universal, universalizable, and limited by respect for the equality of others). Kant (1965) believed that one's will determined the moral law. Thus, people obey the moral law, because to do otherwise would mean contradicting one's self. This view of humanity portrayed man as a self-legislating moral agent, ultimately responsible to his own ability to reason (Kant, 1967).

The fifth and final formulation summarized the previous four. In addition, it served as a practical guide for implementing what the third dictated. As previously demonstrated by Kant (1967), each person was portrayed as a rational agent. The fifth formulation extended that thought and conceives of all fellow persons as forming a community of rational beings (Kant, 1967). Each person in this community views all others persons as ends in themselves, not merely means which may be manipulated (Ackley, 1976). Kohlberg's (1983) theory of moral development, based upon Justice, equality, and fairness was a direct application of Kant's (1967) third formulation. This third formulation emphasized the notion of respect for all persons, i.e., "the categorical imperative to treat each person as an ends, not as means" (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 18).

The five formulations of the Categorical Imperative, along with the rest of Kantian ethics suggested that moral deliberation consisted of more than considering what one wants. Kant (1967) directed one to a consideration of what was right. What was right, was what was rational. What was rational, were actions which the moral agent could and would advocate for all others in a similar situation (Ackley, 1976).

Kant's Nature of Morality

While space constraints prevent a proper analysis of Kantian ethics, several of his related ideas about the nature of morality itself deserve a cursory introduction. The concept of autonomy is often linked with Kant (1925). According to Hill (1987), Kant believed that autonomy functioned as the source of morality and provided the basis of human dignity. In order to grasp Kant's (1925) meaning of autonomy, the word impartiality might be used in its place. The concept of autonomy or impartiality, as articulated by Kant and later modified by Rawls, is a characteristic contained in the will of adult human beings (Hill, 1987). In the ideal sense of the autonomous moral agent, each person rationally determined the universal principles by which they would live (Kant, 1925).

Hill (1987) defined Kant's autonomy or impartiality as consideration of principles from a point of view that was temporarily detached from one's own desires and emotions. Kant's (1925) version of the moral agent was as a legislator

who employed autonomy or impartiality in reviewing moral principles. This moral judge reflected upon how conflicting moral principles might be reconciled or qualified. Ultimately, with impartiality as a constant guide, the moral agent selected the most appropriate (Kant, 1925). Decisions about moral principles, the fact that one's self, family, friends, or country, etc. would be favored over someone else, must not be, by itself the reason one selected a principle (Kant, 1925). In short, morality demanded an impartial regard for others in deciding upon moral principles or values (Hill, 1967).

In the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant (1949b) demonstrated his desire to define the fundamental principle of morality. He assumed that morality had a unitary nature, and thus, a single foundation could be isolated (1949b). Kant (1949b) envisioned the moral knowledge of human reason as unified, without internal tensions or contradictions. In designating obligation as Kant's starting point, Blum (1980) wrote that man is "unconditionally bound to do something simply because it is the morally right thing to do" (p. 6-7).

One final feature of Kantian ethics deserves note. Kant, as a deontologist, assumed the primacy of Justice (1965b). Justice claimed more than a moral priority, however. According to Sandel (1982) Justice was, "also a privileged form of justification; the right is prior to the good not only in that its claims take precedence, but also in

that its principles are independently derived" (p. 2). Justice, for Kant, was not simply one among many principles, but, rather the standard against which other values were to be weighed and judged, making it the value of values (Sandel, 1982).

Traditional Challenges to Kantian Ethics

There are several traditional challenges to Kant's philosophy, each of which is based upon the content of a specific aspect of his work. One of the most frequent challenges is the assertion that Kant ignored the results of actions. By claiming that will alone is the appropriate virtue for praise and blame, critics claim that ignoring consequences renders an inadequate and insufficient view of morality (Ackley, 1976). As demonstrated in the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant (1967) did, in fact, consider results. By requiring universalizability of maxims, Kant (1967) obliquely recognized that results are a part of the moral process. In his theory of ethics, however, the role for results was an anticipatory and idealistic one (Ackley, 1976). Kant, however, certainly relegated results to a much less important role than did other philosophers. Utilitarianism, perhaps best associated with John Stuart Mill, placed results firmly in the foreground of the ethical picture. Utilitarian philosophy holds that human beings are moral or immoral because their actions do or do not result in the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Kimbrough, 1985).

As previously detailed, Kant (1925) believed that the rational will alone, meaning motives and intentions, was deserving of moral scrutiny or judgment. This view of morality ignored the importance of action. Ackley (1976) offered a succinct suggestion, "I believe Kant would have done better to include action and sincere attempts at action as equally important ingredients in his notion of will. This is so, since even in Kant's view a good will is good only insofar as it aims at universalizable action" (p. 53). Kant's (1925) view of will, here again, seems inadequate, or at the least incomplete. Dewey's (1936) definition of will seems a more powerful and compelling notion, "will or character means intelligent forethought of ends and resolute endeavor to achieve them" (p. 246).

The third challenge to Kant involves the autocratic premise of the specific and absolute rules he offers. An example is his famous premise that promises should never be broken (Kant, 1967). Ackley (1976) posed the reasonable question, "are there no circumstances under which a promise might be broken in order to serve a greater good?" (p. 58). Ackley (1976) challenged Kant on these grounds and suggested that Kant has overlooked what he terms the facts of the case, in morality. Ackley (1976) defined the facts of the case as those "circumstances out of which the moral dilemma has arisen and the best available evidence as to what the probable consequences would be of choosing each of the alternative courses of action available" (p. 54). Ackley

(1976) argued that even if a prima facie duty existed, however, circumstances might be such that the duty could not be fulfilled.

In his insightful critique, Ackley (1976) offered yet another challenge. Kant's (1967) cognitivist theory did offer a partial basis upon which to make moral decisions. However, Kant's (1967) formulations seem to require only consistency for his moral agents. While modern philosophers acknowledge that consistency is a prerequisite for moral thought, they have questioned whether it alone would suffice (Perelman, 1965). In other words, consistency may be thought of as a necessary, but insufficient characteristic of morality, much as reliability is related to validity in the field of statistics.

The final challenge to Kant's ethics is by far the most complicated and compelling, dealing as it does with his thinking about the structure of the mind. Kant's (1949b) work was based upon certain presuppositions which he regarded as necessary. These mathematical and logical presuppositions were accepted as true at the time in which he lived. Without the enormous detail necessary to accurately argue this position, the problem briefly stated, is that Kant (1949b) believed that Euclidean geometry was, in fact, a direct result of the structure of the mind (Perelman, 1965). Subsequent to Kant, three different geometric systems have been postulated. Once these several different rational systems of geometry were accepted, the Kantian notion of

geometric space dissolved (Perelman, 1965). Not only was it no longer possible to view geometry as a direct result of the mind, but the idea of truth must then be modified. As Perelman (1965) explained,

> a true proposition, it was formerly held, is a proposition which agrees with reality. Now we find ourselves faced with three systems of geometry, each as coherent and rational as the others, without being able to say which corresponds to reality. It appears from this that truth must be understood as coherence within a given system. . . . Truth is no longer a property of isolated propositions, but is correlated with the system of which the propositions form a part. (p. 203)

In simpler language, one might acknowledge that Kant's (1949b) imperatives and theory, in general, constitute truth within his given system, a system which defined morality in a narrow and prescriptive mode (Perelman, 1965). However, the larger implication from this final challenge is that Kantian ethics probably do not constitute the whole truth, just as Euclidean geometry no longer suffices as the whole of geometric truth.

Additional Problems with the Kantian Image

Kant's philosophy tremendously influenced the work of Jean Piaget (1932) and John Rawls (1971). Their work shaped Lawrence Kohlberg's (1958) theory of moral development. While Carol Gilligan (1982, 1988) has challenged the applicability of Kohlberg's theory for women and girls, it is the Kantian image of morality itself, which served as Kohlberg's foundation, with which many current moral philosophers take issue with. The Kantian version of morality has been detailed at some length in this review and

it was this Kantian image that the British philosopher Iris Murdoch (1970) undertook to supplant in The Sovereignty of Good.

Murdoch (1970) suggested that Kantian philosophy is flawed in two fundamental and related ways. She suggested first, that a Kantian morality simply ignores certain facts. Secondly, Kant's (1949b) claim of a unitary morality imposes a single theory of ethics, which allows no room for rival theories. In Murdoch's (1970) words, "if it is true that philosophy has almost always done this--it is also true that philosophers have never put up with it for very long" (p. 1).

Instances of the facts, as Murdoch (1970) called them, are ideas which have been forgotten or theorized away by Kantian philosophy. Chief among those ideas was the fact that love was central to the moral life. Murdoch (1970) assumed that love was essential to both the everyday and the moral life and wrote, "we need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now . . . can once again be made central" (p. 46).

Murdoch (1970) contended that present philosophers have inherited a powerful Kantian composite which pictures the just man only as a pure, reasoning will. This reduction of self to an "empty, isolated, choosing will or burrowing point of consciousness" (Murdoch, 1970, p. 48) was central to the philosophy of Kant. Kant's legacy, according to Murdoch (1970) is that of a separate, lone, and lonely will. As Murdoch (1970) explained, "the will . . . is isolated from

belief, from reason, from feeling, and is yet the essential centre of the self. Morality is a matter of thinking clearly and then proceeding to outward dealings with other men" (p. 8). Calling Kant's ideally rational man both alien and implausible, Murdoch (1970) rejected this picture of man on empirical, philosophical, and moral grounds,

> I have simple empirical objections (I do not think people are necessarily or essentially 'like that'); I have philosophical objections (I do not find the arguments convincing); and I have moral objections (I do not think people ought to picture themselves in this way). (p. 9)

There are, Murdoch (1970) suggested, three specific problems with humanity viewed as moral agents, "thin as a needle, (which) appear in the quick flash of the choosing will" (p. 53). First, life was more than a series of moments of discrete choice to Murdoch. Moral life operates continuously, she wrote, "not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices" (1970, p. 37).

Murdoch (1970) sought to replace this notion of moral choices arriving in one's life as independent episodes, with a more coherent and connected vision. Morality for Murdoch (1970) seemed more a dimly perceived system in which choices and acts of will emerge, in ways and for reasons that are both unclear and dependent upon the system's condition between moments of choice. Moral choice, then, "is often a mysterious matter" (1970, p. 53).

The Kantian version of a moral agent was an impoverished and inadequate image argued Murdoch (1970). In addition to

love, she suggested that the importance of other virtues, specifically goodness, be reaffirmed. Good has been superseded in Western moral philosophy by right, however, Murdoch (1970) contended that good, and not will was the primary and transcendent characteristic of morality.

Moral guidance, believed Murdoch (1970), could also be obtained from sources other than the rational will or categorical laws offered by Kant and those theorists who adopted his philosophy. Murdoch (1970) believed that ethics must be about more than a rational explanation of everyday behavior, and demanded an ethical system which was prescriptive not descriptive, complete with ways to achieve good conduct in the everyday life of the moral agent.

Finally, Murdoch (1970) argued persuasively that the moral self was not isolated, but was of necessity, connected to others. One acts morally, not as an exercise of the isolated will, but from, at least in part, one's attachments or relationships. Designating morality or goodness as a form of realism, she emphatically endorsed the moral community.

> The idea of a really good man living in a private dream world seems unacceptable. Of course, a good man may be infinitely eccentric, but he must know certain things about his surroundings, most obviously the existence of other people and their claims. The chief enemy of excellence in morality . . . is personal fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one. (1970, p. 59).

Murdoch's (1970) critique served as more than a compelling challenge to the primacy of the Kantian image of morality. The true value of her insight is appreciated best

as a vivid metaphysical backdrop against which a new and powerful version of moral philosophy might be drawn. Describing her work as a philosophical footnote, she concluded, "the sketch which I have offered, . . . must be judged by its power to connect, to illuminate, to explain, and to make new and fruitful places for reflection" (1970, p. 45).

Summary

The short summary of philosophic thought which began this analysis demonstrated that emotions were separated from Reason very early in the history of philosophy. Reason became equated with and glorified as morality itself. In addition, Reason became the province of man, while emotions were delegated to woman, thus relegating them to a less important, albeit complementary status.

Elaboration and refinement of Kant's categorical imperatives and notion of justice have become the dominant process of current moral thought. This image portrayed the moral agent as a rational, reasoning, isolated will, choosing to act based on universal and universalizable maxims (Murdoch, 1970). This image was specified by Kant and accepted as absolute by Kohlberg (1958), as he adopted the Justice orientation for moral development. This image of morality has been challenged as an impoverished and inadequate concept, unequal to the moral tasks currently before humanity by Murdoch and other modern moral philosophers.

Applied Research

> Unless I feel responsibility for others, how can my life be justified?
>
> Elie Wiesel

The first of the three serious challenges to Gilligan's research addressed by this study is theoretical in nature. Almost immediately after publication of In A Different Voice (1982), critics began to question Gilligan's assertion that Kohlberg's theory of moral development was flawed by an inherent sex bias. Gilligan's (1982) assertion of sex bias was based upon two points.

First, the exclusion of girls and women at the theory-building stage of moral development research, specifically that of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1958, 1971, 1983) had led to "consistent conceptual and observational bias" (Gilligan, 1986, p. 325). Gilligan believed that this exclusion of girls and women has serious negative consequences (1982b). She voiced concerns about Kohlberg's theory specifically in this way, "[it] reflects a limited Western male perspective, and may, therefore, be biased against women and other groups whose moral perspectives are somewhat different" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 36).

A secondary point in Gilligan's charge of sex bias was the initial position of Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) that adult women fixated at Stage 3, unlike adult men who progressed to Stage 4, of Kohlberg's six-stage theory of moral development. The most complete answer to Gilligan's charge of sex bias is

to be found in the often cited Walker (1984) meta-analysis which investigated sex differences in moral development research. Walker (1984) reviewed 54 studies which employed Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview and 24 studies which used Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test. The Rest (1979), Defining Issues Test (DIT), is a standardized, paper and pencil instrument which measures moral judgment on the Kohlberg scale. The DIT has been officially sanctioned by Kohlberg.

After an extensive review of this moral development research based on Kohlberg's theory, Walker (1984) consistently reported no significant sex differences. In other words, girls and women did not score significantly lower than did men or boys on the Kohlberg scale.

In the 31 studies focused on childhood and early adolescence, sex differences in moral reasoning were rare, however, when they did occur, females were more advanced (Walker, 1984). In the 35 studies focused on late adolescence, primarily among high school and college students, Walker (1984) found that 10 of the samples yielded significant sex differences. Most of these studies indicated more mature development for males, although Walker (1984) emphasized that the differences were quite small, usually less than half a stage.

Of the 12 studies focusing on adulthood, Walker (1984) identified four which reported significant sex differences, all of which indicated more mature development in males. The

four studies were Haan et al. (1976), Haan (1977), Holstein (1976), and Parikh (1980).

In summary, Walker (1984) concluded that Gilligan's charge of sex bias in Kohlberg's theory and scoring procedures could not be proven empirically. Gilligan's specific charge that women were assigned Stage 3 scores, while men were assigned Stage 4 scores was not evident in the research. Kohlberg (1983) believed Walker's research was sound and used his findings to refute Gilligan's charge.

Despite a continuing controversy over this issue, most critics have accepted Walker's (1984) meta-analysis as a complete answer to the charge of sex bias in Kohlberg's work. Walker, in fact, only addressed the second, and least important point made by Gilligan. In addition, some of the researchers whose work Walker summarized, have criticized his use of statistics and questioned his findings (Dickey, Kroll, & Jenkins, 1987).

Kohlberg (1983) concluded that where sex differences are reported by those using his theory and scoring procedures, those reported differences result from educational, political, and social role-taking opportunities more readily available to males. In a 1985 study, however, Haan controlled for education and social class, used Kohlberg's most recent scoring manual, and still reported significant sex differences. Baumrind's (1985) research actually reported that higher levels of education correlated with lower scores for women. Despite these challenges, Walker's (1984) review

did significantly weaken Gilligan's secondary assertion that women scored lower on Kohlberg's scale of moral development than did men.

The more serious and problematic charge that Kohlberg's work was based upon male samples and was thus a measure of male moral development cannot be so easily dismissed. Gilligan (1982) characterized the concern in this way, "if the criteria for development are derived from studies of males, and these criteria are then used to measure the development of females, the question being asked is how much like men do women develop?" (p. 200)

Gilligan's essential challenge was that Kohlberg's theory and scoring procedures measure Justice reasoning, which like Kant before him, Kohlberg equated with morality. While women could be measured on that scale, a theory of moral development based solely on Justice was an inadequate and incomplete measure of the morality of women (Gilligan, 1982). Thus, while the Justice reasoning of women may be accurately measured by the Kohlberg scale, that theory did not account for how most women and some men, construct, resolve, and evaluate real life moral problems.

Analysis, Synthesis, and Results

> We discover who we are face to face and side by side with others in work, love, and learning. All of our activity goes on in relationships, groups, associations, and communities ordered by institutional structures and interpreted by cultural patterns of meaning.
>
> Bellah et al.

As outlined in Chapter 1, the research in this study endeavored to answer three of the most serious challenges to Gilligan's theory of moral development. One of those challenges asserted that Gilligan's work was suspect on philosophical grounds. In order to answer that philosophical challenge, the Kantian philosophic tradition of reason, duty, and will was contrasted with an alternative aretaic approach in the Philosophical section of Chapter 2. This alternative aretaic approach provided a philosophical basis for Gilligan's research. The elaboration of a philosophical foundation for Gilligan's theory, however, only partially answered the philosophical questions which surround Gilligan's work.

In order to fully address the philosophical concerns raised about Gilligan's theory, more extensive philosophical research was required. The philosophical results which follow are the outcome of that research. As a result of that philosophical work, three metaethical assumptions, implicitly suggested throughout Gilligan's work, were identified. In addition, a working philosophical framework which supports Gilligan's Ethic of Care was conceptualized.

Implicit Philosophical Assumptions of Gilligan's Moral Theory

One cannot deny that the Justice orientation to moral development, elaborated by Kohlberg, rests upon a solid, well-defined, and generally accepted philosophical foundation. Although there have been a number of traditional challenges on content and more recent challenges on the

limited definition of morality, to the Kantian legacy, moral philosophy and its stepchild moral psychology, are still dominated by Kant's work. There do exist, however, theoretical precedents for the Care orientation of moral development articulated in Gilligan's developmental theory.

Ideas drawn from Aristotle (1963), David Hume (1987), Iris Murdoch (1970), Lawrence Blum (1980), and Richard Neibuhr (1963) appeared in new combinations in Gilligan's theory. Prior to elaborating the actual philosophical constructs which define Gilligan's model, however, the first essential task is to unravel the web of assumptions upon which that concept of morality is structured.

In order to perform an adequate philosophical analysis, the assumptions implicitly suggested in Gilligan's work must be explicitly stated. Current literature suggested that this task has not heretofore been attempted (Sichel, 1988; Luria, 1986). There are numerous philosophical assumptions imbedded in Gilligan's theory. However, due to the limited scope of this endeavor, only three of the most important will be discussed.

The first metaethical assumption imbedded in the work of Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1988) was the belief that the nature of morality is not deontological, but aretaic. Broughton (1983) identified this assumption and wrote that Gilligan had "shifted the metaethical ground of the psychology of normative ethics" (p. 623) replacing Kohlberg's deontological approach with an aretaic alternative. He defined aretaic

philosophy as "one that is oriented to virtues and that describes qualities of the ideal person and the good life rather than prescribing the rights and obligations that comprise a just society" (1983, p. 623).

The intellectual lineage of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Lawrence Kohlberg elaborated a notion of the ideally moral community as the "just society." Carol Gilligan offered in its stead, an ideal of the "good society." This aretaic alternative was the first major philosophic assumption upon which Gilligan constructed her theory of moral development. However, philosophers who emphasized virtue rather than justice can be traced back to Aristotle (1963). David Hume (1987), whom Kant "set out to answer" (p. 39) has been joined by a number of contemporary philosophers who rejected the concept of morality as limited to the rational, reasoning will. Morality for these philosophers was more than rights and obligations.

While primarily noted for his work on the problem of change, the theory of knowledge, laws of association, definitions, logic and reasoning, Aristotle (1963) was also concerned with the moral life. There are a number of Aristotle's ideas which are reflected in Gilligan's work. Chief among them is the cultivation of moral character. Moral judgments were to be based upon deliberations of what was good, true, noble and appropriate, given the specifics of each circumstance (Aristotle, 1963). Good was not an abstract concept, but a demonstration of the morally

reflective self, within given social and political systems (Aristotle, 1987). The social aspect of morality was inherent, given Aristotle's view of human beings as political entities.

The work of David Hume (1975) provided considerable philosophical support for Gilligan's implicit assumption that a deontological view of ethics was an inadequate philosophy with which to construct a moral world. The aretaic alternative, with its emphasis upon virtues, found a proponent in Humean ethics which emphasized the cultivation of character traits, rather than obedience to universal laws. Hume (1975) suggested that this process of character cultivation would lead one to an inner peace and a life of integrity.

While not totally discounting the value of general rules or laws, Hume (1975) limited the importance of conformity to such rules. Hume's view of the moral self, the 'good-fellow person' did not consult a universal book of rules, but instead, developed sympathy, pride, self-esteem, generosity, compassion, integrity, honesty, and a host of other virtues (1987).

Morality itself, for Hume (1987) depended upon self-corrected sentiments, or passions, as much or more than it depended upon the reason that concurs with and serves those passions. Hume's morality, in addition to the development of specific virtues, was a product of one's endeavor to eliminate the contradictions which arose from a sensitivity

to one's own and others' needs and desires (1987). The importance of an aretaic philosophy becomes evident in an analysis of the work of philosophers such as Aristotle and Hume. This aretaic philosophical position supports Gilligan's first assumption; the "good society" is as desirable a goal as is Kohlberg's "just society."

The second metaethical assumption unearthed in a philosophical analysis of Gilligan's work was a view of morality which hinged upon a "connectedness to others." Morality as an isolated virtue is meaningless in an Ethic of Care. Individual virtue is best expressed within the dynamic of human interaction. The centrality of "connectedness to others" is, therefore, unavoidable in the moral life. One of Hume's (1987) contributions to philosophic thought was the creation of a list of desirable virtues. It is important to note that many of those virtues are social in nature, involving relationships with others (1987). Murdoch (1970) echoed this theme when she wrote that moral philosophy cannot be reduced to contractual obligations, justly reasoned and honored, but must cover the entirety of one's life, including relations with the rest of the world (1970).

In Gouinlock's (1976) edition of The Moral Writings of John Dewey, this progressive educator and philosopher used a biological analogy to illustrate the moral self,

> and as the activity of each cell is conditioned and directed by those with which it interacts, so the human being whom we fasten upon as individual par excellence is moved and regulated by his associations with others; what he does and what the

> consequences of his behavior are, what his experience consists of, cannot even be described, much less accounted for, in isolation. (p. 110)

The centrality of connection to and with other human beings was a recurring theme in Dewey's work on morality. Dewey (1920) even seemed to question whether a moral self could exist apart from association with others. He stressed the importance of relationships in the social environment, rather than the isolated self.

The third metaethical assumption made by Gilligan was the notion of morality as a pluralistic concept, not a unitary one. Therefore, the celebration of Justice as the singular exemplar of morality was misplaced. As previously demonstrated in this review, the Justice orientation of Kohlberg was based upon the Kantian image of morality. Kant (1925, 1965) viewed morality as a unitary system, having a single foundation. In Kantian ethics, Justice was <u>the</u> primary value. Such an image precludes the existence of other moral systems; right reigns ever supreme over good.

In 1981, Kohlberg wrote a chapter reinvoking the Socratic claim that virtue has but one name, that of Justice. Kohlberg reasserted a claim for the primacy of Justice by discussing Rawls' (1971) <u>Theory of Justice</u>. Rawls (1971) believed that Justice was the first virtue of a society. Following the Platonic tradition, the first virtue of society also served as the first virtue for a person. Thus, Justice was the first, best, and only definition of morality for

Kohlberg (1971) and researchers who accepted his theory of moral development.

Even philosophers who have disagreed with Gilligan's theory, accord a grudging respect for her attack upon this monolithic concept of morality. Broughton (1983) made the point well, "in drawing attention to the multiplicity of metaethical frameworks, she (Gilligan) has offset any Kohlbergian tendencies to theoretical imperialism" (p. 635). This philosophic assumption may be partially ascribed to Lawrence Blum (1980) who made a compelling argument for the validity of altruistic emotions as moral good without discarding previous notions of rationality and justice. Blum (1980) defended the significance of the altruistic emotions while acknowledging the importance of values associated with the Kantian view.

"When I argue for a morality of sympathy, compassion, and concern, I am seeing this as only a part of an overall 'pluralistic' view of morality," wrote Blum (1980, p. 9). The tendency to impose a unitary structure, was in Murdoch's (1970) words, "an occupational hazard of moral philosophy" (p. 49-50). In an insightful critique, Modgil and Modgil (1986) examined Kohlberg's position in which he empirically demonstrated that Justice is superior to love in moral decision-making. Such a claim was possible for Kohlberg, only if one accepted the Kantian view that Justice was <u>the</u> key element in ethics. Therefore, if Justice was the normative goal, then whatever empirically best approached

that norm was more moral by definition. Kohlberg (1983) himself acknowledged that it is the normative which shapes and illuminates the empirical data. Modgil and Modgil (1986) concluded that Justice may be only one of several key ethical considerations in the moral universe.

Taken together, the opinions of Blum (1980), Broughton (1983), and Modgil and Modgil (1986) present a compelling argument for a pluralistic conception of morality. The work of Dewey (1936), Murdoch (1970), and Bair (1987) demonstrated support for the centrality of connection to others as an ethical construct. An aretaic orientation has been promulgated by philosophers such as Aristotle (1963), Hume (1975), and more recently, Murdoch (1970) and Blum (1980). This cursory review has attempted to identify three of the assumptions implied in the moral theory of Carol Gilligan. Once identified, these three metaethical assumptions provide a visible foundation upon which a conceptual philosophical framework for Gilligan's theory can be constructed. Since this review is not intended as a pure philosophical analysis, no attempt to prove these assumptions was undertaken. Kohlberg (1981) himself argued aptly that "philosophical assumptions need not be 'proven' in order to be employed" (p. 98).

The Philosophy of Responsible Altruism: Response, Responsiveness, and Responsibility

This analysis has thus far revealed ideas derived from numerous philosophers which appeared in Gilligan's theory of

moral development. Their concept of morality stands in stark contrast to the current predominant philosophical image, a legacy bequeathed by Immanuel Kant. Three of the metaethical assumptions inherent in Gilligan's work have been isolated and examined.

While this evidence certainly grounds Gilligan's theory in philosophical constructs, it only begins to answer the question of whether an Ethic of Care is supported by a fully developed, rational, and coherent philosophical model. The next task undertaken in this review becomes the articulation of a philosophical framework--a philosophy termed in this analysis, Responsible Altruism. Thus, the metaethical assumptions once identified, become a visible foundation for the conceptual, philosophical framework of Responsible Altruism. As a working philosophy for an Ethic of Care, Responsible Altruism is conceived of having three essential components: Response, Responsiveness, and Responsibility.

Response

As its designation suggests, the Response component of the philosophical model is primarily concerned with how the moral self reacts to the world in which it exists. Recalling that one of Gilligan's implicit metaethical assumptions was the centrality of connection to others, Response indicates the appropriate activity of morality. Baier (1987) suggested that, "a human heart, as well as human reason is needed for the understanding of morality, and the heart's responses are to particular persons, not to universal principles of

abstract justice" (p. 41). Baier's (1987) insight is doubly effective in that she not only identified the essential moral activity--Response; but, indicated that the nature of that response is affective, as well as cognitive.

The term Responsible Altruism is derivative of Blum's (1980) work on altruistic emotions. Those emotions were central to the idea of Response as used in this context. Blum (1980) identified those altruistic emotions as, "sympathy, compassion, and human concern considered primarily as emotions, but also as character traits, and on friendship as a context in which these emotions play a fundamental role" (p. 1).

Given that one of the metaethical assumptions which presupposes Gilligan's theory is the notion of morality as a pluralistic concept, the Kantian virtues of reason and will are not precluded by adopting the philosophy of Responsible Altruism. Hume (1978) described reason and logic as slaves to the passions of the moral self, in that reason enabled one to anticipate probable consequences for alternate courses of action. He denied, however, that reason alone accounts for human action, instead suggesting that it was the sentiments and affections of mankind which do so (Hume, 1978). Hoffman (1976) reiterated this theme, emphasizing the importance of empathy, sympathy, and altruistic motives in morality.

One additional virtue, that of dependence, is characteristic of the kind of Response demanded in this conception of morality. In the Kantian/Kohlberg lexicon,

dependence assumed a negative connotation in that it hampered the development of autonomy, a critical feature of development. Dependence is reconfigured in Gilligan's work and appeared not only as a virtue, but as part of how one responds to others. In her words, being dependent does not mean, "being helpless, powerless, and without control; rather, it signifies a conviction that one is able to have an effect upon others, as well as the recognition that the interdependence of attachment empowers both the self and the other" (Gilligan, 1988, p. 16). This active construction positions dependence as a characteristic way of responding, rather than as a failure of autonomy (Gilligan, 1988).

The Response component of Responsible Altruism is characterized, then, by a genuine regard for the good of another person or by behavior which arises from such a concern. Blum (1980) compared this regard to Butler's (1950) concept of benevolence, stripped of its self-sacrificing connotation. The philosophical concept of Response as articulated here is clearly evident in Gilligan's Care orientation to morality. Broughton (1983) described Gilligan's stages of moral development as a "progressive emergence of an orientation to affective qualities of sympathy, caring, and tolerance of ambiguity" (p. 601).

With an understanding of the kinds of altruistic emotions that constitute an appropriately moral reaction, it becomes important to differentiate between episodic and nonepisodic Response. It could be successfully argued that a

moral person might have concern, for example, about the plight of another human being under the Kantian scheme of ethics. This is an episodic use of this emotional term, and while it involves both cognitive and affective components is significantly different from the use of concern as an ongoing Response, as that term is used here as a component of Responsible Altruism. Being concerned about, or having concern for another, as a moral Response in Responsible Altruism is used in a nonepisodic sense. Thus, a concerned Response is not one employed on specific occasions or limited in time. It is nonepisodic and ongoing in nature (Blum, 1980).

As the first component of Responsible Altruism, Response has been identified as <u>the</u> appropriate moral activity and the emotions/character traits associated with it have been described. Response has been characterized as a genuine regard for the good of others or behavior which arises from that concern. One final aspect of the Response concept which deserves attention is an understanding of moral action. A useful tool in explaining the Responsible Altruist's concept of moral action is to delineate differences which distinguish that concept from the Kantian-Kohlberg view of moral action.

Both systems suggest that the moral agent take the interests of others into account. As detailed in the discussion on the Categorical Imperative, the Kantian model demands that an action must be capable of being generalized and made universal, if it is to be described as moral action.

Consistency, rationality, obligation, an unwavering allegiance to Justice, and 'giving each his due' are hallmarks of moral action in this ethical system (Kant, 1925, 1949).

Blum (1980) articulated a vision of moral action which differed from the Kantian model in two distinct ways. For the Responsible Altruist, action need not be grounded in universal principles, nor must it be generalizeable to all other persons in similar circumstances. In addition, the Responsible Altruist does not act because of obligation, or because of duty. While allowing that it is often desirable to act from universal principles, or from a sense of duty, the concept of Responsible Altruism expands beyond these limitations. Blum (1980) believed that action grounded in "universalizeable principles of obligation does not exhaust the area of morally good action" (p. 93).

The source of moral authority from whence the Responsible Altruist acts is concern and care for the welfare of others. The moral agent, in responding to another's needs, does not evaluate that action against an abstract and universal code. Instead, the moral agent evaluates action in terms of responding to situations by attempting to affect the welfare of others positively. It is this essential desire for another's good which grounds the moral action of the Responsible Altruist (Blum, 1980).

Thus, two structures for moral action emerge. For the Kantian, moral action is grounded in rational and universal

principles. The notions of generality, universalizeability, and consistency are central. When an agent acts, it is in accordance with a principle or maxim. Identical acts can be derived from different principles, and conversely, the same principle might initiate various acts by different agents. In order to assess the morality of any action, the action and its initiating principle must be viewed together (Blum, 1980). For the Responsible Altruist, moral action includes a certain intention (fostering the good of another). The moral agent acts in response to the particular considerations of the situation.

Morality, in this view, is not a function of universality, obligation, or duty. These Kantian requirements are rejected as limiting too severely the domain in which morally good action can occur (Blum, 1980). The intrinsic value of moral action which reflects those emotions or character traits previously described (sympathy, kindness, compassion, etc.), cannot be denied in the real sense of the real world.

The value of reflection in moral action is paramount in the Kantian scheme. Morally good acts must be judged for their moral appropriateness, which is accomplished through reflection and comparison with a universal code of ethics (Kant, 1925, 1949). Responsible Altruism does not necessarily involve reflection or the type of judgment associated with Kant and Kohlberg. As Blum (1980) explained, "acting from kindness or compassion means recognizing that

someone is in need and being moved by that consideration to help" (p. 92). The link between the perception of need and action is a direct and powerful one. Niebuhr (1963) reinforced the importance of the perception component of action by emphasizing not only responsive action, but a response which interprets the circumstances of the situation. Figure 1 represents the difference in moral action for the Kantian/Kohlbergian and the Responsible Altruist.



Figure 1. Moral Action.

In addition to illustrating the importance of reflection to moral action, Figure 1 emphasizes the differences in perception to need which are inherent within each system. Blum (1980) contended that individuals usually characterized as being kind, compassionate, sympathetic, etc. were more perceptive to the needs of others. Thus, they were more likely to understand situations in those terms. This last point is important because Blum (1980) argued that how one responded to others, was dependent in large part on how the situation was perceived. Thus, a complete moral theory must include not only motive and action, but perception as well.

Blum (1980) portrayed the Kantian moral agent as conscientious in doing his duty to help others, once convinced that others were in distress. The problem, warned Blum (1980) is that, "such a person will not naturally perceive others in distress to the extent that the sympathetic person does. Thus, he will less often actually be convinced of the need, pain, suffering, distress of others than will the sympathetic person" (p. 137). Kant (1965) himself cautioned the would-be moral agent against such over-involvement in the concerns of others.

> It is not possible that our heart should swell from fondness for every man's interest and should swim in sadness at every stranger's need; else the virtuous man, incessantly dissolving like Heraclitus in compassionate tears, nevertheless with all this goodheartedness would become nothing but a tenderhearted idler. (1965, p. 58-59)

The conception of Response which has emerged in this review, withstands Kant's prediction that becoming overly

concerned, overly perceptive to the needs of others will disable the moral agent. For the Responsible Altruist, a profession of sympathy, care or concern, without complementary action is meaningless. As conceived by Blum (1980) and used here, it is only the willingness to act that confirms the authenticity of altruistic feelings.

Responsiveness

The second major aspect of the Responsible Altruism philosophical framework is Responsiveness. Responsiveness as used in this context reflects what Niebuhr (1963) called the psychology of interaction. It is this interactional pattern of thought which most accurately describes current interpersonal, political, educational, and economic endeavors. Niebuhr (1963) wrote,

> the faculty psychology of the past which saw in the self three or more facient powers, and the associationist psychology which understood the mind to operate under laws of association, have been replaced by a psychology of interaction which has made familiar to us the idea that we act in reaction to stimuli. Biology and sociology as well as psychology have taught us to regard ourselves as beings in the midst of a field of natural and social forces, acted upon and reacting, attracted and repelling. (p. 56)

Niebuhr (1963) conceded that this image of self was not yet widespread in the field of ethics, but argued that the moral life, is in fact, the Responsive life. In this view the human agent lives as a Responsive being in the natural world, reacting and interpreting the natural events that occur. Niebuhr (1963) extended the analogy by claiming that the moral agent also lives as a Responsive being in the social world,

reacting and interpreting events that affect one. Building on this foundation, the Responsible Altruist believes that the self is more than a rational being in a world of ideas, and that the moral self is defined by more than mores or laws. The Responsible Altruist believes, as did Niebuhr, in "the fundamentally social character of selfhood" (1963, p. 71).

Blum (1980) insisted that how one interacted with others was an essential and critical feature of morality. He termed this social interaction as "being-with-others" and defined it as "those attitudes, values, and orientations which govern social intercourse" (p. 172). Blum (1980) acknowledged that one's being-with-others did not constitute the entirety of morality, but insisted that the nature of one's social interaction was an important component (1980). Dewey (1920) reinforced this notion in his work on morality by describing the self-responsive to others as a "fuller and broader self than one which is cultivated in isolation from or in opposition to the purposes and needs of others" (p. 118).

Niebuhr's idea about the social character of selfhood and Blum's notion of being-with-others as an essential component of morality, contributed to the concept of Responsiveness for the Responsible Altruist. However, Responsiveness as a moral construct appears in the work of earlier philosophers. In Volume IX, Ethica Nicomachea, Aristotle (1925) emphasized the necessity of feeling fear, anger, pity, appetite, and other emotions, "at the right times, with reference to the right

objects, towards the right people, and with the right motive and in the right way" (BK II, 6, p. 1106).

Many of the virtues extolled by Hume (1985) as constituting morality are social in nature. Beyond the virtues themselves, however, was Hume's (1985) expression of moral cooperation. In fact, his account of the sentiments and virtues of the moral person makes one reactive to the sentiments of others (1987). Hume's (1978) own words contribute greatly to understanding the concept of Responsiveness being developed here.

> We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when enjoy'd apart from company, and every pain more cruel and intolerable. Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others. (p. 363)

Martin Buber's (1923/1958) concept of the I-Thou relationship is also relevant to this concept of Responsiveness. For Buber (1923/58), I-Thou relationships occurred between unique individuals, each retaining their respective selfhood. Max Scheler's (1931/1954) concept of authentic sympathy carried with it a recognition of Responsiveness as acceptance and reaction to others. Both Buber's and Scheler's ideas were incorporated into this notion of Responsiveness.

The construct of Responsiveness also carries within it an implicit sense of interpretation and reaction. Thus far,

Response has been construed as a reaction of one moral agent to another. However, acceptance of the Responsiveness construct means a willingness to accept the changeability of morality itself. Responsiveness on the part of the moral agent carries with it the responsibility of interpreting and reacting to the changing world which the agent inherits. Thus, this notion of Responsiveness rejects the Kantian notion of universal laws, which once established, remain inviolate for all time. Dewey (1936) believed that the rules of ethics made by humans are not universal; they are malleable and affected by change, just as the natural world changes. He concluded that what is considered acceptable ethical behavior today, may be unacceptable tomorrow (Dewey, 1936).

Gilligan's (1988) vision that individuals acquired meaning in relationships and that those relationships were central to morality, is directly supported by this interpretation of Responsiveness. For the Responsible Altruist, the moral self is defined through the experience of connection and develops through interaction. This is what Gilligan (1988) termed, "the responsiveness of human engagement" (p. 7). The ideas of Aristotle, Hume, Niebuhr, Blum, Buber, and Scheler have been incorporated and give form to the construct of Responsiveness.

Responsibility

In Gilligan's theory of moral development Responsibility was used to describe one who answers to, or takes care of the needs of another (Lyons, 1989). This differs from current

usage in that Responsibility is most often currently associated with moral accountability and obligation. It was frequently used to describe contractual relationships in the Justice-oriented Kohlbergian morality. Responsibility as the final component in the philosophical framework of Responsible Altruism harkens back to a much earlier use of the word. This use of Responsibility carries a sense of 'answering to something' (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. responsibility). In the 19th century, this earlier meaning was lost, as Responsibility became associated with duty, obligation, and rational conduct (Lyons, 1989). Responsibility as a construct of Responsible Altruism is closely allied with the dimensions of Response and Responsiveness previously detailed. Moral Responsibility means interacting responsively in relationships. However, Responsibility extends the concept of Responsiveness to include taking the initiative for sensitivity to the needs of others. In addition, Responsibility carries an injunction to respond to the needs of others (Gilligan, 1989).

The second aspect of Responsibility logically follows the first. By accepting a definition which involves a mandate to care about and respond to the needs of others, how then, does one evaluate the morality of one's choices? What is the criterion against which the moral agent might measure decisions, choices, or action? For the Kantian, the criterion against which action must be evaluated is the Categorical Imperative. As elaborated by Kohlberg (1971), this Kantian

philosophy was operationalized to mean Justice. Has justice been served in a fair and equitable manner? This becomes the central question in determining whether moral responsibility has been fulfilled.

For the Responsible Altruist, the ethical choice is that which best serves the needs of that situation, what Murdoch (1970) called the particulars of the case. The consequences of choices becomes the criterion in determining the morality of those choices (Broughton, 1983). This philosophy has been operationalized by Gilligan and her colleagues as a Care orientation. As such, how the perceived problem is resolved is central in evaluating the morality of an action. Has the relationship been sustained, restored or improved? This becomes the central question in determining whether moral Responsibility has been fulfilled (Lyons, 1989).

Beyond definition of the Responsibility concept and elaboration of its' criterion of worth, one additional aspect of this construct deserves elaboration. Thus far, Responsibility has been discussed within the context of relationships. However, the third and highest level of Gilligan's theory of moral development was based upon equal maintenance of Responsibility to one's self and others. The moral agent must internalize the transition 'from goodness to truth' as the necessary central insight in proceeding to the highest stage of development where concern for self and others is finally equalized (Gilligan, 1982).

The work of David Hume (1978) provided support for the aretaic nature of morality implicit in Gilligan's theory and has helped define the constructs upon which the philosophical framework of Responsible Altruism is based. Primary among Hume's contributions was the social nature of Response and Responsiveness. For Hume (1987), however, morality must solve intrapersonal as well as interpersonal problems. An effective ethical philosophy must address the conflict, contradiction, and instability inherent in all human lives. Morality for Hume (1987) saved one from self-defeating personal behaviors, as well as self-defeating social behaviors.

By acknowledging the necessity of personal Responsibility, the philosophical framework developed herein meets Hume's requirements. The sensitivity to needs demanded by Responsibility, as developed here, is no less critical when applied to the moral agent's own life. Consequence of behavior is no less stringent a criterion when applied to one's self, as well as to others. In short, the Responsible Altruist must accord Responsibility for self an equal moral claim and is subsequently compelled by that philosophy to act upon such a claim.

Carol Gilligan (1988) acknowledged that her theory of development, which is based upon an Ethic of Care, is as yet, not fully elaborated and lacks a ready vocabulary of moral philosophy. While the ideas of many philosophers appeared throughout her work, there was no attempt to solidify those contributions into a coherent, rational whole which could

function as a working philosophical model. It was in an effort to begin the discussion which could ultimately result in such a complete model, that the philosophy of Responsible Altruism is tendered. The allied constructs of that philosophy, Response, Responsiveness, and Responsibility originate in the writing of Gilligan and her associates and were developed through analysis of both current and previous philosophers.

Challenges to the Philosophy of Responsible Altruism

Having elaborated the concept of Responsible Altruism, several challenges to that model will now be identified and discussed, thus following the format most frequently used in a philosophical analysis. There are two major areas which appear most problematic for Responsible Altruism. Answering those challenges by further refinement of the philosophical framework is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is in an effort to begin the dialogue which will eventually result in such refinement, that the following challenges are identified.

Gilligan's Care orientation to morality, and the altruistic emotions which are a significant component of the Response construct of Responsible Altruism, are limited in that they have not yet been applied to the public domain. Significant work remains before the model of Responsible Altruism could be readily applied beyond the confines of personal relationships. Broughton (1983) articulated this challenge well, "caring is limited as the basis of an ethical

orientation unless it can overcome the parochiality that its association with friends and family tends to convey" (p. 614).

Sichel (1985) reiterated this challenge in a reminder that Blum's altruistic emotions have not yet been applied to public policy, institutional issues, or problems of professional life. Kohlberg et al. (1983) also questioned the viability of an Ethic of Care in resolving the public and professional moral problems of one's life. Can the constructs of Response, Responsiveness, and Responsibility be applied to the entirety of one's moral life? Can Responsible Altruism provide a philosophy which will enable both theorists and practitioners to conceive and attempt the good society as opposed to the just society? Much painstaking philosophical work remains before those questions can be answered affirmatively.

The second challenge to which Responsible Altruism is vulnerable rests upon its attempt to attend to the particulars of each situation, thus abandoning any attempt at universality. Further, by establishing the consequence of action as the only criterion for evaluating the morality of choices, the moral agent has little assistance prior to the fact, or during the resolution of conflict. The human agent is thus cast adrift in a sea of moral conflict, with little provision to assist in survival, beyond an injunction to do whatever works, as long as one cares for the other person. What one ought to do, is therefore, reduced to what one does. Or as Broughton (1983) phrased it, "'ought' is thus reduced to

'is' and prescriptive to descriptive, just as philosophical moralists from Dewey to Kohlberg had warned" (p. 631). Sophisticated philosophical refinement of Responsible Altruism will obviously be necessary in order to prevent this framework from committing the naturalistic fallacy.

Summary of Philosophical Results

Three of the implicit metaethical assumptions which presuppose Gilligan's theory of moral development have been identified and explicated. Based upon the philosophical ideas referenced in Gilligan's theory, a coherent, rational, conceptual framework of moral philosophy was developed.

The philosophy of Responsible Altruism was proffered in an attempt to begin the dialogue necessary for development of a comprehensive moral philosophy which supports the work of Gilligan. The philosophy of Responsible Altruism contains the constructs of Response, Responsiveness, and Responsibility. Response suggests the appropriate moral activity. The moral agent has a mandate to interpret and respond to the world with the altruistic emotions of sympathy, compassion, concern, and dependence, fully recognizing their worth and validity. Contained within the Response construct is an admonition for moral action, conditioned by heightened sensitivity to the needs of others.

The Responsiveness construct suggests that the moral self is defined through the experience of connection and develops through interaction in a world of relationships. This pattern of reacting to and interpretation of others' actions, choices,

and decisions underscores the fundamentally social nature of moral selfhood.

Responsibility is defined by its earliest meaning of one who answers to, or takes care of the needs of others. Responsibility also implies accountability for one's decisions and actions. Consequences validate the morality of one's choices. Responsibility is also interpreted as being both intrapersonal and interpersonal in nature. The moral agent has Responsibility for not only attending to the needs of others, but personal needs as well.

This philosophic analysis began with the essential question of all moral agents, "What shall I do?" As documented by the literature analysis, the deontologist, as elaborated by Kant and theorized by Kohlberg, answers: "What is my duty, my obligation, what are the competing claims?" In Niebuhr's (1963) words, "What is the law, and what is the first law of my life?"

The Responsible Altruist answers "What shall I do?" differently. "What are the circumstances? What are the needs of those involved?" In short, "How can I best care for others and for myself?"

In response to the probing attack of prominent philosophers, Lawrence Kohlberg (1983) defended the philosophic assumptions upon which his theory of moral development was based and the theory of moral development that he had constructed. In his words, "at a philosophical level, these assumptions remain controversial, but their use has led

to the discovery of empirical findings which seem to justify their continued use" (1983, p. 9).

Carol Gilligan's theory of moral development is arguably the most dramatic and significant challenge to Kohlberg's dominance of modern moral philosophy in the past 40 years. While many of the assumptions explicated in this analysis, as well as the philosophy of Responsible Altruism, are bound to be controversial, one is reminded of the appropriateness of Kohlberg's remarks.

CHAPTER 3
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

> Science, then can test whether a philosopher's conception of morality phenomenologically fits the psychological facts. [However] science cannot go on to justify that conception of morality as to what morality ought to be.
>
> Lawrence Kohlberg

General Research Design

This study was an exploration of the variables of gender and race in the moral development of college students and did so by replicating the research of Carol Gilligan. The purpose of the study was to examine her theory of moral reasoning in order to seek evidence that either supported or disconfirmed the claim that individuals primarily used one of two different moral orientations when faced with real-life moral dilemmas.

In addition, the study was designed to investigate whether individuals used one of two separate modes of self-definition and whether moral orientation was related to one of these distinct modes of defining the self. The purpose of the study was also to address the three most serious challenges to Gilligan's research (one of which was theoretical, one philosophical, and one methodological).

In order to answer the fundamental theoretical challenge of whether an Ethic of Care could be shown empirically to exist, 20 college students were interviewed and tape

recorded. Transcripts of those interviews were then coded by the principal investigator and two additional scorers.

The Coding Schemes developed by Lyons (1982) were utilized in coding participants' responses regarding moral orientation (an Ethic of Care or an Ethic of Justice) and for mode of Self-Definition (Connected or Separate/Objective). Data collected were analyzed in each of those sections in terms of the study's two variables--gender and race. Relationships between these variables were then explored within the context of Gilligan's theory.

In addition to the principal investigator, two additional independent scorers coded 10 of the interviews. Using additional scorers to code one-half of the interviews was consistent with Lyons' methodology in developing the Manual for Coding Real-Life Dilemmas (1982). Information on Lyons' Manual for Coding Real-Life Dilemmas appears in Appendix G. The research of Gilligan and her associates relied upon scorers who received extensive training through Harvard's Center for Moral Development. A secondary and more practical goal of this study was to determine if typical student services practitioners could reliably score this type of data with minimal training.

The two student services practitioners received 3 hours of moral development training, which included practice using the Lyons Coding Schemes to interpret real-life moral dilemmas. Facilitating the transition of Gilligan's theory from the textbook into a practical tool for student services

professionals became a secondary purpose of this study. By demonstrating that practitioners could, with minimal training, utilize this dramatic new theory to enhance their work with students provided a practical, as well as theoretical, foundation for the study.

Population

The population for this study consisted of all students at a mid-sized state college which fell within selected demographic parameters. Only full-time, traditionally aged, students 18-25 years old were included in the population.

Sample

A sample comprised of equal numbers of male and female volunteers was solicited for this study. Twenty students at the college were interviewed and tape recorded. One-half of the males and one-half of the females were African-American students. The other one-half of the sample were Caucasian students.

Gilligan and her associates deliberately concentrated on sampling criteria of high intelligence, education, and social class. No such attempt was undertaken in this study. The college from which the sample was drawn, had as its residential population students who primarily came from the inner city of New York. A majority of the students came from poor, disadvantaged neighborhoods. Almost all were first generation college students. Many came with an academic background below the national norms. Fifteen of the 20 participants in the study were resident students, with the

remaining five being commuters. The commuting students came from significantly different homes. They were drawn from the upscale, suburban communities of Long Island.

Data Collection

After securing permission to conduct the study from the college's faculty committee on research, the following steps were initiated to secure a sample from the population.

1. During the summer and fall of the 1992-93 academic year, the researcher visited six classrooms in the psychology, sociology, and American studies departments. After a short presentation on the research project, interested volunteers signed up to participate in the study.

2. In addition, the researcher made similar presentations to a number of student clubs and organizations (Student Government Association, the Residence Hall Council, the Inter-Greek Council, Pre-Law Society, and the Afrikaan Peoples Organization). In each case, interested volunteers were solicited and signed up for individual appointments.

3. Presentations were also made during the training programs for Resident Assistants, Judicial Board members, and Safety Aides.

4. The tape recorded individual interviews with students followed the Interview Protocol developed by Gilligan and her colleagues.

Data were collected in the individual interviews by using three portions of the Interview Protocol developed by Gilligan, Langdale, and Lyons (1982). The remaining two

portions of the Interview Protocol were irrelevant and inappropriate given the scope of this study. The Interview Protocol appears in Appendix C. Permission to use this Interview Protocol was obtained from Lyons.

The interviewer asked follow-up questions to those shown on the Interview Protocol. These follow-up questions were designed to encourage participants to clarify and elaborate their responses. Participants were also asked to explain what was meant by words like obligation, moral, fair, selfish, caring, and responsibility.

This open-ended interview, conducted in a clinical manner, was derived from Piaget (1929/1979) and was successfully used by Kohlberg in his moral development research. Gilligan's (1982, 1988) research adopted Kohlberg's use of this hermeneutic, cognitive-structural approach.

Habermas' (1983) elaboration and clarification of Kohlberg's method of inquiry is appropriate here and offers insight into this methodology. Interpretation, said Habermas (1983), is a hermeneutic art, and "rests on trying to come to agreement with another member of a speech-community who is expressing his or her belief about something in the world" (p. 257).

Kohlberg (1983) combined Habermas' interpretive hermeneutic framework with his own cognitive-structural approach. Since Gilligan (1982) adopted Kohlberg's structured interview process for her own data collection,

understanding this hermeneutic, cognitive-structural framework becomes important for this study. Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983) described their hermeneutic, cognitive-structural approach in this way.

> First, the observations of others are made phenomenologically, i.e., by attempting to take the role of the other, to see things from his or her conscious view point. Second, we mean by cognitive the fact that interviewing and scoring are acts of 'interpreting' a text around some shared philosophic categories of meaning. (p. 11-12)

In addition to these two components, Kohlberg et al. (1983) added two more tasks to the researcher's job. Those tasks included defining the subject's structure in terms of meanings found in the world and understanding the subject's perceptions of the world. Adoption of the hermeneutic framework led Kohlberg to reject the use of a standardized or psychometric approach to interviewing and scoring. Gilligan's (1977, 1982, 1988) methodology also clearly signaled her selection of hermeneutic interpretation, rather than a standardized, written instrument for interviewing and scoring the real-life dilemmas of her subjects.

The interview for this study proceeded from the structured questions shown on the Interview Protocol (see Appendix C) to a more unstructured exploration and clarification of each person's response, as did the original research of Gilligan and her colleagues. The interview questions were developed to illuminate how the individual constructed his or her own reality and meaning, in this case, the experience of self in the domain of morality (Gilligan &

Attanucci, 1988). Participants also completed the Participant Descriptive Survey shown in Appendix B.

Coding the Data

Data were analyzed first for subjects' moral orientation, then for modes of self-definition using considerations identified in their accounts of real-life dilemmas. Finally, the data were analyzed for relationships between these two components.

Participant responses were coded using the Lyons Coding Manual (1982). In order to score subjects' moral dilemmas in the same way as in the Gilligan research, permission was obtained to use the Lyons Coding Manual (see Appendix A). This Scoring Manual was developed by Lyons as a member of the research team for the National Institute of Education research project and later evolved as her doctoral dissertation (1982). Information about the Scoring Manual is included in Appendix G of this study. Appendix D indicates the Coding Sheet used in coding the subjects' Mode of Self-Definition. Appendix E indicates the Coding Sheet used in coding Considerations of Response (an Ethic of Care) and Considerations of Rights (an Ethic of Justice). This Coding Sheet was used to determine the participants' moral orientation.

The Lyons scoring procedure analyzes the content of an interview by identifying moral considerations. The unit of analysis is the moral consideration, which can be defined as

each idea presented by the subject in describing a moral dilemma (Lyons, 1983).

Lyons (1983) and others have found that a real-life moral dilemma usually consists of seven considerations. However, that number varies from 4 to 17. In this research, that number varied from 11 to 29.

The rater scores these considerations as either rights (Justice) or response (Care). A Lyons Score indicated the predominant, most frequent mode of moral reasoning as either Justice or Care (Lyons, 1982). More recent analysis by Gilligan and Attanucci (1988), however, redefined predominance, such that a

> real-life moral dilemma consisting of only care or justice considerations is labeled CARE ONLY or JUSTICE ONLY. A dilemma consisting of 75% or more, care or justice considerations is labeled CARE FOCUS or JUSTICE FOCUS, respectively. A dilemma in which both orientations are present, but neither orientation accounts for 75% of the codable considerations is placed in the CARE-JUSTICE category. Thus, dilemma are described as focused only when more than 75% of the participant's considerations fall into one mode. (Gilligan & Attanucci, p. 79)

A schematic representation of the five categories to which subjects are assigned based upon their codable considerations is shown in Table 3.

Table 3
Coding Scheme for Considerations

CARE ONLY	CARE FOCUS	CARE/ JUSTICE	JUSTICE FOCUS	JUSTICE ONLY

Interrater Reliability

In addition to the principal investigator, two additional student services practitioners coded one-half (10) of the sample interviews. Using one-half of the sample to establish interrater reliability is consistent with Lyons' methodology in developing the Manual for Coding Real Life Dilemmas, (1982). Interrater reliability was established between the three coders in a two-step procedure first used by Gilligan, Langdale, and Lyons in 1982. Lyons (1982) described the two steps in this way:

> In Step One each consideration in a subject's dilemma is 'chunked', that is, data to be coded as 'a consideration' is identified. Reliability is determined between coders on this step first; that is, the percent agreement between independent coders 'chunking' and identifying the same data as a consideration is determined. (p. 188)

Step Two of the reliability process involved categorizing the considerations identified in Step One as either rights (Ethic of Justice) or response (Ethic of Care). Considerations were identified in three distinct parts of each subject's moral dilemma: (a) how the moral problem was construed; (b) how the moral problem was resolved; and (c) how the subject evaluated the resolution of that moral conflict. As explained by Lyons (1982),

> In Step Two each consideration is placed in a category as a consideration of 'rights' or 'response'. At this step [two], reliability is determined again, this time for the percentage of agreement between coders in determining the category for a consideration. (p. 189)

This study followed this same format, however, there was no discussion between the principal investigator and the two additional scorers between Steps One and Two. In other words, each scorer independently identified the considerations in each subject's moral dilemma (Step One). Next, each scorer independently categorized those considerations as either Justice or Care (Step Two).

Once the scoring procedure was completed by all three scorers, interrater reliability was established in the following way. In analyzing the completed Coding Sheets from each scorer, a consideration had to be identified by at least two of the three scorers in order to be retained for further analysis (Step One). The list of considerations for each subject was thus narrowed to those which were identified by at least two scorers. Those considerations then had to have agreement between at least two scorers as being either Care or Justice (Step Two). This is in keeping with the Gilligan research (1982), in that, 66% agreement between coders was reached at both steps in order to retain and code items (considerations) for analysis.

This two-step coding process is more rigorous than most correlational reliability measures (Gilligan, Langdale, & Lyons, 1982). Step One of the process required at least a 66% agreement on the identification of which specific statements conveyed a subject's major ideas (considerations) about their moral conflicts. Thus, the percentage of agreement reached at Step One indicates a "one-to-one

correspondence of judgments by two (or more) independent coders with the exact words of an individual" (Lyons, 1982, p. 189).

Agreement in more traditional correlational methods simply means that coders agree on frequency of a particular behavior, amount of a skill, trait, or attribute, or subject's position relative to some test score (Lyons, 1982).

According to Lyons (1982), the methodological stringency of this process is particularly important given the kind of data with which coders are working. This strict, two-step method of reliability served to standardize the data, thus facilitating the use of Habermas' interpretive, hermeneutic framework.

Interrater Reliability and Generalizability Theory

Beyond following the two-step procedure establishing interrater reliability used by Gilligan, Langdale, and Lyons (1982), the application of Generalizability theory to this research provided a more sophisticated analysis than had previously been attempted. Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, and Rajaratnam (1972) indicated that Generalizability theory provided a useful method for estimating the dependability of a scoring system. According to Lane and Sabers (1989, p. 196)

> a generalizability study (G study) allows the investigator to identify multiple sources of errors that may arise in scoring essays under various measurement conditions (facets). The G study provides estimated variance components for the facets and objects of measurement that are subsequently used in decision studies (D studies). By evaluating the variance components associated

> with the facets the investigator can identify the amount of error that each facet contributes to the dependability of the scoring system. (p. 196)

Classical test theory held that an observed measurement could be deconstructed into a "true" score and a single source of random "error" (Brennan, 1992). However, the application of classical test theory could not differentiate among multiple error sources. Brennan (1992) wrote that Generalizability theory extends classical test theory "by application of analysis of variance procedures to measurement models involving multiple sources of error" (p. 1).

The purpose of a G study is to derive estimates of the variance components within the universe of admissible observations (Brennan, 1992). The universe of admissible observations for this research consisted of two facets; an observation facet (items of consideration--each idea presented by the subject in describing a moral dilemma) and a rater facet. In addition, the universe of admissible observations for this study consisted of those pairings between raters (r) and observations or items (o). This meant that the universe of admissible observations for this study was crossed between observations (o) and raters (r). Being crossed means that in this study all of the raters were involved in all observations.

"Typically in generalizability theory, the word "universe" is reserved for conditions of measurement (observations and raters), while the word "population" is

used for objects of measurement (subjects or persons)," stated Brennan (1992, p. 11).

Decision studies (D studies) focus on the estimates of variance components and emphasize their use and interpretation for decision-making. This study was a Decision study because an instrument (the Lyons scoring procedure and Coding Sheets) was used to make a specific decision with regard to inferring differences in moral orientation between gender and ethnic groups.

Specific Design of the Study

This study was a multifaceted Decision study. The three facets of the study were subjects, raters, and observations (items of consideration categorized as either justice or care). Levels for the three facets were as follows: subjects - 10; raters - 3; and observations - 40 (most considerations identified in subjects' moral dilemmas).

All three facets were random. Subjects were random because the object of measurement is always random, as Brennan writes, "if inferences are made from the subjects to the universe of generalization" (1992, p. 4). As detailed in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 5, possible inferences are drawn from the results regarding the subjects of this study to the larger population.

Raters in this study were random. They were a sample of a population of possible raters. Observations were also a random sample of a population of all possible observations of considerations regarding moral orientation, either Justice or

Care. This study was fully crossed, with both raters and observations crossed with subjects and with raters crossed with observations. Therefore, the model for this Decision study was:

s x R x O

The R and O are shown in capital letters because this was a Decision study. As previously detailed, the Lyons scoring procedure and Coding Sheets were used to make specific decisions about the moral orientation of males/females and blacks/whites in the study. If the purpose of the study had been related to developing the Lyons scoring procedure and Coding Sheets (the research instrument) this would have been a Generalizability study. In that case, the design model would have been:

s x r x o

with all three facets being shown in lower case letters. Subjects, as the object of measurement, are always lower case, regardless of the type of study. To summarize, this study was a fully crossed, three-random-facet, Decision study.

Mode of Self-Definition

The process for determining the Mode of Definition for each subject was also to have been a two-step procedure. Each statement about self-definition by a participant was to have been coded by each of the three scorers. At Step One each idea about self was to be identified as a

characterization. Reliability between scorers on identifying each characterization could then have been determined.

At Step Two each idea was to have been categorized as belonging to a way of defining the self as Connected or Separate/Objective. Reliability between scorers in categorizing characterizations could then have been determined (Gilligan, Langdale, & Lyons, 1982). However, the existence of two distinct modes of Self-Definition was not confirmed by this study. Scorers were unable to distinguish, with any accuracy or consistency, enough statements to identify the existence of two ways of defining the self. A complete discussion on this aspect of the findings of the study appears in the appropriate section of Chapter 4.

Data Analysis Using the Chi-Square Statistic

The data analysis consisted of reporting the frequency of moral orientation (CARE ONLY, CARE FOCUS, CARE/JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOCUS, JUSTICE ONLY) for the 20 participants in the study. Responses were reported for both of the study's variables--gender and race.

The data analysis section was to have also consisted of a report on the frequency of Modes of Self-Definition (either Separate/Objective Self or Connected Self). However, since raters did not identify two distinct modes of self-definition, this section of the data analysis offers a discussion of the possible reasons and implications for this finding.

After reporting the moral orientation of the study's participants, data were then analyzed using the chi-square test at a 95% confidence level. The chi-square statistic was chosen because it analyzes goodness-of-fit between an expected binomial distribution of considerations and the actual, reported distribution of those considerations by categorical variable. Using a binomial model, if one assumes an equal probability of Care and Justice orientations in an account of a real-life moral dilemma ($p = .05$), then a random sampling of moral considerations (typically, $n = 7$ per moral dilemma), over 20 trials (20 participants), would result in an expected binomial distribution. To test whether the distribution of scores fit the expected distribution, the chi-square, goodness-of-fit test was applied.

In this study, a significant chi-square indicated that the observed distribution of scores differed significantly from that expected in a random distribution. Thus, this statistic could provide corroborating evidence that significant moral differences existed in both of the variables explored (gender and race), beyond the parameters of chance.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

> In our anxiety to avoid the intrusion of sentiment into our scientific formulations, have we not gone to the length of excluding it altogether from our field of observation?
>
> Ian Suttie

Quantitative Analysis and Results

Presented in this chapter is an analysis of the data collected from 20 college students using Interview Protocol of Gilligan, Langdale, and Lyons (1982). The presentation of the data includes a description of the sample derived from subjects' responses to the Participant Descriptive Survey discussed in Chapter 3.. A brief description of the college which the students attended is also presented.

In addition, a descriptive and statistical analysis of the variables investigated (gender and race) are examined within each of the Gilligan et al. (1982) hypotheses: (a) there are two distinct moral orientations; an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice; (b) there are two distinct modes of self-definition; the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self; and (c) modes of self-definition and moral orientation are related. Thus, the first section of this chapter provides the quantitative analysis and results of the data (data collection, interrater reliability, and statistical analysis using chi-squares). A qualitative

analysis of the subjects' interviews is presented in the second section of this chapter.

Description of the Sample

As previously reported, Gilligan and her associates deliberately concentrated on sampling criteria of high intelligence, education, and social class. No such attempt was undertaken in this study. The resident student population at the college in question is primarily comprised of individuals from the opposite end of the socioeconomic status scale than were Gilligan's research subjects. This was certainly true for many of the subjects in this study.

A Participant Descriptive Survey was completed by each subject. As reported on those surveys, the average (mean) combined family income was $38,500. Only five participants reported combined family incomes above $40,000. All five of those participants were Caucasian. Nine participants reported combined family incomes below $25,000. Mean family size was five. The mean age of subjects was 22.

Fourteen subjects received at least one type of financial aid. Thirteen were first generation college students. All but two were from New York state. Eight were from New York City. All eight of those subjects were African-American. Fifteen subjects were resident students living on-campus and five were commuting students.

Description of the College

Founded in 1965, the college is located on a 605 acre estate formerly owned by prominent sportsman and

philanthropist, F. Ambrose Clark. The college is on the north shore of Long Island, approximately 20 miles from New York City.

The college is one of the youngest of the liberal arts colleges in the state system. From its inception, the college has been dedicated to a diverse, multicultural student, faculty, and staff population. It has deliberately sought to serve those who were traditionally bypassed by the educational system. Students have most typically come from the five boroughs of New York City. In addition, the college has in recent years recruited more high school and community college transfer students from Long Island.

African-American, Hispanic-American, Asian-American, and International students comprise 48% of the 4,300 students. Approximately 42% of the faculty are people of color. Within the state system, the college has less than 5% of the total enrollment of the liberal arts colleges, yet, enrolls about 26% of the system's minority students.

Approximately 800 students live on campus. Typically, those students come primarily from New York City. Over 90% of the 800 resident students are people of color with the largest groups being African-American, Latino, and Asian. Almost all are first generation college students. Almost all come from the inner city and are at the very low end of the socioeconomic status scale.

Data Collection

The discussion of quantitative results includes an analysis of each variable (gender and race) in reference to the two components of Gilligan's theory; moral orientation and mode of self-definition. Data were analyzed first for moral orientation and then for mode of self-definition. Frequency of moral orientation was reported first in each of the five categories used by Gilligan: CARE ONLY; CARE FOCUS; CARE/JUSTICE; JUSTICE FOCUS; and JUSTICE ONLY for all participants. Responses were reported for both of the study's variables--gender and race. This follows the procedure used by Gilligan and her associates. However, in this study, unlike Gilligan's research, additional quantitative analysis was also done. This analysis included the use of Generalizability theory and the chi-square statistic at a 95% confidence level.

In this study, a significant chi-square indicated that the observed distribution of scores (subjects' moral orientations), differed significantly from that expected in a random distribution. As Best (1981) explained, "A significant chi-square finding indicates that the variables do not exhibit the quality of independence, that they tend to be systematically related, and that the relationship transcends pure chance or sampling error" (p. 288).

Generalizability Theory

Generalizability theory provided a sophisticated method of analysis regarding the dependability of the Interview

Protocol and scoring procedure. The use of a Generalizability theory model allowed the researcher to identify multiple sources of error that may have arisen in scoring under various measurement conditions (facets). The Generalizability study (G study) provided estimated variance components for the facets and objects of measurement that were subsequently used in a Decision study (D study). By evaluating the variance components associated with the facets, the amount of error that each facet contributed to the dependability of the scoring system could be identified (Lane & Sabers, 1989).

The data were analyzed by a three-way subject (s) x observation (o) x rater (r) analysis of variance with repeated measures to obtain the variance components for the Generalizability study. These components are shown in Table 4, however, they were subsequently converted into variance components that were then used for this research project's Decision study (see Table 5).

These two tables report the information needed for a Generalizability study (G study), which is a study conducted to estimate variance components in a universe of admissible observations (Brennan, 1992). These estimated variance components were then used to estimate results for this research, which was a Decision study (D study). Brennan (1992, p. 5-6), states that, "the typical quantities that are estimated for a specified D study design and universe of generalization include D study design variance components,

Table 4
Analysis of Variance for the Generalizability Study

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares
Subjects (s)	12.93	9	1.43
Raters (r)	0.03	2	0.02
Observations (o)	22.72	39	0.58
(s) (r)	3.50	18	0.19
(s) (o)	43.60	351	0.12
(r) (o)	10.77	78	0.14
(s) (r) (o)	52.37	702	0.08

Table 5
Estimates of Variance Components

Component	Estimated Variance
$\hat{\sigma}^2(s)$	0.00994
$\hat{\sigma}^2(r)$	-0.00061*
$\hat{\sigma}^2(o)$	0.01316
$\hat{\sigma}^2(sr)$	0.00300
$\hat{\sigma}^2(ro)$	0.00635
$\hat{\sigma}^2(sro)$	0.07459

*Negative variance components are set at zero for calculations

universe score variance, error variances, and a generalizability coefficient." The remaining statistic to be reported for this study is a generalizability coefficient.

See Appendix F for actual formulae and calculations used to generate the generalizability coefficient.

Based on the formulae and calculations detailed in Appendix F, the generalizability coefficient for this Decision study was .63. This coefficient infers that an estimated .63 of the variance in the observations from the study was due to universe score variance. This is the variance due to the object of measurement, which was the subjects. To paraphrase classical reliability terminology, the .63 represents the "true" score, with the remaining .37 estimated as "error variance."

This analysis illustrates the use of generalizability theory for estimating the dependability of the scoring procedure used by the three raters in categorizing the moral orientation of the subjects in the study. The dependability of the raters' categorization of moral orientation was evaluated by obtaining estimates of the error variance components and generalizability coefficient.

Because all of the facets in this design were random, inferences can be made about the populations from which those facets (subjects, raters, and observations) were drawn. A frequent and pertinent criticism of qualitative research is that because of its small sample size, statistical analysis of the data is frequently limited.

Generalizability theory offers an important way to analyze and interpret qualitative data in ways that have meaning beyond the sometimes narrow boundaries imposed by

small sample size. However, using generalizability theory is rather complicated, as Brennan (1992, p. 2) articulated, "Generalizability theory can be used to address numerous issues in a systematic matter--issues that other psychometric theories treat only marginally, if at all. However, the power of generalizability theory is purchased at the price of some conceptual and statistical complexities."

Moral Orientation--An Ethic of Care or An Ethic of Justice

Using the Lyons' scoring procedure and Manual for Coding Real Life Dilemmas (1982), the 20 interviews with the study's participants were coded and scored by the principal investigator. Two additional scorers coded one-half (10) of the participants' dilemmas. Subjects were then assigned to one of the five categories used by Gilligan based on the codable considerations contained in their real-life moral dilemmas. The five categories were CARE ONLY, CARE FOCUS, CARE/JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOCUS, and JUSTICE ONLY.

Subjects who voiced considerations which were only Care or Justice, were placed in the CARE ONLY or JUSTICE ONLY category as appropriate. If 75% of a subject's considerations were either Care or Justice, they were placed in the CARE FOCUS or JUSTICE FOCUS category, respectively. Subjects which voiced both Care and Justice considerations, with neither orientation accounting for 75% of their total considerations, were placed in the CARE/JUSTICE category. In this study, however, those subjects in the CARE/JUSTICE category were heavily oriented towards one moral orientation

or the other. All of the subjects in the CARE/JUSTICE category used at least 66% Care or Justice considerations. In order to indicate the moral preference of those subjects, they are noted as either Care Heavy or Justice Heavy within the CARE/JUSTICE category in the tables which follow.

Relationship of Variables, the Chi-Square Analysis

The tables which follow indicate results derived from data analysis using the chi-square statistic. The chi-square test was initially run on the variables of race and gender using the five categories in the previous tables (CARE ONLY, CARE FOCUS, CARE/JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOCUS, and JUSTICE ONLY). A significant difference was indicated on the variable of gender, however, a stable estimate could not be guaranteed due to the small sample size. Those results are reported in Table 6.

As indicated in the previous table, a significant difference was found on the gender variable. However, since a stable chi-square estimate could not be derived because of the small sample size, no further tables reporting a chi-square using five moral orientation categories are reported. In order to obtain a stable estimate, the five moral orientation categories were collapsed into two--CARE and JUSTICE. No further tables using five categories are reported. The following tables report results of analysis via the chi-square statistic using two moral orientation categories--Care and Justice.

Table 6
Five Categories of Moral Orientation by Gender

		CARE ONLY	CARE FOCUS	CARE/ JUSTICE	JUSTICE FOCUS	JUSTICE ONLY	TOTALS
Females	N	4	2	0	4	0	10
	%	40%	20%	0%	40%	0%	100%
				(3 Care heavy) (2 Justice heavy)			
Males	N	0	2	5	1	2	10
	%	0%	20%	50%	10%	20%	100%
TOTALS	N	4	4	5	5	2	20
	%	20%	20%	25%	25%	10%	100%

Chi-Square: 11.111
df: 4
Prob. < .05: .025

As indicated in Table 7, females in this study were more likely to use an Ethic of Care, than were males. Sixty percent of the females used an Ethic of Care, while only 50% of the males used an Ethic of Care.

When moral orientation was examined by race, African-Americans clearly prefered the use of an Ethic of Care, as demonstrated in Table 8. Seventy percent of the black students in the study used an Ethic of Care, compared to only 40% of the white students.

Table 9 reports moral orientation by both race and gender. Eighty percent of the black males used an Ethic of Care, while 80% of the white males used an Ethic of Justice.

Table 7
Collapsed Categories of Moral Orientation by Gender

		CARE	JUSTICE	TOTALS
Females	N	6	4	10
	%	60%	40%	100%
Males	N	5	5	10
	%	50%	50%	100%
TOTALS	N	11	9	20
	%	55%	45%	100%

Chi-Square: .202
df: 1
Prob. < .05: .6531

Table 8
Collapsed Categories of Moral Orientation by Race

		CARE	JUSTICE	TOTALS
Black	N	7	3	10
	%	70%	30%	100%
White	N	4	6	10
	%	40%	60%	100%
TOTALS	N	11	9	20
	%	55%	45%	100%

Chi-Square: 1.818
df: 1
Prob. < .05: .1775

Table 9
Collapsed Categories of Moral Orientation by Race and Gender

		CARE	JUSTICE	TOTALS
Black Females	N	3	2	5
	%	60%	40%	100%%
White Females	N	3	2	5
	%	60%	40%	100%
Black Males	N	4	1	5
	%	80%	20%	100%
White Males	N	1	4	5
	%	20%	80%	100%
TOTALS	N	11	9	20
	%	55%	45%	100%

Chi-Square: 3.838
df: 3
Prob. < .05: .2795

black and white females used the two ethics in similar patterns.

Response (Care) and Rights (Justice) Considerations

Tables 10 and 11 indicate the frequency of considerations of Response (Care) and/or Rights (Justice) in the way participants constructed and solved their real-life moral dilemmas. This set of tables reflects an analysis of the individual considerations presented by each subject.

This analysis at a micro-level reveals the same patterns as those reported in the previous tables.

Table 10
Frequency of Considerations* of Response or Rights in the Construction and Resolution of Moral Conflict: Females and Males

Sex	Dilemma	Response	Rights
Females	Construction of the Prob.	36	21
N = 10	Resolution of the Prob.	34	14
	Totals	70	35
		Response	Rights
Males	Construction of the Prob.	24	20
N = 10	Resolution of the Prob.	20	20
	Totals	44	40

*Numbers are of considerations individuals present on two aspects of their real-life moral dilemmas, i.e., the construction of the problem and the resolution of the problem (Lyons, 1982).

Table 10 indicates again that the males in this sample were closely split between considerations of Care and Justice. Females, however, clearly used Care considerations (Response) more than Justice (Rights) in constructing and solving their moral dilemmas.

The preference of black students for the Care orientation is once again demonstrated in Table 11. Responses from individuals who were completely absent considerations of either Response (Care) or Rights (Justice) in their moral dilemmas are reported in Tables 12 and 13.

Table 11
Frequency of Considerations of Response of Rights in the Construction and Resolution of Moral Conflict: Blacks and Whites

Sex	Dilemma	Response	Rights
Blacks N = 10	Construction of the Prob.	32	18
	Resolution of the Prob.	32	15
	Totals	64	33
Whites N = 10	Construction of the Prob.	28	23
	Resolution of the Prob.	22	19
	Totals	50	42

Table 12
Absence of Response or Rights Considerations: Females and Males

Sex	No Response	Considerations	No Rights	Considerations
Females N = 10	0%	(#) 0	40%	(#) 4
Males N = 10	20%	(#) 2	0%	(#) 0

As reflected in Table 12, no females were absent at least some Care considerations. Similarly, no males constructed or resolved moral problems without some Rights (Justice) considerations.

As indicated in Table 13, only one black student and one white student used No Response (Care) considerations.

However, two black students and two white students used No Rights (Justice) considerations in solving their real-life dilemmas.

Table 13
Absence of Response or Rights Considerations: Blacks and Whites

Sex	No Response	Considerations	No Rights	Considerations
Blacks N = 10	10%	(#) 1	20%	(#) 2
Whites N = 10	10%	(#) 1	20%	(#) 2

Summary of Results About Moral Orientation

The results which were reported in Tables 6-9 indicated that within the context of this study, two distinct moral orientations--an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice were found to exist. Thus, the first of Gilligan's original three hypotheses was reaffirmed.

As reported in Table 7, females in this study were more likely to predominantly use an Ethic of Care, than were males. Results reported in terms of both gender and race were shown in Table 9. There it became clear that there were considerable differences between black and white males. White females and white males used moral orientations as expected; white females preferred an Ethic of Care, while only one white male used Care a majority of the time. Four white males used an Ethic of Justice, while only two white

females did. These results confirm Gilligan's research and conclusions.

However, black women and men did not mirror their white counterparts in this study. Specifically, while more black women used an Ethic of Care (3 Care and 2 Justice), so did black men. In fact, four of the five black men in the study used an Ethic of Care a majority of the time. This is quite different than the white males in the study. These results are also quite different than those reported heretofore in other moral research. Only one of the five white males used an Ethic of Care a majority of the time.

This finding was also shown in Table 8 which reported moral orientation by race. Reporting both men and women together, seven black students used an Ethic of Care a majority of the time, while only four white students primarily used a Care orientation.

Based on these results, the following statements about the moral orientation of the study's subjects can be made.

1. Two distinct moral orientations--an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice were found in the real-life moral dilemmas of 20 college students.

2. More females than males used an Ethic of Care a majority of the time (six females and five males).

3. More males than females used an Ethic of Justice a majority of the time (five males and four females).

4. Males in this sample were evenly divided between using an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice.

5. More black students used an Ethic of Care a majority of the time (seven used Care and three used Justice).

6. More white students used an Ethic of Justice a majority of the time (six used Justice and four used Care).

7. Black females and white females demonstrated similar patterns regarding use of moral orientation (three used Care and two used Justice in each group).

8. Black males and white males demonstrated very different patterns regarding use of moral orientation.

9. Most of the white males used an Ethic of Justice a majority of the time (four used Justice and one used Care).

10. Most of the black males used an Ethic of Care an majority of the time (four used Care and one used Justice).

Statistical Analysis Using the Chi-Square Test

Using the chi-square test at a .05 level of significance, only one variable produced a significant difference (see Table 6). The gender variable did produce a significant chi-square, however, a reliable estimate could not be guaranteed using the five categories of moral orientation established by Gilligan.

When the moral orientation categories were collapsed to two (CARE and JUSTICE), a reliable estimate was obtained. However, with this adjustment no significant differences were reported. While there are a number of possible reasons why no significant difference was obtained, a small sample size obviously restricts the power of any statistical test. As in most other qualitative research, including the work of

Gilligan and her colleagues, this study had a small sample size (20 participants). This weakness of qualitative research is well documented in the literature. However, given the labor intensive nature of coding real life moral dilemmas, large samples are problematic from an operational standpoint.

Summary of Results About Mode of Self-Definition

Data obtained in the research project for the National Institute of Education, by Gilligan, Langdale, and Lyons (1982) led the team to assert that there were two distinctly different ways of describing the self. As detailed previously, these two characteristic modes of describing the self differed in their relationship to others. Those individuals operating from what Lyons (1983) called the Separate/Objective Self were connected to others through their own abilities. The ideal relationship was based upon equality.

Individuals operating from the Connected Self (Lyons, 1983), however, connected through the people in their world. People were viewed in their own terms. Relationships were interdependent and were based upon concern for another's well being.

The Gilligan et al. (1982) hypotheses; (a) there are two moral orientations--and Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice; (b) there are two modes of self-definition--the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self; and (c) that

modes of self-definition and moral orientation were related were all proven in that study.

Results obtained in this study, also confirmed the existence of two distinct moral orientations. However, no evidence of two completely different ways of describing the self was found. Attempts to identify codable considerations regarding modes of self-definition were unsuccessful by all three scorers.

While a small number of considerations regarding self-definition were reported for some subjects, there was no consistency between scorers on the items to be coded. Thus, the extremely small number of considerations found, and the lack of interscorer reliability rendered no results which could be meaningfully interpreted.

In short, none of the three scorers was able to identify consistently and accurately the existence of two different modes of self-definition for the study's sample. Therefore, in terms of this study, only the first of the Gilligan hypotheses was reconfirmed.

There are several possible reasons why the two modes of self-definition identified in Gilligan's research were not found in this study. First among those reasons is the possibility that two completely different modes of self-definition simply do not exist in this population. Another possibility is that the two ways of seeing one's self do, in fact, exist. However, this sample group was unable to articulate those conceptions of self-definition in ways that

could be reliably coded. Differences between this sample group and Gilligan's subjects (sampling criteria of high intelligence and socioeconomic social class) may very well have been a factor with this possible explanation.

The third possibility is that two distinct modes of self-definition did exist in the sample and that the subjects did articulate examples of that mode which could have been reliably coded, but which were not. One reason why considerations articulated by the subjects as to mode of self-definition might have been missed by the scorers was the lack of detail in the Lyons' Scoring Manual on this procedure. The 69-page manual specifies in considerable detail both the logic and exact procedure to be followed in identifying and categorizing considerations regarding moral orientation. However, the manual contains only a single, short paragraph on identifying and categorizing considerations regarding mode of self-definition.

Any one or combination of the possibilities outlined here may have been the reason why no evidence of two distinct ways of seeing the self was found. The only statement which can be made with some certitude, however, is that the two modes of self-definition elaborated by Gilligan were not found in the data obtained through this study.

Summary of All Quantitative Analysis and Results

The significance of the results from this study lies in the empirical verification of Gilligan's hypothesis that two distinctly different moral orientations exist. As

demonstrated in this study, both an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice were shown to exist in this sample. As Gilligan (1987, p. 19) stated, "the empirical confirmation of the existence of a morality of Care indicated that people do not think about moral conflict and choice solely in terms of Justice and rights."

Gilligan's assertion that moral orientation was gender-related was also reconfirmed in this study. More females than males (60%) used an Ethic of Care a majority of the time. In this study, however, the Ethic of Care was used as frequently by men as was the Ethic of Justice. This finding was influenced by the inclination, specifically of black males, to use an Ethic of Care rather than an Ethic of Justice.

Black females and white females used both moral orientations in approximately the same pattern. However, black males and white males did not. Eighty percent of the white males used an Ethic of Justice, while 80% of the black males used an Ethic of Care. If this pattern is reconfirmed in larger studies drawn from a random sample, it indicates an important and unexpected difference between the ethnic groups.

There was one additional difference between males and females. All of the female subjects were in the "ONLY or FOCUS" categories. No women were classified as being in the CARE/JUSTICE category. Subjects in the CARE/JUSTICE category used considerations from both moral orientations, but with

neither ethic having 75% of the codable considerations. Using Gilligan's coding scheme, 75% of the identified considerations must be either Care or Justice to move a subject into the "FOCUS" category.

Fifty percent of the men, however, were in the CARE/JUSTICE category. This means that the males in this study used both ethics in constructing and resolving moral dilemmas far more frequently than did the females. This was illustrated in Table 7.

This study reconfirmed Gilligan's findings regarding the absence of Response and Rights considerations. Specifically, there were no females which did not indicate at least some Response (Care) considerations as they solved their real-life dilemmas. Forty percent of the women, however, evidenced No Rights (Justice) considerations. Twenty percent of the males indicated No Response (Care) considerations, but, there were no males who did not indicate some Rights (Justice) considerations.

In contrast to Gilligan's research, no evidence to support the notion of two distinct modes of defining the self were found in this study. This finding calls into question one of Gilligan's essential themes. She believed that not only did two modes of self-definition exist, but that an understanding of the self's perception was crucial in understanding her theory of moral development. However, the results of this study make it possible to understand, analyze, and compare the two moral orientations of Care and

Justice without tying them to the construct of self-definition.

Qualitative Analysis and Results

> Respect autonomy, do no harm, benefit others, be just, and be faithful.
>
> Karen Kitchner

Three major themes emerged from a qualitative analysis of the data collected from the 20 college students in this study. Those themes confirm and complement the quantitative results reported in the first section of this chapter. As reported in Tables 6-9, within the context of this study, two distinct moral orientations--an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice were found to exist. Thus, the first of Gilligan's original three hypotheses was reaffirmed. As indicated in Table 10, evidence of these two different ethics were found in all groupings of the sample--black females, white females, black males, and white males.

The first major theme which emerged from a qualitative analysis of the data correlates to the empirical affirmation that two different ethics do, in fact, exist. This qualitative theme confirms Gilligan's premise that moral problems are construed, resolved, and evaluated in completely different ways by those operating from the two Ethics.

The following excerpts from the taped interviews of two subjects illustrate how moral problems are constructed (in the situation, and conflict components of the dilemma), how they are resolved (in the decision component), and evaluated in two distinctly different ways. The first excerpt is an

example of an Ethic of Care (see Table 14) and the second excerpt is an example of the Ethic of Justice (see Table 15).

These two dilemmas illustrate the different ways in which moral problems are constructed, resolved, and evaluated for the two Ethics. For someone using an Ethic of Care, something becomes a moral problem when it has to do either with relationships or the activities of care (Lyons, 1982). Lyons (1982, p. 53) explains the conflicts of relationships as issues which "surround the potential fractures between people, that is, with the breaking--not the trusts or obligations--but the severing of ties between people."

For Subject #4, the moral problem was the rending of relationships--with her stepfather whom she loved and with the mother she was afraid to tell because of the possible consequences. It was only through the connection of a relationship with an aunt, that she was finally able to make the decision to talk about 5 years of sexual abuse. That relationship with an aunt, built slowly and grounded in trust, allowed the subject finally to resolve her dilemma by telling someone about her sexual abuse.

The resolution of a moral dilemma is evaluated by someone using an Ethic of Care against two criteria. According to Lyons (1982), the criteria which help someone decide if they have made the <u>right decision</u> are (1) whether relationships were established, restored, or maintained and/or (2) how things worked out, or may work out. As Lyons (1982, p. 65) wrote, "How things work out is a measure of

Table 14
Subject #4--An Ethic of Care

SITUATION:

". . . he tried to rape me. He never got to, because I fought him. And it really hurt me because I was really close to him. He was the only father I knew . . . I was closer to him than my mother . . . I really needed someone to talk to, but the problem I was having, I was really scared to share it."

CONFLICT:

". . . but then I decided I was going to have to talk about it because it was affecting me in school. I was already a year behind. I just had to make a decision. It was important that I do something about it."

DECISION:

". . . yes, I decided to tell her [Aunt]. At the beginning I didn't. It took me a really long time before I did tell her . . . she supported me, that's what it was . . . so, I began to trust her. So, I guess when I found the trust in her, that's when I really decided to tell . . ."

EVALUATION:

". . . I didn't know the right thing to do . . . because sometimes you make a decision and you're like, did I make the right decision? Did I make the best decision? Is something good going to come out of it or something bad?"

Table 15
Subject #19--An Ethic of Justice

SITUATION:

". . . I was in the 10th grade . . . and me and a whole bunch of friends went to the mall and all my friends were stealing things and they were asking me to do the same."

CONFLICT:

". . . and by the way I way I was raised, I wasn't raised to steal. And that was the hardest part, because if you didn't do it, you weren't in, you were a sucker . . . a weakling . . . you were called names."

DECISION:

". . . but even if I didn't get caught, my conscience would pick on me always and I just couldn't do it. I couldn't bring myself to do it."

EVALUATION:

". . . what helps me is my standards, my goals, my reasons for why I'm here, for why I'm doing what I'm doing in life. You have to think before you act, always."

resolution in that in seeing what happens to people over time, one then knows if the resolution worked. This marker also carries the notion that only over time can one know results, that is, know in the sense of seeing what actually happens/happened."

Subject #4 was unable to know yet, whether she had made the right decision in talking about her sexual abuse. She would only know later when she found out, in her words, "is something good going to come out of it, or something bad?"

Subject #19's moral problem dealt with conflicting claims. On the one side were friends who demanded that she steal in order to be IN. On the other side, and in conflict with those demands, were standards of behavior instilled by parents. This subject's moral dilemma illustrates all three ways in which issues can become moral problems for someone operating from an Ethic of Justice. As identified by Lyons (1982, p. 71), those three ways are "mediating issues of conflicting claims in the relationships between people; or how one is to decide conflict; or how one can justify one's decision and actions."

Not only are there differences in how moral problems are construed between those using an Ethic of Care and those using an Ethic of Justice, there are also distinct differences in how conflict is decided. In addition, the criteria that one uses to evaluate whether a right decision has been reached, also differ markedly. As illustrated by the first subject, who used an Ethic of Care, the decision finally to tell was evaluated in terms of future consequences. In short, she did not yet know if she had made the right decision.

The second subject, operating from an Ethic of Justice, evaluated her decision differently. She knew that she had

made the right decision because she had kept faith with her values and standards. As elaborated by Lyons (1982, p. 84), the two criteria used to evaluate moral choice for someone using an Ethic of Justice are "(1) how the decision was justified, thought about; and (2) whether values, standards, or principles were maintained, especially fairness."

As indicated in the quantitative analysis reported in the beginning of this chapter, the data obtained throughout this study provides clear evidence that two distinctly different moral orientations--an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice--were shown to exist in this sample. As illustrated in Tables 6-9, these two different ethics appeared in the sample as a whole, within the groupings by separate variable (gender or race), and within a grouping by combining variables (gender and race). This first qualitative theme--that moral problems are construed, resolved, and evaluated in completely different ways demonstrates what finding evidence of the two Ethics means in human terms. This theme also reaffirms Gilligan's research.

The second major theme to emerge from a qualitative analysis of the data, is that Gilligan's assumption of gender-relatedness to moral orientation was reconfirmed in this study for white students only. Gilligan's research (1982), stated that a Care perspective was not gender-specific, but was certainly gender-related. That finding was reaffirmed in this study, but only for white students.

This finding was reported in Table 8 of this chapter, which indicated moral orientation by race. As reflected in Table 8, seven of the ten black students in this study predominantly used an Ethic of Care. This compares to only four white students who predominantly used an Ethic of Care. Results of the study become even more meaningful when moral orientation is reported by both race and gender, as they were in Table 9 of this chapter.

There were three white women and three black women who predominantly used an Ethic of Care and two of each race who used an Ethic of Justice. One white male used an Ethic of Care, with four white males using an Ethic of Justice. All of these results conform to Gilligan's hypothesis and research regarding the gender-relatedness of the Care orientation. However, the most unexpected result of this study is reflected in Table 9 of this chapter. As reported in Table 9, four of the five black men in this study used an Ethic of Care, with only one using an Ethic of Justice.

This result of the study deviates from Gilligan's findings and assumptions on several levels. First, and most obviously, the black men in this study <u>did not</u> primarily use an Ethic of Justice, which according to Gilligan, men are supposed to favor decidedly. Secondly, more black men used an Ethic of Care than did black women. Again, the issue of gender-relatedness to moral orientation is clearly called into question by this finding.

Thirdly, there were distinctive socioeconomic status differences between the black male students and the white male students. One of the questions raised by the findings of this study is whether those socioeconomic status differences influenced the preference of black men for the Ethic of Care.

Table 16, which appears on the following page, profiles the black males in the study and Table 17 profiles the white males in the study. Information reported in these tables was taken from the Participant Descriptive Surveys, which were completed by all participants in the study.

Table 17 profiles the white male subjects in the study. Once again, this information was obtained from the Participant Descriptive Surveys which were completed by the subjects of the study.

As reported in Table 16, four of the five black males came from New York City (inner city neighborhoods), lived on-campus, received financial aid, and were first generation college students. The five had an approximate family income mean of $20,000 and averaged 3.4 siblings.

As reported in Table 17, none of the white males came from New York City. Four were from suburban Long Island communities and one's home was Cambridge, Massachusetts. Those communities are vastly different than were the inner city neighborhoods which were home to four of the five black males in the study.

Table 16
Profile of Black Male Subjects

	Subjects					
Info. from Surveys	#3	#8	#17	#25	#30	Average
Age	21	21	24	21	19	21.2
GPA	3.2	2.5	3.7	3.4	2.9	3.14
1st gen. college?	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes (4)
# of siblings	2	2	9	0	4	3.4
Resident or commuter	res	com	res	res	res	res (4)
New York City or suburban Long Island	NYC	L.I.	NYC	NYC	NYC	NYC (4)
Approx. family income (in thousands)	$11	$30	$10	$29	$20	$20
Fin. Aid ?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Only one of the five white males was a first generation college student, and only one received financial aid. Four of the five commuted from home and the average number of siblings in the family was 1.4. The approximate family income mean was $70,000, compared to an approximate average of $20,000 for the black males in the study.

No definitive reasons for the dramatically different patterns regarding moral orientation evidenced by black and white males in the study will be attempted here. However, the significant geographic differences in home neighborhoods (affluent, suburban, Long Island, and the impoverished,

Table 17
Profile of White Male Subjects

	Subjects					
Info. from Surveys	#7	#11	#18	#21	#24	Average
Age	20	24	20	24	21	21.8
GPA	2.9	3.9	3.4	2.7	3.0	3.18
1st gen. college?	no	no	yes	no	no	no (4)
# of siblings	2	1	2	2	0	1.4
Resident or commuter	com	com	com	com	res	com (4)
New York City or suburban Long Island	L.I.	L.I.	L.I.	L.I.	Cambridge Mass.	L.I.(4)
Approx. family income (in thousands)	$100	$75	$30	$60	$88	$70
Fin. Aid ?	no	no	yes	no	no	no (4)

dangerous, inner city of New York) certainly offer a rich field for future research.

Liddel, Halpin, and Halpin (1993) have suggested that numerous factors other than gender may significantly affect moral orientation. In their words, "many factors influence individuality through decision-making, career choice, mate selection, and moral reasoning. Whether gender truly affects those individual differences is a question of empirical and practical importance to student affairs professionals, educators, and researchers" (1993, p. 143).

As indicated in Table 9 of this chapter, black females and white females in the study used moral orientation in the same pattern. Both groups had three individuals which used an Ethic of Care and two which used an Ethic of Justice.

Table 18 profiles the white female subjects in the study. Information reported in Table 18 was obtained from the Participant Descriptive Surveys, completed by all participants in the study.

Table 18
Profile of Black Female Subjects

	Subjects					
Info. from Surveys	#4	#5	#6	#19	#20	Average
Age	22	21	21	19	19	20
GPA	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.1
1st gen. college?	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
# of siblings	4	1	6	6	2	3.8
Resident or commuter	res	res	res	res	res	res
New York City or suburban Long Island	NYC	NYC	NYC	NYC	NYC	NYC
Approx. family income (in thousands)	$13	$13	$23	$12	$21	$16.4
Fin. Aid ?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Table 19 profiles the white female subjects in the study. Information reported in Table 19 was obtained from

the Participant Descriptive Surveys, completed by all participants in the study.

Table 19
Profile of White Female Subjects

	Subjects					
Info. from Surveys	#2	#9	#12	#26	#31	Average
Age	24	21	22	19	23	21.8
GPA	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.4	3.65
1st gen. college?	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes (3)
# of siblings	3	1	3	3	1	2.2
Resident or commuter	res	res	res	res	com	res (4)
New York City or suburban Long Island	L.I.	L.I.	L.I.	L.I.	L.I.	L.I.
Approx. family income (in thousands)	$80	$35	$35	$18	$30	$39.6
Fin. Aid ?	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes (4)

As reported in Tables 18 and 19 of this section, there were differences between black women and white women in the study. However, those differences were not as marked as those between the two groups of males in the study. Black females were all from New York City and had an approximate mean family income of $16,400. White females came from suburban Long Island and had an approximate mean family income of $39,600.

One clear signal which arises from this study is the need for future moral development research with socioeconomic status as a variable, as well as gender and race. This research obviously questions Gilligan's findings and assumptions regarding the gender-relatedness of the two Ethics. The possibility that environmental differences might affect the gender-relatedness of moral orientation is certainly raised by examining descriptive data on black and white males. Those same environmental differences, however, do not seem to have affected the preference of black women for using the Ethic of Care. Does this mean that the preference of males for the Justice orientation is more susceptible to environmental factors? Only further research which is designed to identify and study the relationship of these variables to moral orientation will provide that answer.

The third major theme to emerge from the stories told by the 20 college students concerns the influence of television on their moral decision-making. Five of the 10 males referenced what they had seen on television as an influence on how they solved moral dilemmas. These references were completely unsolicited. The researcher asked no questions about the role or influence of television in moral decision-making. Given that half the male sample spontaneously volunteered this information, however, it is interesting to speculate what might have been discovered were this part of

the interview protocol. The following excerpts illustrate the theme of television's influence on moral choice.

Subject #7 (white male) responded this way when asked how he knew whether he had done the right thing, ". . . or I try to use, try to keep to myself with what I've done in the past, whenever I'm involved in a situation, it's usually a situation that I've seen before . . . saw it on TV . . . that reminded me of what would be the right thing."

Subject #8 (black male) elaborated at some length on the role television had played in shaping his value system. ". . . and then again, I watch, it's funny, I watch a lot of TV and you see [the] good guy and bad guy. And you see how the good guy is supposed to act and stuff like that."

". . . not even so much a particular role model on TV, but, it's just that you see so many shows that you know. . . you know, in a good sense, it might have its drawbacks also, TV really influences."

Subject #25 (black male) returns to the theme of how television shaped his concept of how to do the right thing. "Well, in life, like growing up, I've always learned to do the right thing. I didn't necessarily learn it from my parents or my family . . . it's like, you know, how you watch TV and how certain characters would do certain situations. And that's how basically I grew up."

Subject #11 (white male) attempted to explain his change of academic major (from pre-law to communication) as an example of what he had learned from television and how that

affected his ethical code. "You see people like that [lawyers], they don't do anything. You know, there are lawyers that, of course, help people--not like those guys on TV . . . those guys are complete leeches . . . I decided I didn't like what I would probably turn into, you know, if I was one of them."

Subject #30 (black male) reiterates the theme of having used television shows as a medium for learning moral lessons. "Yeah, you know, I know some of that stuff was really fake on TV, but, for me it just made up my mind about what I do--what's wrong and right. You see a lot of shows, it teaches lessons. I got a lot, learned a lot of lessons from it [TV], you know . . . it just helped me out. Once in a while when there's a problem, when, if there's a question and it was right there on TV, and, I'm like, hmmm, maybe that's a good solution, you know?"

Interestingly enough, none of the women in the study referenced television in any way. Therefore, in this study, the theme regarding the role and influence of television on moral development was confined to males. This theme provides a rich vein to be mined with future moral development research, with television's influence as a focus variable. Within that framework, further differences and similarities between genders and races promises exciting and important information in the quest to understand moral development.

Summary of Qualitative Analysis

Three major themes emerged from a qualitative analysis of the data in this study. Two of those themes function as a corollary to, and further elaboration of, the empirical results documented in the quantitative analysis section of this chapter. The first qualitative theme which emerged was a reaffirmation of Gilligan's thesis that moral problems are construed, resolved, and evaluated in completely different ways by those operating from the two Ethics. The quantitative section of this chapter provided proof, that within the context of this study, two distinctly different ethics were shown to exist. The qualitative section of this chapter provided, in the words of the study's subjects, how those two different ethics were employed in solving their real-life moral dilemmas.

The second theme which emerged from an analysis of the subjects' stories emphasized another quantitative finding--specifically, that Gilligan's assumption of gender-relatedness to moral orientation was reconfirmed, in this study, for white students only. The overwhelming preference of black men for an Ethic of Care deviated from Gilligan's research on several levels, which were explored in some detail. The distinctive differences in socioeconomic status between black and white males offered one possible explanation for the difference in moral orientation between the two groups. As previously indicated, Gilligan and her associates have focused on research subjects who were highly

intelligent, articulate, and who were drawn from economically advantaged backgrounds. The black subjects in this study were nothing like Gilligan's subjects. Since socioeconomic status was not a variable of the study, no conclusions may be drawn from this theme. However, enough evidence emerged to highlight possible directions for future research.

Finally, the influence of television as a critical feature of moral decision-making emerged after analyzing the real-life moral dilemmas of the subjects in the study. Half the males in the study referenced television, in one way or another, as contributing to their value system, and providing guidance about how to resolve moral problems. These references were completely unsolicited and were not a part of the interview protocol. Interestingly enough, none of the females in the study referred to television in relating their moral dilemmas. Because the influence of television was not a variable of this study, no conclusions can be drawn. However, this theme emerged too frequently and too significantly in the real-life moral dilemmas of the subjects for it not to be reported as one of the findings of the study. The themes which emerged from the qualitative analysis of data have provided several exciting, and virtually unexplored, avenues for future research on moral development.

CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> In place of the image of hierarchy, we find the image of a network . . . built and sustained through the responsiveness of people to one another . . . a responsiveness that requires a kind of vigilance to perceiving the particular needs of others . . . a responsiveness that reflects a moral ideal of care, where everyone would be responded to and included, and no one would be left alone or hurt . . . .
>
> Carol Gilligan

Summary

Believing that men and women proceeded from different moral perspectives, developed along different developmental paths, and ultimately claimed different moral perspectives, Gilligan offered a theory of moral development based upon an Ethic of Care (1977, 1982). The research of Gilligan and her associates (1982) indicated that this care perspective was gender-related, but not gender-specific (most individuals using an Ethic of Care were women). This approach directly challenged the core assumptions of Kohlberg's model of moral development.

The central principle of Kohlberg's deontological theory was Justice, which built upon the philosophic tradition of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. For Kohlberg, moral development referred to the thought process that an individual employed in making judgments and arriving at conclusions related to moral dilemmas (Cohen, 1982).

Hearing a different voice, Gilligan believed that morality could not be defined exclusively for everyone as moral judgment or reasoning. For Gilligan, the virtues of caring and responsibility to others were equally as important to most women and some men. Her research (1977, 1979, 1982) identified two different conceptions of morality, as well as two different ways of defining one's self.

The Problem

This study replicated Gilligan's research by analyzing whether the real-life moral dilemmas of college students evidenced two moral orientations (an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice) and two modes of self-definition (the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self). The possible relationship between moral orientation and definition of self was sought, as it was in Gilligan's research. Moral orientation, self-definition, and the possible relationship between these two factors was then analyzed in terms of the study's two variables--gender and race. Beyond simply replicating Gilligan's research, however, this study was also an attempt to answer three of the most serious challenges to her theory of moral development. One of those challenges was theoretical, one was philosophical, and the last was methodological.

The Purpose

Testing the validity of Gilligan's theory of moral development based upon a sample of full-time, traditionally aged college students was the purpose of this study. The

study replicated Gilligan's research and hypothesized that (a) there are two distinct moral orientations (an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice); (b) there are two distinct modes of self-definition (the Connected Self and the Separate/Objective Self); and (c) that modes of self-definition and moral orientation are related.

Gender and race were the two variables which were analyzed in relation to each of Gilligan's three hypotheses. By focusing on race, as well as gender, this study was an extension of Gilligan's work in a significant and timely direction.

Validation of Gilligan's theory of moral development could not be achieved entirely by independent corroboration or replication of her research, however. Although that purpose provided the essential structure of this study, there were other major challenges which must also be answered. If Gilligan's work is to be accepted as a fully functioning model of moral development, the serious theoretical, philosophical, and methodological concerns identified by numerous researchers must also be addressed.

The most serious theoretical challenge to Gilligan's theory questioned her assertion that Kohlberg's predominant theory of moral development was flawed by an inherent sex bias. Gilligan asserted that Kohlberg's six-stage model was simply inadequate to accurately reflect the moral development of most women and some men. The second prong of the theoretical challenge to Gilligan's work questioned whether

her Ethic of Care could be empirically shown to exist in the general population. Both prongs of this theoretical challenge were answered in this study.

A number of critics also challenged Cilligan's work on philosophical grounds. Sichel (1985) pointed up this weakness by noting that while Kohlberg interrelated psychology and philosophy, Gilligan failed to ground her raw data and thesis with philosophical assumptions.

This study answered that challenge by contrasting the Kantian philosophy of reason, duty, and will, upon which Kohlberg's theory rests, to an alternative aretaic approach. This aretaic perspective provided a philosophical basis for Gilligan's theory. As a result of the philosophic analysis undertaken, three metaethical assumptions implicitly suggested throughout Gilligan's work were identified and explicated. Finally, a working philosophical framework which supported Gilligan's Ethic of Care was developed. That philosophical framework was Responsible Altruism. The identification of metaethical assumptions and the development of a philosophical framework represent a result of the philosophical analysis completed as part of this study. Those results are reported in the final section of Chapter 2.

Gilligan's work has also been challenged on methodological grounds, as well as theoretical and philosophical ones. Extremely limited sampling has opened her theory to attack. Participants in the three studies conducted by Gilligan and her associates were all drawn from

small, economically advantaged, highly educated samples. By sampling from the opposite end of the socioeconomic status continuum, this study was designed to answer some of those methodological concerns. In addition, by sampling from two distinct ethnic groups (African-American and Caucasian) in this study, the essential process of replicating Gilligan's research with varying populations was begun.

The Methodology

This study was an investigation of the moral development of college students by replicating Gilligan's research and by analyzing two variables--gender and race. The purpose of the study was to examine her theory of moral development and to seek evidence that either supported or disconfirmed her three hypotheses: (1) there are two distinct moral orientations (an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice; (2) there are two distinct modes of self-definition (a Connected Self and a Separate/Objective Self); and (3) that moral orientation and mode of self-definition are related. The study also attempted to address the three most serious challenges to Gilligan's theory: one theoretical challenge; one philosophical; and one methodological.

Twenty undergraduate students were tape recorded as they recounted real-life moral dilemmas in response to the Interview Protocol developed by Gilligan and her associates. Transcripts of those interviews were then coded by the principal investigator using the Coding Schemes and the

Coding Manual developed by Gilligan associate, Nona Lyons (1982).

In addition to the principal investigator, two additional, independent scorers coded 10 of the interviews. Using additional scorers to code one-half of the interviews was consistent with Lyons' methodology in developing the Manual for Real Life Dilemmas (1982).

The two additional scorers were student services practitioners who received 3 hours of moral development training. The training session included practice using the Lyons' Coding Schemes to interpret real-life moral dilemmas. Of the 20 students interviewed, one-half were males and one-half were females. Half of the males and half of the females were African-American. The other half were Caucasian.

During the summer, fall, and spring semesters of the 1992-93 academic year, the researcher visited classes and student club/organizational meetings at a mid-sized state college in order to recruit volunteers for the study. Six classroom presentations were made to classes in the psychology, sociology, and American studies departments. The following clubs and student organizations also received visits from the principal investigator: Student Government Association; Inter-Greek Council; African Peoples Organization; Pre-Law Society; and the Resident Hall Association. Resident Assistants, Safety Aides, and Judicial Board members were also recruited during their respective training periods. As a result of those classroom and

organizational presentations, over 40 interviews with student volunteers were tape recorded. Eventually, a 20-person sample, comprised of equal numbers of males/females and blacks/whites, was selected.

Data Collection

Data were collected during the interviews using the Interview Protocol developed by Gilligan, Langdale, and Lyons (1982) and which appears in Appendix C. Data collection from an open-ended interview, conducted in a clinical manner, is derived from Piaget (1929/1979) and was successfully used by Kohlberg in his moral development research. Gilligan's research (1982) adapted Kohlberg's use of this hermeneutic, cognitive-structural approach.

Interviews with subjects in the study proceeded from the structured questions listed on the Interview Protocol in Appendix C to a more unstructured exploration and clarification of each person's responses. This procedure was also used by Gilligan in her research. The interview questions were designed to illuminate how the individual constructed his/her own reality and meaning. In this case, the experience of self in the domain of morality (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Participants also completed a Participant Descriptive Survey (Appendix B), which was designed for this study and which was used to elicit descriptive information about each participant.

Data from the interviews were then analyzed for the subject's moral orientation and mode of self-definition using

considerations identified in their accounts of real life moral dilemmas. Participants' interviews were coded using the Lyons' Coding Manual (1982). The Coding Scheme used to code subjects' Mode of Self-Definition is found in Appendix D. Appendix E shows the Coding Scheme used in coding "Considerations of Response" (an Ethic of Care) and "Considerations of Rights" (an Ethic of Justice). Categorizing a subject's considerations as either Response (Care) or Rights (Justice) was the critical step in determining their moral orientation.

Subjects could be assigned to one of five moral orientation categories identified by Gilligan and Attannuci (1988) based upon their codable considerations. Those five categories to which subjects were assigned based upon their codable considerations were: CARE ONLY; CARE FOCUS; CARE/JUSTICE; JUSTICE FOCUS; and JUSTICE ONLY.

Subject whose real-life moral dilemmas contained codable considerations which were only Care or Justice were assigned to the CARE ONLY or JUSTICE ONLY category. A dilemma which consisted of 75% or more, Care or Justice considerations would be labeled CARE FOCUS or JUSTICE FOCUS appropriately. A subject who presented both Care and Justice considerations, but with neither orientation accounting for 75%, was placed in the CARE/JUSTICE category.

In this study, subjects who were in the CARE/JUSTICE category because their considerations were neither 75% Care or 75% Justice, nonetheless leaned heavily towards a Care or

Justice orientation. In other words, a subject in this category (CARE/JUSTICE) might present considerations in their real-life dilemma 70% of which were coded as Care or 66% as Justice. In order to reflect this propensity towards usirg an Ethic of Care or an Ethic of Justice, subjects classified as being in the CARE/JUSTICE category were noted as follows in the tables which reported results.

CARE ONLY	CARE FOCUS	CARE/ JUSTICE	JUSTICE FOCUS	JUSTICE ONLY
		(3-Care heavy)		
		(2-Justice heavy)		

In all cases, subjects assigned to the CARE/JUSTICE category used considerations which were at least 66% Care (reported as Care heavy) or 66% Justice (reported as Justice heavy).

Statistical Analysis (Generalizability Theory and Chi-Square)

A fully crossed, three random facet, Decision study model was used to address the issue of interrater reliability. This analysis estimated the dependability of the scoring procedure used by the three raters in categorizing the moral orientation of the subjects in the study.

Data were analyzed first for moral orientation and then for mode of self-definition. Frequency of moral orientation was reported first in each of Gilligan's five categories;

CARE ONLY, CARE FOCUS, CARE/JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOCUS, and JUSTICE ONLY. Results were reported in terms of the study's two variables--gender and race. Data were then analyzed using the chi-square test at a 95% confidence level.

In this study, a significant chi-square indicated that the observed distribution of scores differed significantly from that expected in a random distribution. Thus, the statistic provided corroborating evidence that significant moral differences existed in the gender variable, beyond the parameters of chance. However, since the only significant difference was reported with a chi-square test which could not guarantee a stable result (limited sample size), no statistical verification of the study's qualitative results was obtained. Gilligan's research was not analyzed using any sort of statistical test.

Findings of the Study

The results of this study offer empirical verification of Gilligan's hypothesis that two distinctly different ways of constructing and resolving moral questions exist. As demonstrated by this research, both an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice were found to exist in a sample of traditionally-aged, full-time undergraduate college students. Gilligan's assertion that moral orientation was gender-related was reconfirmed in this study for white students.

In this study, more females than males (60%) used an Ethic of Care. Black females and white females primarily used an Ethic of Care. While 80% of the white males used an

Ethic of Justice, 80% of the black males used an Ethic of Care. Based on the findings of this study, the following statements about the moral orientation of the study's subjects can be made.

1. Two distinct moral orientations--an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Justice were found in the real-life moral dilemmas of 20 college students.

2. Significantly more females than males (60%) used an Ethic of Care.

3. More males than females used an Ethic of Justice (50%).

4. Males in the sample were evenly split between using an Ethic of Care (50%) and an Ethic of Justice (50%).

5. More black students used an Ethic of Care (70%) than an Ethic of Justice.

6. More white students (60%) used an Ethic of Justice than an Ethic of Care.

7. Black females and white females demonstrated similar patterns, with three Care and two Justice orientations in both groups.

8. Many more white males used an Ethic of Justice (80%) than did black males.

9. Many more black males used an Ethic of Care (80%) than did white males.

Gilligan's second and third hypotheses; (2) there are two distinct modes of self-definition (a Connected Self and a Separate/Objective Self), and that (3) modes of self-

definition and moral orientation are related were not reaffirmed in this study. No evidence of two completely different ways of defining the self was found. Attempts to identify codable considerations regarding two modes of self-definition were unsuccessful by all three scorers.

Three major themes emerged from a qualitative analysis of the data in this study. Two of those themes function as a corollary to, and further elaboration of, the empirical results previously discussed. The first theme which emerged was a reaffirmation of Gilligan's thesis that moral problems are construed, resolved, and evaluated in completely different ways by those operating from the two ethics.

The second theme which emerged emphasized another quantitative finding--specifically, that Gilligan's assumption of gender-relatedness to moral orientation was reconfirmed, in this study, for white students only. Finally, the influence of television as a critical feature of moral decision-making emerged after analyzing the real-life moral dilemmas of the subjects in the study.

Implications of the Findings

The philosophical framework of Responsible Altruism detailed in Chapter 2 was offered in an attempt to begin the dialogue necessary for the development of a comprehensive philosophical model which would implement Gilligan's theory. It is hoped that this original philosophical work will prompt an examination, analysis, and refinement of this precursor to a model by practicing moral philosophers. This would be a

small step forward in the quest for viable philosophical models of morality which can be applied to the very real moral questions which daily confront an ever more complicated world.

This study has produced empirical evidence which can contribute to the growing sense of agreement that two distinct moral voices exist. In this study, as in Gilligan's research, moral orientation was also gender-related, but, only for white students. However, there is still disagreement about the gender-relatedness of these two moral orientations. Ford and Lowery (1986), Moon (1987), and Nunner-Winkler (1984) found no significant differences between men's and women's tendencies to use Justice versus Care orientations.

Bollerud (1987), Atunzo (1986), Gilligan and Attannuci (1988), as well as Rodger (1990), did uncover gender-relatedness to moral orientation. Thus, this study adds to the growing debate on this aspect of moral orientation, because while white students exhibited gender-relatedness to moral orientation, black students (specifically black males) did not. The implication of this finding leads to speculation about other ethnic groups which will only be answered by additional moral research with race as a focus.

Affirmation of the importance of using real-life dilemmas is an important result of this study. As demonstrated in Chapter 4 of this work, moral problems are constructed differently in an Ethic of Justice and an Ethic

of Care. Therefore, one implication from this study is that a research methodology which allows people to constuct moral problems themselves, instead of being forced to use hypothetical dilemmas, is important if an accurate assessment of moral orientation is to take place. Gilligan's labor intensive methodology, replicated in this study, does, however, limit in a practical sense the sample size. As demonstrated in this study, a limited sample size reduces the viability of statistical analysis such as chi-squares. However, the use of more sophisticated statistical analysis like generalizability theory can be successfully used with the sort of data derived from this study, as detailed in Chapter 4.

New instruments to measure moral orientation, like Liddell's Measure of Moral Orientation (1990), while attempting to examine the relationship between gender and orientation do not remain faithful to one of the core beliefs of Gilligan's research. Liddell's Measure of Moral Orientation resorts to a set of 10 preconstructed moral dilemmas. While the lure of standardized, prefabricated dilemmas are infinitely easier to administer and score, this approach loses the ability to code nuances in the construction of moral dilemmas which offer valuable clues as to true orientation. Thus, one implication from this study is a cautionary signal to researchers eager to exchange the open-ended clinical interview for the less difficult standardized paper and pencil instrument.

As noted by Liddell, Halpin, and Halpin (1993), the growing body of research on moral orientation has numerous implications for student services professionals. Historically, administrators have established rules and procedures deeply rooted in the Kohlbergian tradition. That is, policy and practice were shaped by attention to fairness, equality, rights, and most importantly, Justice. The underlying assumption has been that the establishment and adherence to clearly identified rules and regulations was the best way to deal with the competing claims, needs, and inevitable conflicts between individuals.

Perhaps the most powerful implication of the growing body of research on moral orientation, of which this study is a part, is a challenge to that underlying assumption which has governed administrators and the institutions they served. Liddell, Halpin, and Halpin (1993) make the point,

> our professions' adherence to the notion of justice, objectivity, and autonomy as institutional and developmental models belies an ethnocentrism that well may be foreign to many. In the search for a multicultural educational context, professionals might consider re-examining policies, organizational structure, and even the developmental models that guide us in order to uncover our unconscious commitment to Kohlbergian ideals. (p.143)

The Kohlbergian influenced policies and procedures administered daily by student services professionals clearly exclude a majority of women and some men. That approach also excludes, as indicated in this study, a majority of African-Americans as well.

Recommendations for Future Research

The first recommendation is for further philosophical research on the Responsible Altruist framework developed in this study. The hope is that moral philosophers find enough significance in the framework to begin the sort of deconstruction necessary to distill any worthwhile contributions. Since the Responsible Altruist framework was developed by a practitioner and not a philosopher, perhaps other practitioners will undertake similar attempts. For the philosopher, further research is needed on how to apply Gilligan's theory to issues beyond the relationships of individuals. This is, at present, a very limiting aspect of Gilligan's work.

More use of Lyons' Coding Schemes and Manual will underscore their viability as a tool for those interested in moral development research. Further research should convince others that these are usable tools which allow for real-life dilemmas to be coded in a reliable and standard way.

The most interesting area of future research for the principal investigator will be research on the variable of race in moral orientation. Similar studies with larger, randomly selected samples of African-Americans will be important in determining if the results of this study hold true. In addition, the exploration of moral orientation in other ethnic groups should be an extremely exciting area of future research.

In short, despite the volumes of words written in response to Gilligan's theory, and the growing body of research on moral orientation, much more information about moral orientation is needed. It is not yet understood exactly what the Care and Justice orientations really represent, how to more easily identify them, or how to incorporate both in our understanding of morality. Further, it remains unclear, both to individuals or to society, how the world would change with an equal emphasis on Care, as well as Justice.

For college administrators the challenge is to develop viable methodologies as they attempt to create in residence halls, student governance activities, judicial boards, and organizational structures the "good society" as well as the "just society."

> [I think you will find differences between the men, but, not the women of the two races] . . . because the women of the two races had to overcome struggles as women first . . . it didn't matter the color or anything, they were just women . . . they were already interconnected being women.
>
> Subject #19

APPENDIX A
PERMISSION TO QUOTE/REPRODUCE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

PERMISSION TO QUOTE/REPRODUCE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

I (We), Nora Lyons, owners of the copyright of the work known as Lyons' Scoring Manual

hereby authorize Mary Lynn Williamson to use the following material as part of his/her thesis/dissertation to be submitted to the University of Florida.

Page	Inclusive Line Numbers	Passages to be Quoted/Reproduced
		1. Interview Protocol
		2. Coding Sheets
		3. Scoring Procedure

I (We) further extend this authorization to University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan for the purpose of reproducing and distributing microformed copies of the dissertation.

Nora Lyons

Signature of the Copyright Holder

Only as corrected for citation. See Tables attached for Table heading.

TABLE 1

Relationships* of Reciprocity and Relationships of Response
(LYONS ADOPTED/ADAPTED)

The Separate/Objective Self

Relationships are experienced in terms of	mediated through	and grounded in
RECIPROCITY	RULES	ROLES
between separate individuals that is, as a concern for others considering them as one would like to be considered, with objectivity and in fairness;	that maintain fairness and reciprocity in relationships;	which come from duties of obligation and committment.

The Connected Self

Relationships are experienced as	mediated through	and grounded in
RESPONSE TO OTHERS IN THEIR OWN TERMS	THE ACTIVITY OF CARE	INTERDEPENDENCE
that is, as a concern for the good of others or for the alleviation of their burdens, hurt, or suffering (physical, or psychological);	which maintains and sustains caring and connection in relationships;	which comes from recognition of the interconnectness of people.

*Relationships are the ways of being with or towards others that all individuals experience but that may be understood in either of two ways.

**Table cited from Lyons, N. P. (1983). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality, HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, VOL. 53 NO 2, MAY 1983. ~~In Gilligan, C., Ward, J.V., & Taylor, J.M. (Eds.) Mapping the moral domain (p. 32). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.~~

TABLE 2

The Relationship of Conceptions of Self and Morality to Considerations Made in Real-Life Moral Choice: An Overview

(LYONS (ORIGINALIZATION))

A Morality of Justice

Individuals	tend to use a	moral problems	considering:	and evaluated considering:
defined as SEPARATE/ OBJECTIVE in RELATION to OTHERS: see others as one would like to be seen by them, in objectivity and	morality of JUSTICE as FAIRNESS that rests on an understanding of RELATIONSHIPS as RECIPROCITY between separate individuals grounded in the duty and and obligation of their roles;	are generally construed as issues, especially decisions, of conflicting claims between self and others (including society); resolved by invoking impartial rules, principles, or standards;	(1)one's role-related obligations, duty, or commitments; (2)standards, rules,or principles for self, others, or society; including reciprocity, that is, fairness- how one should treat another considering how one would like to be treated if in their place;	(1)how decisions are thought about and justified; or (2)whether values, principles, or standards are (were) maintained, especially fairness.

A Morality of Response and Care

Individuals	tend to use a	Moral problems	considering:	and evaluated considering:
defined as CONNECTED in RELATION to OTHERS: see others in their own situations and contexts;	morality of care that rests on an understanding of RELATIONSHIPS as RESPONSE to ANOTHER in their own terms;	are generally construed as issues of relationships or of response, that is how to respond to others in their particular terms; resolved through the activity of care;	(1)maintaining relationships and response that is, the connections of interdependent individuals to one another; or (2)promoting the welfare of others or preventing their harm; or relieving the burdens, hurt, or suffering (physical or psychological) of others;	(1)what happened/ will happen, or how things worked out; or (2)whether relationships were/are maintained or restored.

Harvard Educational Review, Vol 53, No 2, May 0

* Lyons, N.P. (1983). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality, ~~In Gilligan, C., Ward, J.V., & Taylor, J.M. (Eds.) Mapping the moral domain (p. 33). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.~~

APPENDIX B
PARTICIPANT DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY

PARTICIPANT DESCRIPTIVE SURVEY

Name_____ Phone_____

Address_____ SS#_____

_____

1. Age: _____

2. College hours earned: _____

3. Current cumulative grade point average: _____

4. College classification: _____

5. Academic major: _____

6. Race (African-American or Caucasian): _____

7. Gender: _____

8. First generation college student? _____

9. Number of siblings: _____

10. Approximate income of family: _____

11. Receive financial aid? Please circle all those which apply.

    PELL Stafford Loan SLS PLUS TAP

    Work Study Other (identify): _____

12. Hometown: _____

APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

1. Real-Life Moral Dilemma:

   A. Have you ever been in a situation of moral conflict where you had to make a decision, but, weren't sure what the right thing to do was?

   B. Could you describe the situation?

   C. What were the conflicts for you in that situation?

   D. What did you do?

   E. Do you think it was the right thing to do?

   F. How do you know?

2. Self-description Data:

   A. How would you describe yourself?

   B. Is the way you describe yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the past?

   C. If you see change, how would you account for that?

3. General questions throughout the intervie

   A. What does morality mean to you?

   B. What makes something a moral problem for you?

   C. When responsibility to self and others conflict, how should one choose?

APPENDIX D

A SCHEME FOR CODING RESPONSES TO THE "DESCRIBE YOURSELF" QUESTION USED TO DETERMINE MODE OF SELF-DEFINITION

A SCHEME FOR CODING RESPONSES TO THE "DESCRIBE YOURSELF" QUESTION USED TO DETERMINE MODE OF SELF-DEFINITION

1. General and Factual
   - A. General factual
   - B. Physical characteristics
   - C. Identifying activities
   - D. Social status

2. Abilities and Agency
   - A. General ability
   - B. Agency
   - C. Physical abilities
   - D. Intellectual abilities

3. Psychological
   - A. Interests (likes/dislikes)
   - B. Traits/dispositions
   - C. Beliefs, values
   - D. pre-occupations

4. Relational Component
   - A. Connected in relation to others:
     1. Have relationships (relationships are there)
     2. Abilities in relationships (make, sustain, to care, to do things for others)
     3. Traits/dispositons in relationships (help others)
     4. Concern: for the good of another in <u>their</u> terms
     5. Pre-occupations: with doing good for another, with <u>how</u> to do good
   - B. Separate/objective in relation to others:
     1. Have relationships (relationships part of obligations/ committment, instrumental)
     2. Abilities in relationships (skill in interacting with others)
     3. Traits/dispositions in relationships (act in reciprocity, live up to duty/obligation, committment, fairness)
     4. Concern (for others in light of principles, values, beliefs, or general good of society)
     5. Pre-occupations (with doing good for society, with <u>whether</u> to do good for others)

SUMMARY STATEMENTS

SELF-EVALUATING COMMENTARY
- A. In self's terms
- B. In self in relation to others
  1. Connected Self
  2. Separate/objective Self

APPENDIX E

A SCHEME FOR CODING CONSIDERATIONS OF RESPONSE AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RIGHTS USED TO DETERMINE MORAL ORIENTATION (RESPONSE = CARE, RIGHTS = JUSTICE)

A SCHEME FOR CODING CONSIDERATIONS OF RESPONSE AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RIGHTS USED TO DETERMINE MORAL ORIENTATION (RESPONSE = CARE, RIGHTS = JUSTICE)

1. The Construction of the Problem

   A. Considerations of Response (Care)
      1. General effects to others (unelaborated)
      2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships, or response to another considering interdependence
      3. Welfare/well-being of another (the aboidance of conflict, or the alleviation of another's burden/hurt suffering- physical or psychological)
      4. Considers the "situation over the principle"
      5. Considers care of self, care of self vs. care of others

   B. Considerations of Rights (Justice)
      1. General effects to self (unelaborated including "trouble" or how to decide
      2. Obligations, duty, or committments
      3. Standards, rules, or principles for self or society
      4. Considers the "principle vs/over the situation"
      5. Considers that others have their own contexts

2. The Resolution of the Problem

   A. Considerations of Response (Care)
      1. General effects to others (unelaborated)
      2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships, or response to another considering interdependence
      3. Welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of conflict, or the alleviation of another's burden/hurt/suffering-physical or psychological
      4. Considers the "situation vs./over the principle"
      5. Considers care of self, care of self vs./care of others

   B. Considerations of Rights (Justice)
      1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including "trouble" "decision")
      2. Obligations, duty, or committments
      3. Standards, rules, or principles for self or society, or considers fairness, that is, how one would like to be treated if in the others' place
      4. Considers the "principle vs./over the situation"
      5. Considers that others have their own contexts

3. The Evaluation of the Resolution

   A. Considerations of Response (Care)
      1. What happened/how things worked out
      2. Whether relationships were maintained/restored

   B. Considerations of Rights (Justice)
      1. How decided/thought about/justified
      2. Whether values/standards/principles maintained

APPENDIX F
FORMULAE AND CALCULATIONS USED FOR GENERALIZABILITY COEFFICIENT

FORMULAE AND CALCULATIONS USED FOR
GENERALIZABILITY COEFFICIENT

The generalizability coefficient is the ratio of universe score variance ($\hat{\sigma}^2(')$) to total score variance. The total score variance is the sum of universe score variance ($\hat{\sigma}^2(t)$) and error variance ($\hat{\sigma}^2(\delta)$). Therefore, the formula for the generalizability coefficient is shown as:

$$\hat{P}^2 = \hat{\sigma}^2(t) \Big/ \left[\hat{\sigma}^2(t) + \hat{\sigma}^2(\delta) \right]$$

The numerator in the equation shown above represents the universe score variance. This is the variance due to the object of measurement (the subject) $\hat{\sigma}^2$ (s). Therefore, in this study ($\hat{\sigma}^2(t) = (\hat{\sigma}^2(s))$ which has been estimated at 0.00994 (see Table 5). The denominator in the equation above adds this component plus the error score variance ($\hat{\sigma}^2(\delta)$). The equation for determining error score variance ($\hat{\sigma}^2(\delta)$) in a fully crossed, three-random-facet design is:

$$\hat{\sigma}^2(\delta) = \hat{\sigma}^2({}_sR) + \hat{\sigma}^2({}_sO) + \hat{\sigma}^2({}_sRO)$$

In order to solve this equation for the error score variance, the three variance components included in the source table (Table 5) and which are designated by lower case letters, must be converted into variance components used in a D study. These components used in a D study are designated by upper case letters. The formulae for those conversions are shown as follows, with n' (r) as the number of raters, and n' (o) as the number of observations.

$$\hat{\sigma}^2({}_sR) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(sr)}{n'o}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}^2({}_sO) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(so)}{n'r}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}^2({}_sRO) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(sro)}{n'r \quad n'o}$$

The equations were then solved as follows:

$$\hat{\sigma}^2({}_sR) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(sr)}{n'o} = \frac{.00300}{40} = .00075$$

$$\hat{\sigma}^2({}_sO) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(so)}{n'r} = \frac{.01654}{3} = .005133$$

$$\hat{\sigma}^2({}_sRO) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(sro)}{n'r \quad n'o} = \frac{.07457}{(40)\,(3)} = \frac{.07457}{120} = .00062158$$

Now that the components for calculating error score variance have been converted into variance components used in a D study, the genralizability coefficent equation is shown as:

$$\hat{P}^2 = \hat{\sigma}^2(t) \Big/ \hat{\sigma}^2(t) + \underbrace{\hat{\sigma}^2(\delta)}_{\text{error variance}}$$

$$\hat{P}^2 = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(s)}{\hat{\sigma}^2(s) + \underbrace{[\hat{\sigma}^2(sR) + \hat{\sigma}^2({}_sO) + \hat{\sigma}^2(sRO)]}_{\text{error variance}}}$$

$$\hat{P}^2 = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(s)}{\hat{\sigma}^2(s) + (.00075) + (.005133) + (.00062158)}$$

$$\hat{P}^2 = \frac{.00994}{.00994 + .00075 + .005133 + .00062158}$$

$$\hat{P}^2 = \frac{.00994}{.01576988}$$

$$\hat{P}^2 = .63$$

APPENDIX G
INFORMATION ON THE LYONS SCORING PROCEDURE AND MANUAL

INFORMATION ON THE LYONS SCORING PROCEDURE AND MANUAL

The scoring procedure and Coding Schemes used in coding the real life moral dilemmas of subjects in this study are those developed by Nona Lyons. Lyons developed and detailed this scoring procedure, the Coding Schemes, and the Manual for Coding Real-Life Moral Dilemmas in her 1982 doctoral dissertation at Harvard University. Microfilm copies of that dissertaion are available through the Harvard library. The citation for the dissertation is shown below.

Lyons, N. (1982). Conceptions of self and morality and modes of moral choice: Identifying justice and care in judgments of actual moral choice. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard University.

REFERENCES

Ackley, T. E. (1976). Moral thought and argument in education (Doctoral dissertation, University of Florida, 1975). Dissertations Abstracts International, 37, 4304A

Arendt, H. (1971). The life of the mind: One/thinking. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Aristotle. (1925). The works of Aristotle (W. D. Ross, Trans. & Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Baier, A. C. (1987). Hume, the woman's moral theorist? In E. F. Kittay & D. T. Meyers (Eds.), Women and moral theory (pp.37-55). New Brunswick, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Baumrind, D. (1985). Sex differences in moral reasoning: Response to Walker's (1984) conclusion that there are none. Child Development, 57, 511-521.

Bellah, R., Madson, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. (1985). Habits of the heart. New York: Harper & Row.

Best, J. W. (1981). Research in education. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Blum, L. Q. (1980). Friendship, altruism, and morality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bowie, N. (1985). Making ethical decisions. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Brabeck, M. (1983). Moral judgment: Theory and research of differences between males and females. Developmental Review, 3, 274-291.

Broughton, J. M. (1983). Women's rationality and men's virtues: A critique of gender dualism in Gilligan's theory of moral development. Social Research, 50(3), 597-642.

Butler, J. (1950). Fifteen sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Carter, R. (1986). Does Kohlberg avoid relativism? In S. Modgil & C. Modgil (Eds.), Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and controversy (pp. 9-20). Philadelphia: The Falmer Press, Taylor & Francis Inc.

Chickering, A. (1969). Education and Identity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Chodorow, N. (1974). Family structure and feminine personality. In M. Zimbalist-Rosaldo & L. Lampere (Eds.), Women, culture, and society (pp. 412-467). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Chodorow, N. (1978). The reproduction of mothering. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cohen, E. R. (1982). Using the defining issues test to assess stages of moral development among sorority and fraternity members. The Journal of College Student Personnel, 23(4), 324-328.

Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., & Lieberman, M. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monograph of the Society of Research in Child Development, 48(4), 111-134.

Dalton, J. (1982). Student development and values education. NASPA Journal, 20(1), 3-46.

Delworth, U., & Seeman, D. (1984). The ethics of care: Implications of Gilligan for the student services profession. Journal of College Student Personnel, 25(6), 489-492.

Dewey, J. (1922). Human nature and conduct. New York: Random House, Inc.

Dewey, J., & Tufts, J. (1936). Ethics. New York: Henry Holt & Co.

Dickey, B., Kroll, B., & Jenkins, L. (1987, November). Gilligan revisited: Methodological issues in the study of gender and moral development. Paper presented at the National Convention of the Speech Communication Association, Boston, MA.

Durant, W. (1961). The story of philosophy. New York: Washington Square Press.

Gilligan, C. (1977). In a different voice: Women's conception of self and morality. Harvard Education Review, 47(4), 480-517.

Gilligan, C. (1980). Moral development in the college years. In A. Chickering (Ed.), The modern american college. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982b). New maps of development: New visions of maturity. American Journal of Orthopsychiatrist, 52(2), 199-212.

Gilligan, C. (1987). Gender difference and morality: The empirical base. In E. F. Kittay & D. T. Meyers (Eds.), Women and moral theory (pp. 19-33). Patterson, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gilligan, C., & Attanucci, J. (1988). Two moral orientations: Gender differences and similarities. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 34(3), 223-37.

Gilligan, C., & Attanucci, J. (1989). Two moral orientations. In Gilligan, C., Ward, J., & Taylor, J. (Eds.), Mapping the moral domain (pp.73-86). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C., Langdale, S., & Lyons, N. (1982). The contribution of women's thought to developmental theory: The elimination of sex-bias in moral development theory and research. Final report to the National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C.

Gilligan, C., & Murphy, J. (1979). Development from adolescence to adulthood: The philosopher and the dilemma of the fact. In D. Kuhn (Ed.), Intellectual development beyond childhood. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Gilligan, C., Ward, J. V., & Taylor, J. M. (Eds.). (1989). Mapping the moral domain. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gouinlock, J. (Ed.). (1976). The moral writings of John Dewey. New York: Hafner Press.

Haan, N., Brewster-Smith, M., & Block, J. (1968). Moral reasoning of young adults: Political-social behavior, family background, and personality correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10(3), 183-201.

Haan, N., Langer, J., & Kohlberg, L. (1976). Family patterns of moral reasoning. Child Development, 47, 51-61.

Haan, N. (1977). Coping and defending: Processes of self-enviornmental organization. New York: Academic Press.

Haan, N. (1985). With regard to Walker (1984) on sex differences in moral reasoning. Unpublished manuscript. University of California, Berkeley: Institute of Human Development.

Habermas, J. (1983). Interpretive social science vs. hermeneuticism. In N. Haan, R. Ballah, P. Rabinow, & W. Sullivan (Eds.), Social science as moral inquiry (pp. 129-156). New York: Columbial University Press.

Hare, R. (1963). Freedom and reason. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hill, T. E. (1987). The importance of autonomy. In E. F. Kittay & D. T. Meyers (Eds.), Women and moral theory. (pp. 129-138). New Brunswick, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

Holstein, C. (1976). Irreversible, stepwise sequence in the development of moral judgment: A longitudinal study of males and females. Child Development, 47, 51-61.

Hotelling, K., & Forrest, L. (1985). Gilligan's theory of sex role development: A perspective for counseling. Journal of Counseling and Development, 64(3), 183-186.

Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries. (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, Eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, Eds.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hume, D. (1985). Essays moral, political, and literary (E. F. Millar, Ed.). Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

James, W. (1983). Cited in Habermas, J. (1983). Interpretive social science vs. hermeneuticism. In N. Haan, R. Ballah, P. Rabinow, & W. Sullivan (Eds.), Social science as moral inquiry (pp. 129-156). New York: Columbial University Press.

Kant, I. (1925). Fundamental principles of the metaphysic of ethics. (T. K. Abbott, Trans.). London: Longmanss, Green, and Co.

Kant, I. (1938). Fundamental principles of the metaphysic of ethics (O. Manthey-Zorn, Trans.). New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc.

Kant, I. (1949). Fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals (T. K. Abbott, Trans.). New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.

Kant, I. (1949b). Critique of practical reason and other writings in moral philosophy. (L. W. Beck, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kant, I. (1957). Perpetual Peace (L. W. Beck, Trans.). New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.

Kant, I. (1964). The doctrine of virtue: Part II of the metaphysic of morals. (M. J. Gregor, Trans.) New York: Harper & Row.

Kant, I. (1965). The categorical imperative (H. J. Paton, Trans.). London: Hutchinson & Co.

Kant, I. (1965b). Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime. (J. T. Goldthwait, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kant, I. (1965c). The metaphysical elements of justice: Part I of the metaphysics of morals. (J. Ladd, Trans.). Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.

Kerber, L., Greeno, C., Maccoby, E., Luria, Z., Stack, C., & Gilligan, C. (1986). On *In A Different Voice*: An interdisciplinary forum. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 11(21), 305-333.

Kerlinger, F. (1964). Foundations of behavioral research. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc.

Kimbrough, R. B. (1985). Ethics: A course of study for educational leaders. Arlington, VA: American Association of School Administrators.

Kitchener, K. (1986). Teaching applied ethics in counselor education: An integration of psychological processes and philsophical analysis. The Journal of Counseling and Development, 64, 347-480.

Kittay, E. F., & Meyers, D. T. (Eds.). (1987). Women and moral theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Knefelkamp, L., Widlick, C., & Parker, C. (Eds.). (1978). Applying new developmental findings. New Directions for Student Services. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Kohlberg, L. (1958). The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years ten to sixteen. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Chicago.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive developmental appproach to socialization. In D. Goslin (Ed.), The Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (pp. 125-253). Chicago: Rand McNally.

Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (pp. 151-235). New York: Academic Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: The nature and validity of moral stages. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L., & Gilligan, C. (1971). The adolescent as a philosopher: The discovery of the self in a post-conventional world. Daedalus, 100, 1051-1086.

Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., & Hewer, A. (1983). Moral stages: A current formulation and a response to critics. Basel, Switzerland: Karger.

Langdale, S., & Gilligan, C. (1980). The contribution of women's thought to developmental psychology. Interim Report submitted to the National Institute of Education.

Liddel, D., Halpin, G., & Halpin, W. (1983). Men, women, and moral orientation: Accounting for our differences. NASPA Journal, 30(2), 138-144.

Lloyd, G. (1983). Reason, gender, and morality in the history of philosophy. Social Research, 50,(3), 491-511.

Locke, D. (1986). A psychologist among the philosophers: Philosophical aspects of Kohlberg's theories. In Modgil, S. & Modgil, C. (Eds.), Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and controversy (pp. 21-38). Philadelphia: The Falmer Press, Taylor & Francis Inc.

Lyons, N. (1982). Conceptions of self and morality and modes of moral choice: Identifying justice and care in judgments of actual moral dilemmas. Dissertation Abstracts International. Harvard University.

Lyons, N. (1983). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality. Harvard Educational Review, 53(2), 125-145.

Lyons, N. P. (1989). Two perspectives: On self, relationships, and morality. In Gilligan, C., Ward, J. V., & Taylor, J. M. (Eds.), Mapping the moral domain. (pp. 73-86). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McBee, M. (1980). The values development dilemma. In M. L. McBee (Ed.), Rethinking college responsibilities for values (pp. 121-132). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

McBee, M. (1982). Moral development: From direction to dialogue. NASPA Journal, 20, 30-35.

Modgil, S., & Modgil, C. (Eds.). (1986). Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and controversy. Philadelphia: The Falmer Press, Taylor & Francis, Inc.

Murdoch, I. (1970). The sovereignty of good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Murphy, J., & Gilligan, C. (1980). Moral development in late adolescence and adulthood: A critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. Human Development, 23(2), 77-104.

Niebuhr, H. R. (1963). The responsible self. New York: Harper & Row.

Nisan, M., & Kohlberg, L. (1982). Universality and cross-cultural variation in moral development: A longitudinal and cross-sectional study in Turkey. Child Development, 53, 865-876.

Perelman, C. (1965). An historical introduction to philosophical thinking (K. A. Brown, Trans.). New York: Random House.

Piaget, J. (1966). The moral judgment of the child. New York: The Free Press.

Pirakh, B. (1980). Development of moral judgment and its relation to family environment factors in Indian and American families. Child Development, 51, 1030-1039.

Rest, J. (1979). Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis.

Rest, J., Masanz, J., Coder, R., Cooper, D., & Anderson, D. (1974). Judging the important issues in moral dilemmas --an objective measure of development. Developmental Psychology, 4, 491-501.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rudolph, F. (1962). The American college and university. New York: Knopf.

Sandel, M. J. (1982). Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scarr, S. (1988). Race and gender as psychological variables. American Psychologist, 43(1), 56-59.

Seib, G. (1980). The teaching of ethics in higher education. A report by the Hastings Center. Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences.

Sichel, B. A. (1985). Women's moral development in search of philosophical assumptions. Journal of Moral Education, 14(3), 149-161.

Smith, A. (1978). Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive stage theory of the development of moral judgment. In C. A. Parker, et al. (Eds.), Applying new developmental findings (pp. 342-366). New Directions for Student Services, 4, 53-65.

Smith, M., & Glass, G. (1987). Research and evaluation in education and the social sciences. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Snarey, J., Reimer, J., & Kohlberg, L. (1985.). Development of social-moral reasoning among kibbutz adolescents: A longitudinal cross-cultural study. Developmental Psychology, 21(1), 3-17.

Soloman, R. (1976). The passions: The myth and nature of human emotions. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Vasudev, J. (1988). Sex differences in morality and moral orientation: A discussion of the Gilligan and Attanucci study. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 34(3), 239-244.

Walker, L. (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review. Child Development, 55, 677-691.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Mary Lynn Williamson was born in 1952 at Ft. Polk, Louisiana. She holds a B.A. in speech and journalism education (1974) from Northwestern State University, located in Natchitoches, Louisiana. She also received two graduate degrees from Northwestern; a M.A. in student personnel services (1977), and a M.Ed. in counseling and guidance (1978).

She has held a variety of student affairs positions at Arkansas Tech University, Tulane University, the University of Florida, and SUNY College at Old Westbury. She is currently the Vice President for Student Services at Henderson State University in Arkadelphia, Arkansas.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

James L. Wattenbarger, Chair
Distinguished Service Professor of
Educational Leadership

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

C. Arthur Sandeen, Cochair
Professor of Educational Leadership

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

David Honeyman
Associate Professor of Educational
Leadership

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

James Pitts
Assistant Professor of Counselor
Education

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the College of Education and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 1994

David E. Smith

Dean, College of Education

Dean, Graduate School